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The issues concerning birth and death often occur in the available literature, 
in books on “applied ethics" or in essays on "bioethics". This suggests ethics is 
already constituted and that afterwards the question will be to see how ethics 
“applies" to those matters. The present book aims to drastically break this usual 
expositive mold: birth and death are part, as it will be seen, of the very theoretical 
structure of ethics, of its constitution as such, not as “mere applications” that could 
be made or not. This work argues ethics has been constituted on the basis of not 
explicit answers, of fundamental character, given to these two issues: birth and 
death. 
 
Someone once considered the Introduction to formal logic of the Spanish 
Thinker Alfredo Deaño as "logic for children." In some ways, I wish this book will be 
considered an "ethics for children." Indeed, the questions - often exasperating – 
this work rises, are the basic questions of life that usually appear in the stubborn 
and monotonous questions of kids: Why are we here?, Why should we live?, Why 
do we have to die?, Why may be not kill our family?, Why should we love our 
parents?, Why not kill ourselves?, Why have we been brought to the world?, etc., 
and these questions are raised here exactly with the same innocent cruelty of 
children. That will no doubt infuriate the “adult” ethicists who promptly want to 
surpass the stage of the children‟s questions and to analyze “the serious moral 
crisis of our time”, the political, ecological, diplomatic, military subjects. These 
"adult" issues do not interest children and they are not interesting for the present 
book either. Philosophers and poets share with the child the unbearable conviction 
life is a badly told story, and that no "big issue" newspapers talk about and the 
more powerful countries of the world discuss will be able to extinguish the 
disturbing flames of Origin. In this sense, the child has his own maturity. All the 
“naive” and childish spirit this book could transmit is strictly intentional precisely 
because one of its main points is that jumping directly to those “great ethical issues 
of our time”, ignoring the original problems, is one of the basic features of the lack 
of moral sense of our time, and maybe of all times. 
 
Nor do I mean to say something particularly "profound" or "interesting" about 
my questions, but only to expose what appears as true to rational argument and 
unquiet moral sensibility. The idea truth must be "profound" and "interesting" is 
strangely uncritical. If truth is superficial, irritating and banal - as the relations 
between truth and death suggest - this book will inevitably be superficial, irritating 
and banal. As jugglers, writers and directors of horror films, philosophers have 
always tried to “surprise” their readers, telling them something new and never 
heard; and their best procedure has been questioning of the obvious: they have 
tried to demonstrate the world we see does not exist, that the other humans may 
be robots, that we have no images in our minds, that there are no intentions in our 
actions, that we do not  make representations of things, that our expressions have 
no meaning, and that it is not true that if I push a billiard ball with my finger, my 
action has been the cause of the movement of the ball.  
 
Philosophies seem to assume the obligation of saying something different, 
extraordinarily interesting and strongly counter-intuitive, and whoever fails falls 
under the stigma of banality, and listeners move to another place where they could 
be told "something they do not already know".  As if philosophical astonishment 
would be lost and replaced by mere surprise. Philosophers seem to have lost the 
ability to hear "the same", the ability of re-position, and think that truth must 
necessarily move, change its skin, shining in different stances. As if the dynamics 
of truth would be confused with the dynamics of life. It is part of the vivacity of life 
to keep incessantly feeding with "the new", but we do not need to think of truth as a 
stimulus to life. Why would not truth have a much greater affinity with the monotony 
of death than with the always renewed exuberance of life? This book has been 
written for those who are able to bear the irritating sound of a hammer hitting 
always on the same nail. All the "depth" of the book - whether it is even possible to 
be "deep" in radical philosophy - will be achieved through its banality and 
monotony, and the book does not aspire to any other deepness. 
 
Nor have I intended the book is, in Fernando Savater‟s words, particularly 
“innovative” or “revolutionary”, an impression which could be given by the 
deliberately radical character of the reflection. On the contrary, the intention is to 
show an uncommon way of visualizing morality that could be repetitive, insisting on 
the monotonous trivialities of human condition; a procedure far from any 
proclaimed “revolutionary” style of thinking. 
 
Writers and filmmakers have indeed lingered more in the monotony of human 
condition than philosophers. Artists seem more gifted for pointless repetitions than 
philosophers, who frequently felt obliged to assume the clarity and precision of 
science. But it is difficult for philosophers to make scientific philosophy and, at the 
same time, to say something relevant about the monotonous human condition, of 
which science knows little. The notion of "affirmative" criticized in this book shows, 
however, that under the current philosophical practices following the model of 
science, literary motivations are hidden in a sort of narrative impulse to tell moral 
(or moralist) tales where the heroine is moral law and the villains, skepticism, 
relativism and nihilism. Perhaps in the impossibility of philosophy to refrain from 
telling an "edifying" story to their readers - despite its professed scientific objectivity 
and universality – is concealed some kind of revenge of what is neither art, nor 
science nor philosophy, but religion. The "metaphysics of life" presented here in 
the form of a “natural ontology” aims to move away from scientific arbitrariness - 
whereby nothing is essentially linked to anything – as from religious fatalism, 
according to which, magically, everything is inextricably connected to everything. 
 
This type of subject also facilitates the temptation for ad hominem arguments. 
As it occurs with firearms, when someone handles ideas about life, death and 
suicide, he or she should take extreme care in their manipulation. With "mortal 
questions" happens the same thing as with "deadly weapons": when we have them 
in hand, we must “freeze”: never point a mortal idea to anyone, even unloaded. 
This book has not been written, for example, for those who, when we talk about 
morality of suicide, brutally snap: "Well, so why don‟t you commit suicide once and 
for all and leave us alone?" A book that tries to submit procreation to ethical 
questioning and argues for a possible morality of suicide may easily, in our type of 
society, be considered "nihilist", "pessimistic", "immoral", "destructive", 
“irresponsible”, “dangerous” and other labels disguising the laziness or fear of 
thinking the roots of life. This book, anyway, is not written by a nihilist, but by a 
radical moralist shocked by the familiarity with which we have come to accept 
manipulation of the other, in particular manipulation of newborns and cold 
elimination of the enemy in the organization of "fair wars", the stifling lack of 
freedom in our lives, monitored by health, legal and religious policies. Properly 
read, this is the book of a moralist who decided to lead moral reflection to the last 
consequences. If that strategy opens the way towards "nihilism," it will be 
something sensibly different from much of what has been called by that name 
throughout the history of thinking. 
 
The ethical approach presented here is “negative” only in a relative sense, 
and may be regarded as a counterproof – perhaps ad absurdum – of the 
Nietzschean account about the essential immorality of life, from two simultaneous 
angles: the unavoidable need to organize society on the basis of the destruction of 
others, and the impossibility of looking for a truth not compatible with indefinite self-
defense. Negative ethics is, at the same time, the ethics denied and omitted by all 
the others, the ethics capable of displaying the last roots of the structural difficulty 
of being ethical in a world like ours. 
 
The book also will have to struggle against academic tendencies of 
production of philosophical ideas, which requires that what has been thought 
should be properly “placed” in some of the geopolitical spaces of research, 
adopting a style, a jargon, a way to quote, a way to omit. Nowadays, a 
philosophical work may simply stop existing if it does not comply with some rules of 
appearance in the world of culture. I fear the present text totter on the edge of non-
existence, to the extent it is not a self-explanative work that does not fit within usual 
"professional" rhythms of exposing concepts. 
 
The idea of writing this book dates back to 1982. Between that year and 
1987, I collected texts, informal notes and stormy personal experiences. In 1987 – 
traveling from Marseille to Paris and back for six months – I began to develop a 
programmatic text on those issues, which I finally published in São Paulo with the 
title Project for a negative ethics, in 1990, being professor of ethics in the 
University of Brasília. The present book aims to be a more argumentative 
presentation of that project written in aphorisms. 
 
It is difficult to summarize here all that meant for my own ethical reflection the 
encounter - in the beginning of the 1980s - with the books of Fernando Savater on 
ethics and correlate issues. Despite my almost total disagreement with everything 
he affirms in ethics (particularly with regards to his very impossibility to conceive 
the negative except under the form of "nihilism"), the seduction his way of 
composing philosophy (and the musical term is not casual) has exerted on me has 
been far more decisive than any “agreement of ideas”. I also want to emphasize 
the intellectual hospitality of Javier Muguerza, Agapito Mestre and Santiago 
González Noriega during my stay in Madrid in 1991, and Cnpq of Brazil for having 
sponsored that stay through a scholarship of "post-doctorate." I would also like to 
remember the students of the "Mortal Group”, who discussed with me about these 
issues at the University of Brasilia during the year 1990. And my teacher of 








Addendum to the Foreword 
 
I am involved in the questions of birth, death and value of life since the eighties of 
the past century when I begin to collect the material for the Project of Negative 
Ethics. The Critique of Affirmative Morality appears at 1996 in Barcelona. From this 
time to the present I continued to make research in this area in numerous papers, 
articles and communications in congresses and meetings. I develop this line of 
research in Negative Ethics in many places of Brazil and other countries in Latin-
America. The stigma of not writing in English can condemn a lot of philosophical 
work to literal disappearance in present communities of discussion. This is the 
main objective of editing now an English translation of the Critique. This edition 
adds a commentary to David Benatar‟s book of 2006, whose positions concerning 
the same matters did not exist in the time of the publication of my book. Another 
epilogue is also added to the present edition containing a summary of Negative 
ethics and some recent issues on suicide. 
 
 
       Julio Cabrera 











































From the question on the sense of being to the question 
on its value. Value of being and oblivion. Ethics and 
ontology 
 
In this text, I intend to achieve a similar type of radical approach to the 
question on the value of being as the assumed in the purely “descriptive” ontology. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger has put the interrogation about the question of the 
sense of being, and he has insisted at various points in this work that the question 
is not a matter of valuating or of raising ethical issues. Thus, for example, 
Heidegger writes: "To the constitution of the being of 'Dasein' is inherent the fall... 
Dasein, being essentially decaying, is, because of the constitution of his very 
being, in 'falsity'. This term is used here ontologically, and the same with the word 
„fall‟. We must beware of any negative 'valuing‟ that would be ontic (referring to 
beings) on its analytic-existential use." (Sein und Zeit, § 44; my translation from 
German). I have a skepticism of principle about this supposed neutrality: contrarily 
to the warnings of the author, Being and Time leads to wonder if there is not 
always a necessary link between ethics and ontology, and therefore whether it is 
not a superficial and naïve statement to say that the analysis had given us "only" 
an ontology, so it "still owes us" an ethics.  
 
Regardless of what one can decide, in a more or less categorical way, about 
this connection in the specific case of Heidegger, I can say that, in the present 
book, I am interested on an evaluation of the world that takes into account the 
ontological clarifying of it in the light of the Daseinanalyse. Or saying in another 
way: what should be valuated when one asks about the value of the world are 
precisely those structures displayed in the existential analysis, that is, the being-in-
the-world of Dasein as such, and not the value of this or that intra-worldly being. 
Just as Dasein is the place where we ask about the sense of being, Dasein is also 
the place where we ask about its value. This results in a kind of radical ethics 
which, due to a historical juncture, takes the aspect of a “negative” ethics, in a 
sense that will become clear gradually. 
 
In the context of clamorous controversies about Heidegger's relations with 
Nazism, it has been said the way of ontology is closed to the ethical dimension, to 
the extent the thinking of being does not leave space for the must-be. There is no 
holzwege from ontology to ethics. I believe this point of view is based on first 
impressions, as it stays in a non-radical range of questioning. To the strict extent 
the valuing of being is done at a radical level – that is, literally, a valuing of being 
and not a mere pondering of intra-worldly beings -, ontology and ethics will appear 
inseparable. If Heideggerian fundamental ontology reveals, for example, death in 
the existential dimension of a being-towards-death, allowing to distinguish 
between, by one side, death as the most proper choice and, by the other, punctual 
death usually feared in the intra-worldly fear, it is unavoidable to derive, from this 
knowledge of being, an evaluative-ethical separation, very close to the one 
performed by Heidegger in the duality property/not-property. Heidegger uses the 
idea of a "proper death”, removed from daily “ontization” (to turn ontic), as 
fundamental illustration of the notion of a "proper existence" (Ibid., § 45). At this 
point, he recites again the presumed evaluative neutrality of his existential 
analysis. “… it falls outside the circle of an existential analysis of death what could 
be discussed under the title of a „metaphysics of death‟. The issues of how and 
when death „came into the world‟, what meaning it may and should have as evil 
and pain… presuppose… the ontological clarification of evil and negativity in 
general” (§49). 
 
But the thesis of neutrality and the "purely descriptive" character of the 
existential analysis seem untenable. The normative space is marked by the hiatus 
existing between the regular ontization of being in everyday life and its awaited 
"ontological recovery”. In the work, it is described, with sometimes apocalyptic 
colors, a situation of loss, of non authenticity, of vulgarization, depersonalization 
and anonymity that should be overcome by "something better". "Having lost and 
having still not won can only be, and in fact is, in its very essence, possible „proper‟ 
Dasein..." (§9). The irritated pejorative tunes with which Heidegger refers to the 
process of leveling and becoming ordinary - "Every privilege results eliminated 
without making a noise. All originality is flattened, as a long known fact, from night 
to day. Everything that was ardently conquered becomes vulgar. All mystery loses 
its strength" (§ 27) - seems very scarcely “descriptive" or "neutral."  
 
In addition, at various moments of his work, Heidegger explicitly uses 
dispensable moral terminology: "In his state of humor, Dasein is always already 
effectively 'open' as a being whose responsibility was given to him in his being, as 
the being Dasein has to be by existing" (§ 29). "... as what is mine, in each case, is 
being able to be free in the property or in the not property or in the modal 
indifference of both" (§ 45). "This exegesis leads to see that a 'to be able to', 
characteristic of Dasein, lies in the will to have „moral conscience' (§ 45). On the 
other hand, notwithstanding his warnings, in many cases it is impossible to 
separate the existential analysis from what Heidegger had called “Metaphysics of 
death”, in a moral-evaluative sense. (cf. §50, §54. In characterizing the proper 
being-towards-death, he defines it as a standing “…before the possibility…of being 
himself, but himself in the passionate freedom relative to death, disconnected from 
the illusions of the impersonal One (Man), certain of itself and that gets anguished" 
(§ 53)). As in all moral schemes, there is something that does not work, the 
possibility of a "trans-course", of a "restoring journey”, of recovering something lost, 
etcetera. Other non-ethically loaded words were available to describe the 
existential process.  
 
Also in the field of the questioning about the value of being is present the 
phenomenon of the millenarian concealment, or the "oblivion of being." But in the 
light of the results of Heidegger‟s negative ontology, at least as appropriated by my 
reading of it in this book, it would be better to use a less elliptical expression than 
"oblivion of being". Given this negative character of ontology, in a primary impulse 
one could speak rather of something like "oblivion of non-being". What is forgotten 
in the "oblivion of being" is forgotten because of something usually interpreted as 
"negative", as something suspected of “not being”. By contrast, fearfully covering in 
the middle of beings is also a kind of escape towards the affirmative, however 
fictitious or temporary, the regular and daily affirming of beings and supporting on 
beings. The affirming of beings seems to reassure or at least indefinitely postpone 
the fear of negative.  
 
Heidegger‟s "tour de force" is precisely trying to show this false "negative" as 
being simply ontological, and as the most proper possibility of Dasein: the 
abandonment of the attitude of "forgetting" coincides therefore with the de-
negativation of being, retreating death from the negativity in which it is usually set 
in affirmative societies by force of the impersonal “One” (Man, in German), in 
everyday intra-world, ruled by intra-temporality and the "time of clocks". So it is not 
strictly oblivion of being, but rather forgetting the fact the non-being of being 
"belongs" to the being, and in an entirely proper manner. What is forgotten is 
therefore the non-being of being, interpreted as something strange and 
adventitious, as absolute otherness, as something that would “occur” to the being 
“from outside". So the term "oblivion of being" is elliptical, since in that expression 
is hidden the dialectics being/non-being developed inside the phenomenon of 
forgetting. 
 
In the field of the issue about the value of being, perhaps it is possible to 
better raise the question of why there has always been given a negative 
interpretation of the non-being. What is the motive of such "oblivion"? Before that, 
let us ask: What is non-being? In terms of analyzing the structure of Dasein, of 
human beings, and their situation concerning ethics (which is our primary concern 
here), non-being manifests essentially in three very concrete facts: dying, killing 
and refrain from procreating, that is, stopping-being-the-own-being, interrupting-
the-already-being-of-others, and abstaining-from-making-another-be. In affirmative 
societies, the usual ontical ethics (or ethics of beings) has consistently interpreted 
as "negative" some of those possibilities of Dasein in the form of "moral 
condemnations", both voluntary death and, more attenuated, the denial to 
reproduce and, much less - as we shall see – homicide. Dying (regarding one‟s 
own life or the life of another) is an attitude of Dasein before already existing life, 
as refraining is an attitude of Dasein about possible life. Possible life cannot die, 
but can be refrained from existing. If the question of birth is raised, the existential 
structure should consist not only of a "being-towards-death", but, in general, of a 
"being-for-the-not-being"., including a being-for-refraining, a being-for-not-being-
born and a being-for-not-giving-birth.  
 
The existential intentionality towards death is just one dimension of Dasein, 
which should also include intentionality towards not being born and towards not 
giving birth. Being referred to death in a structural way is, at the same time, being 
referred to never being born, as a complementary form of non-being, because birth 
and death are inseparable in an existential analysis of Dasein, in its structural 
relation with both, sense and value of being. 
 
The lack of radical reflection in the current ethics of beings (both classical and 
modern, of Kantian or, specially, Utilitarian inspiration) consists of the fact the 
crucial question has been, throughout the history of philosophy, how one should 
live, without considering in a positive way the possible ethical character of dying 
and abstention. Asking, in the ethical field, how to live is admitting ab initio there is 
not and there cannot be any moral problem in the very fact of being; that all moral 
problems arise "afterwards", in the domain of how. If the initial ethical question is 
how to live, it is assumed beforehand that living has not, in itself, any moral 
problems, or that living is, per se, ethically good, or that, for some motive that 
should still be clarified, the matter of good and evil does not concern to being, but 
only to beings. Affirmativeness is the historical form taken by the lack of radical 
character of the ethical reflection. (Indeed, a reflection that would answer "no" to 
the initial question would not be radical either). But what is the philosophical-
rational justification of living as ethically good (valuable) per se, and of the idea the 
only thing that ethically matters is how to live, that is, how to turn into ethically good 
this or that ontic human life, excepting life itself from any questioning whatsoever? 
 
A radical inquiry could show there is a fundamental ethical problem in the 
mere fact of being and, therefore, it could be radically impossible to transform a 
human life in a morally "good life". Precisely, a fundamental ontology on the 
footpaths of Heidegger could provide the grounds for such radical ethical theory, 
regardless how irrelevant this type of project may be for Heidegger‟s philosophical 
program. This ethics would be "negative" - as described in my Project of 1990 - 
only in a relative sense, as a radical ethics born inevitably within the prevailing 
affirmative ethics, and negative with respect to it (in the sense the Heideggerian 
being-towards-death is not itself a "negative" nor an "affirmative" existential fact, 
although it is certainly negative within the context of affirmative oblivion of being on 
benefit of beings, with its punctual and dated conception of death as "interruption" 
of projects). 
 
Considering the issue of the value of being, and not only that of its sense, 
may help better understand the motives of oblivion and concealment. Why is being 
regularly hidden into beings? In terms of value, one might ask: Why would 
something (supposedly) valuable regularly be hidden? Why ethical-ontological 
problems of procreation are simply ignored in the noisy reception of the newborn 
and, later on, in the ontical details of his or her education? We do not speak here of 
the obvious value of beings. We have several criteria for valuing beings like cars 
and pieces of furniture, human actions and attitudes. We speak here of the value of 
being itself. It seems we hide ourselves in the domain of the value of beings, as if 
in the situation of having to decide the value of being, we could only stammer. But 
when we present the fundamental issue of the value of being in a context of an 
ethical inquiry, are we not asking ourselves if the being has an intrinsic ethical 
value itself? That would sound completely absurd for many philosophers who 
agree with Wittgenstein that “In the world everything is as it is and all occurs as it 
occurs. There is no value in it.” It seems values are always transcendent to the 
world. So, what meaning would our initial question have? The following: the 
fundamental ontology will certainly not determine being, by itself, as ethically 
valuable or the contrary. The fundamental ontology will simply describe how the 
world is. 
 
But let us suppose that ontology states being as having some empirical 
property A. This is obviously not, by itself, an “ethical determination”. But, if we 
know the world is A, starting from the features of A, we might ask, for example, if it 
is ethically good to abandon a world that is A, or if it is ethically good to refrain from 
setting people in a world that is A, or if it is ethically good to withdraw a person 
from a world that is A, and so on. From the purely descriptive and factual features 
of the world, as elucidated by fundamental ontology, we could indeed ask 
ourselves, on a second step, if it is or not ethically valuable to take certain attitudes 
concerning these features. The internal connection between ethics and ontology is 
seen in the fact we can determine the value of being-in-the-world, or of stopping-
being-in-the-world, or of letting-the-other-be-in-the-world, or of letting-the-other-not-
to-be-in-the-world, etc., based on the structural features of the world elucidated by 
fundamental ontology; with the advantage our ethical appreciations of the world will 
have the same radical character of the ontological elucidation itself. That way, it is 
not the world we valuate, but the being or the non-being or the stop-being or the 
non letting-be in the world. Although in the world, as Wittgenstein said, there 
cannot be any value, in the being-in-the-world and its modalities, there certainly is. 
 
One of Heidegger‟s fundamental ideas in Being and Time is that human life – 
in the sense of what he calls “existence” – constitutes an access to being. Thus, 
although living and being are not the same thing, they are internally connected 
through this “accessibility”. That is an appropriate clue in order to understand the 
motives for the systematic concealment and oblivion of being in benefit to beings. 
Human being, the only being who can question about the sense and value of 
being, cannot do it coldly, as if he or she was in conditions of observing being from 
outside without commitments. Within being is the human already involved and the 
questioning about being is inevitably addressed from inside, in a living. This being 
in question “squeezes” humans who ask, under the form of a “life” that has some 
intensity, some urgency, a tone, an affection. Humans cannot make this question 
about being without trying to assure for them some space supposedly free from the 
dangers of this very questioning.  
 
The space from which humans ask about the sense and especially for the 
value of being is precisely the space they need for a living. What human beings 
conceal or “forget” is in strict connection with the space from which they can allow 
themselves to make the question about the value of being. This way, human 
beings are compelled to forget, if they intend to keep living a life. Because the 
oblivion of non-being of being, which is an obstacle for their reflection, is, at the 
same time, what they need in order to preserve the space in which they will be able 
to continue living, which is what usually matters a lot to them. The empirical 
conditions of their reflection might, therefore, get in conflict with its “transcendental” 
conditions. When we make a reflection, we empirically need some space, this 
same space reflection challenges in the very heart of its legitimacy. 
 
On that perspective, it is necessary to ask if a condemnation of the oblivion of 
being, throughout the history of Western metaphysics, can be made from an 
ethical-ontological point of view, to the extent this ability to forget seems to be 
conditio sine qua non to keep developing a life, even a philosophical and 
questioning one. Heidegger faces the problem all the time as if it was about a sort 
of available option. But the ontological analysis itself should decide whether there 
is really an option or not. If, on a magic situation, we could examine the issue of 
being from outside, maybe the results obtained would be quite different. However, 
how to ask, coldly and without caring about the consequences, over a being from 
which we run out day by day, about a being that, hour after hour, slides from our 
hands? The human configuration of being as “life” has a direct connection with the 
structural motivation for oblivion and concealment, and the question about its 
inevitability (and, therefore, about the impossibility of overloading those attitudes by 
ethical appreciations) directly relate to the Nietzschean question about how much 
truth can a human life tolerate. The motives of oblivion are not, however, 
independent from the “pathetical” (from Pathos) level in which we are inevitably 
situated when we make the question about the value of being. Oblivion is not 
simply an epistemological “error” or a moral “sin”, but maybe the indispensable 




Note 1: About the radical character of thinking 
 
Radical questioning has been, throughout the history of philosophy (from 
Aristotle and Plato to Husserl and Wittgenstein), an inescapable demand of 
thinking. Nevertheless, what I sustain here, at least in the case of the question of 
the value of being – to the extent this has been able to affect the very possibility of 
opening that space in which the existent is situated, or intends to be situated, in 
order to think -, is that the intention of radical questioning has been usually 
damaged in the history of philosophy, precisely in the mode I call “affirmative”. I 
want to show this affirmative commitment in the attitude concerning reflexive 
radicalism – that makes that radicalism itself dissolves into a fiction – by alluding to 
the case of Heidegger‟s master, Edmund Husserl.  
 
On the Second Part of Erste Philosophie, entitled “Theory of 
phenomenological reduction”, in the first chapters of first section, Husserl develops 
some ideas about the philosophical attitude and the starting point for making 
philosophy, one of his favorite subjects of reflection. There he describes the person 
who chooses himself as a philosopher as someone “who takes a decision of will 
compromising his whole life…” (Lesson 28. page. 8; my translation from French). 
On the next Lesson, Husserl criticizes the fact science has disconnected from 
philosophy, taking distance from the need for justification, “losing, that way, the 
spirit of radicalism”, and falling into a semi-naiveté. (p. 14). “It is precisely that 
defect of science what justifies the philosophical demand for a start without 
requirements, of a new life of knowledge, really radical…” (p. 15). Notwithstanding, 
Husserl continues declaring this radicalism must necessarily commit the 
philosopher to what he calls “supreme good”. “It is about a decision through which 
the subject determines himself… based on his best, in the universal domain of the 
values of knowledge and of a life eternally devoted to that „supreme good‟” (Id).  
 
On Lesson 30 we read: “Everywhere the realization of pure and authentic 
values required more and more from the creator subject, this radicalism of intention 
that could never be satisfied with the finite, the imperfect, the unfinished, and that, 
on the contrary, aspire to the eternal poles of the idea” (p. 23). And furthermore: “It 
is this way the need for a new radicalism is imposed, the necessity for a universal 
and absolute radicalism that, by principle,  proposes to destroy all naiveté and, 
triumphing over it, intends to achieve ultimate truth… in such way arises the will to 
start and maintain systematically an absolutely original science… a science, at last, 
no longer threatened by the abysms of skepticism, and in which, on the contrary, 
everything is, from one side to another, bright, clear and right” (p. 27). 
 
However, what kind of radicalism is this that excludes beforehand the 
possibility that reflection may lead, if performed with full responsibility and criticism, 
to supreme evil, to finitude, to imperfection, to the unfinished, to obscurity and to 
skepticism? How can the radical philosopher propose to himself the task of 
achieving the Good? How can a radical philosopher know beforehand what his 
reflection will find along the way? How could the radical practice of philosophy 
have the previous guarantee of finding what it has intended to seek, renouncing to 
the risk which seemed intrinsic to the very practice of radical reflection? The 
“radicalism” of Husserl seems more a “mission” or an “apostolate” than a strictly 
philosophical enterprise. One thing is to find the limits of thinking in the very 
process of reflection and another is to impose these limits beforehand, as part of a 
program of inquiry. 
 
In the present investigation about the value of being, we will precisely use the 
same evaluative categories of ethical values that are used in affirmative 
approach… but radicalized, that is to say, applied not only to intra-worldly beings 
but also to the very being as such. The application of ethical categories to the 
being of the world itself might bring, as an unavoidable consequence, the opening 
of the spaces of “negativity” – in the relative sense already mentioned – that were 
suffocated in the prevailing affirmative organization of intellectual societies. On that 
sense, the question about the value of being intended in the present work is strictly 
internal, in the sense that a moral questioning of the very establishment of being 




Note 2.  Being and beings. 
 
An initial skepticism could arise concerning the possibility of making questions 
about being itself (about its sense and value) independently of questions about 
beings. On the other hand, the possibility of a second skepticism also stands out in 
what refers to the illegitimate “ontologization” of simple psychological attitudes, as 
the oblivion of non-being of being or the fear before death, and so on. Both 
skepticisms are about the possibility of opening a structural range of analysis 
beyond what can be determinable in the domain of beings. The structural level that 
matters here is of a formal nature, I would almost say in the logical sense of this 
term. It refers to the very functioning of being, with independence from its contents. 
A phenomenology of attitudes would allow discovering this structural level. 
Frequently in daily life, what does not work is the very mechanism and not the data 
we handle, as sometimes everything we eat makes us sick, and the problem is not 
what we eat, but our assimilative system as a formal structure “that does not work”. 
The distinction that matters in the present reflection is nothing of excessively 
technical or subtle nature, but one distinction that goes in the direction of these 
everyday issues describable by a simple phenomenology. 
 On the domain of ethical matters themselves, both common people and 
intellectual moralists tend to admit life can be worth living independently from intra-
worldly pain and suffering. This idea has been expressed, for example, by William 
James, in The Will to believe: “… sufferings and hardships do not, as a rule, abate 
the love of life” (James, “Is life worth living?”, included on this book). Also Aristotle 
has distinguished, in the Nicomaquean Ethics, between the intra-worldly functions 
of human beings (being a doctor, a warrior, a teacher) and the worldly-structural 
function of purely being a human. Also Wittgenstein presents, in his Conference of 
Ethics, the difference between being frightened by something empirical (as, for 
example, the size of an animal), and to be frightened by the simples fact the world 
“is over there and it is as it is”. This current distinction, which seems strictly 
connected to the very establishment of the philosophical view into the world, shows 
it is perfectly possible to distinguish between a structural-worldly domain and an 
intra-worldly level of analysis, to the point we can, in an evaluative vein, devalue 
beings without, because of that, devaluing being itself. It is the valuing of the very 
“function of living” what the present investigation proposes to make, and not 
primarily of “what is lived”. Is such thing possible? This is one of the main concerns 
of the present investigation.  
 
The ontic/ontological distinction is of logical character, related to levels of 
understanding and analysis; it relates to the distinction form/content. The 
distinction ontological/psychological is a particular species of the ontic/ontological 
distinction. The oblivion of the non-being of being is not merely a psychological 
attitude but also structural. We can visualize different levels of helplessness, the 
intra-worldly helplessness of orphans or impaired people and the structural 
helplessness of human beings as such. Helplessness, fear, oblivion, etc, tolerate 
psychological versions in the intra-world, but anguish is not just an “ontologization” 
of fear. Radical fear, lived in the level of the world itself, is anguish, that is to say, 
worldly-structural fear. Much more than an ontologization of the psychological, 
there is here a naturalization of ontology, in a peculiar sense that will be explained 
furthermore. From the formal-ontological point of view, it is clear that what is said 
about the value or disvalue of being will be independent of the psychological 
particular experiences such as fear, oblivion, intra-worldly helplessness, and so on.  
We can live life in a good psychological state even when we understand its 
questionable ontological structural and vice-versa. On this structural level, we do 
not manage a purely intra-worldly discourse, but neither an extra-worldly one; it is 
situated neither inside nor outside the world, but precisely in the world itself. 




























Fragments of a map for the re-conduction of non-being to 
the very structure of the world 
 
The negative interpretation of non-being (of dying, killing, letting-someone-
die, abstaining-from-letting-other-live, letting-another-die, letting-someone-live, and 
so on) is a crucial component and a key for understanding oblivion and 
concealment. Societies organized around diverse policies of beings are noteworthy 
“affirmative” societies where suicide and abstention from procreating are ethically 
condemned. Every attempt of ethical defense of these forms of non-being is 
stigmatized as pathological, irrational, subjective or socially disturbing. The 
incessant battle against the supposed “nihilism” of these attitudes, from the part of 
medical, religious, juridical and philosophical flanks, can be seen as an attempt to 
transform the non-being of being into an external “danger” that can be avoided 
through procedures, an incessant movement that transforms the non-being of 
being into something that “comes after” the being, as something that could have 
been avoided some way.  
 
Affirmative societies interpret as “nihilist” any attempt to give the non-being a 
positive interpretation. It prefers to give it a moral sense that currently determines 
non-being as being some kind of “evil”. The “presence of evil in the world”, one of 
the premises of  theodicy, is supported on a purely negative interpretation of non-
being, in contrast with the being seen as non problematically affirmative, where 
non-being seems indefinitely “postponed”. Affirmative ethics lives under the 
expenses of the presence of “evil” in the world, and prefer not taking notice of the 
non-being of being (or maybe the policy of beings prepares a polite pretending “not 
taking notice”) even when this attitude leads to extreme points as of the Kantian 
ethics affirming there has never been in the world one single moral action, or as of 
the Christian ethics in general, declaring every man is a sinner. Not even when 
“evil” fills the world and occupies the totality of spaces, affirmative conceptual 
organization of society accepts thinking about the possibility that non-being admits 
a positive interpretation, as structural part of being, instead of considering it as a 
foreign negativity or a passing anomaly. 
 
To that affirmative ethics corresponds, by force, an affirmative ontology. The 
basic postulates of this ontology are assertions such as: “being is better than not-
being”, “being more is better than being less”, and so on. Usual completely basic 
ethical assertions can be derived from this, such as: “the being is good; the non-
being is bad”; “being bad is better than not being anything at all”, and so on. There 
is, within this affirmative ontology, a systematic favoring of being against non-
being, and also a kind of ontological-ethical “maximalism” (“The more being, the 
better”). The incongruence of affirmative societies seems to consist of the 
simultaneity of the basic belief in the goodness of being (and in the “evilness” of 
non-being) with the regular mechanisms of concealment of this being. How is it 
understood that something basically “good” must stay hidden and forgotten?  
 
So, being is considered basically good (as when, in William James‟ vein, it is 
said that “in spite of hardships and sorrows, life is worth living”), but affirmative 
societies imperiously need to appeal to beings of all kinds in order to paradoxically 
endure the good being and be protected from it! The almost compulsive looking for 
beings seems to show, on the contrary, an implicit devaluing of being as such, far 
beyond the explicitly declared in a phenomenology of usual speeches and 
expressions. The policies of beings move in the level of the manageable and 
subjected to manipulation. Affirmative ontology alleges a curious “privilege of being 
over non-being”, of accomplishing projects over maintaining them in pure 
possibility. Our culture is built on the idea that it is always better to carry out 
projects than keeping them unfinished. It is usual to say that, among all the 
possible worlds, the present one (ours) “has the privilege of being real”. What may 
those strange expressions rationally mean? 
 Our societies are characterized by the simultaneous activity of affirming and 
concealing, not as two distinct operations but as the two faces of the same coin. 
Affirmation is itself concealing: in affirming, societies support, consolidate and 
postpone. It seems that affirmation is not, therefore, genuinely evaluative, but 
strictly constitutive and founding. This “supporting” foundation is regularly confused 
with an evaluative declaration about the “goodness” of being. But nothing prevents 
from thinking affirmative performance is precisely based on the opposite, on a full 
(and promptly concealed) visualization of a radical “lack of value”, which constantly 
demands the “support” of urgent affirmative moves. That the being is good (and 
non-being is bad) is almost an automatic and fatigued statement, when in fact what 
we see is incessant affirmative work looking for “supporting”, not in the sense of 
“considering good”, but of pure enduring. Considering something as good is 
postponed until the meeting with all sorts of beings. And it is only among beings 
within the world where is finally “supported” a being that seems to be in decaying 
all the time, losing balance under the weakest blow.  
 
 With the interpretation of affirmativeness as supporting and not only as 
positive valuation, the mentioned incoherence between something admitted as 
good and, notwithstanding, regularly concealed, can no doubt be avoided. It is 
perfectly understandable that affirmative societies sustain it is “worth while” to 
conceal what could not be openly accepted as positively valuable, in such a way  
this “worth while” could get along with the admission the world is not precisely 
“worthy”. This clearly points to a total preference for beings and their political ethics 
of distribution and managements. Does this indicate “negative ethics”, in a sense 
strictly relative to the current affirmative one, could achieve the ontological-
existential levels of analysis the affirmative-supporting-forgetting ethics could not?  
Does it mean an affirmative ethics cannot, in any way, be radical in the sense of 
thinking within the domain elucidated by a fundamental ontology? 
 
A “privilege of being over non-being” cannot be nevertheless, sustained 
neither ontologically-existentially nor in a descriptive level, nor in the evaluative-
ethical level. In a phenomenology of experiences one can verify the presence of 
structures connected to a fundamental “disappointment” before being. All that can 
be achieved, even the most glamorous from the ontical point of view, will carry the 
stigma of impoverishment, limitation and disappointment. The pure possibility was 
always greater and broader, more developed and more fulfilled than any realization 
of possibilities, however amazing. The non-being of pure possibility cannot do less 
than to limit itself in order to occupy a space into some form of being. The unlimited 
expressivity of non-being is necessarily restricted to limits and constrained in order 
“to be”. The being, any being, is born from suffocation and strangling, from an 
inescapable basic narrowing.  
 
An alleged “privilege of being” should be understood as the acceptance of the 
impoverishment as the price to be paid for abandoning non-being, by preferring an 
extremely poor being rather than a non-being exuberant in possibilities. 
Nevertheless, the matter of why it is a privilege to leave the non-being towards 
being, since such step impoverishes and disappoints, is precisely the problem that 
is not usually put nor answered by affirmative ontology. The being seems to be 
characterized by impoverishment, strain and limitation. A phenomenology of 
experiences of being and non-being would remind, for example, the 
disappointment of the artist before the finished work, so inferior to the project (at 
the end of the movie Decameron, of Pier Paolo Pasolini, Giotto exclaims, looking to 
his finished work: “Why performing a work if it is so beautiful to dream with it?”). 
 
An existential ontology, assisted by such fundamental phenomenology of 
experiences does not get intimidated by the hypothesis those “disappointments” 
are nothing but “psychological delusions”. As it was clarified on a previous note, it 
is sure those difficulties, within the field of naturalization of ontology, do not stop 
being psychological as well, but they are so, precisely within a structural-worldly 
level. Concerning “delusion”, existential ontology describes experiences, deceptive 
or not, to the strict extent that “delusion” and self-cheating also open, as much as 
truth and righteousness, the fundamental domain of being. 
 
Disappointment towards being faces, as compensation, an increasing 
appraisal for pure possibilities and non-being. The intensity of absences in contrast 
with the inevitable wearing and erosion of prolonged presences, the aura of those 
who leave to long journeys, including the ones who leave to a journey without 
return, the sinking of events and experiences into nostalgia of the past, specially 
the remote (think of Marcel Proust„s Recherche), the huge strength of everything 
we did not do and could have done; in our experiences, constantly appear those 
“negative primacies” of the distant over the near, of what departs over what 
remains, of what was not done over what has been realized, of the past over 
present, of the remote over the recent. Does a good part of the invincible power of 
Christ not reside in the fact it has been a long time since he left the world and 
remains infinitely distant, so nothing can stain or harm him? Is not part of his truth 
based on his eternal refusal? (Is he distant because he is divine or did he become 
divine for being distant?) On the other hand, the very enjoying of the world appears 
mediated by negativity, both joy and contentment lived by exclusion, by absence or 
lack, much more than “positively” (Freud‟s theory of desire and the negative theory 
of happiness from Schopenhauer give important conceptual tools to study these 
crucial phenomena).  
 
These experiences suggest some cautions concerning the very idea of an 
unquestionable “ontological privilege of being over non-being”. It is curious and 
intriguing the fact people keep believing, in spite of frequent disappointment, being 
“is more” than non-being, and that it is worthwhile passing from non-being to being. 
The wearing of prolonged company or intimacy is not seen as a destruction of the 
fascination of pure possibility, and people keep escaping from silences, absences, 
lack, emptiness and loneliness as phobia, calling these things “bad” without 
realizing the systematic dissatisfaction of being when finally obtained, and without 
taking into account the scarce enjoying of the world is gained much more through 
the hiatus of being, from its interruptions, as furtively and always pushed by the 
anxious search of a being that satisfies less, the more one tries to make it positive 
in experiences. 
 
 But also on the ethical perspective, it should not be sustained an alleged 
“primacy or privilege of being over non-being” either. In ethical theories of all 
persuasions (eudemonists, stoics, Kantians, Utilitarian and combinations of them), 
the apotheosis of immorality consists of manipulation of the other for one‟s own 
benefit. The aggression towards the others, in the sense of invasion of their forum 
of possibilities, is certainly the paradigmatic case of manipulation. One may 
consider as the “fundamental ethical articulation” the attitude consisting of being 
disposed not to follow, systematically and regularly, the unrestricted defense of 
what is convenient to one‟s own interest and not taking into account also the 
interest of others, using any mean, including violence and forced persuasion, to get 
one‟s own purposes. Günther Patzig has expressed it this way: “… the most 
important function of moral behavior rules is to counteract the lack of consideration 
with which people try to fulfill their own interests also to the harm of others” (Patzig 
G., Facts, norms, propositions, p. 202; my translation from Spanish). This 
“fundamental ethical articulation” is independent from particular ethical theories: it 
may concern the “humiliation” before the moral law in aprioristic Kantian ethics, or 
the regular sacrifice of individual happiness in benefit to “happiness of the largest 
number” in Utilitarian ethics, and so on. The formal core of immorality consists in 
an expansive movement incapable of self-limitation.  
 
But here resides the paradox of an alleged “ethical privilege of being over 
non-being”. In its original emergence from non-being, being, as we have seen, 
limits and cuts, restricts and wares out. However, once appeared it expands, 
crawls, covers the greatest area, gets space, invades, offends, disturbs, eliminates.  
All that was mere limitation in its relationship to non-being and possibility turns now 
into expansive non-limitation in its relations to other beings. In the very 
establishment of being in relation to other beings, there seems already to be a kind 
of risk of moral transgression in a purely “formal” sense, because this 
establishment has the capability of harming, on a very basic ground, the 
fundamental ethical articulation. While the articulation invites to a certain “going 
against oneself”, the relationship among living beings has the exactly opposite 
direction, the unconditional self defense, self-supporting and going against the 
others. It is an ontological oddity that, within the realm of non-being, the totality of 
space was available and notwithstanding it was abandoned in benefit of being; and 
now, within being, where there is no space enough, being intends the occupation 
of the greatest possible spaces.  
 
Being seems to successively transgress an ontological law in its mere 
establishment and an ethical law in its intention to stay forever and to continue in 
any way. The abandon of non-being stains and disappoints; on the other hand, 
being disturbs, gets in conflict, expands and makes noise. It seems that being, far 
from sustaining any king of “privilege”, commits an ontological mistake in 
establishing, and an ethical mistake in continuing. Those lines of thought suggest a 
“negative” ethics could – hammering precisely over what was “forgotten” by current 
affirmativeness, over what lacks and not on what there is – could recover, at the 
same time, the ontological-structural levels of reflection and enjoy the ethical 





Birth and Suicide: the arguments of a radical and anti-skeptic 
moralist 
 




The structural-worldly suffering and its connection with moral 
disqualification 
 
The matter of the value of life does not reduce, as it seems to be the case in 
the very well-known essay by Albert Camus, to the problem of “suicide”. Suicide 
refers only to already existent lives and is, therefore, half the problem. If, as Camus 
argues, there is a great responsibility around the issue of the “value of life”, to the 
point that if somebody comes to the conclusion life has no value, this person would 
be, according to Camus, ethically obliged to commit suicide, it is also plausible to 
think, coming to that same conclusion, we are also obliged to refrain from 
procreate other beings, because how could we understand life does not have 
enough value for me to continue, but, however, it does have enough value so my 
possible children would start living? 
 
In the stubborn denial of talking about these questions, it is usually assumed 
the trivial and trivializing objection that it is not worthy to discuss the problem on 
the value of life because, anyway, when we put this question, we are already alive, 
so the question “arrives too late”. Our life would be taken, therefore, as “a fact”. 
This insignificant argument would have certain force if the problem about the value 
of life was reduced as in Camus‟ work, to the matter of suicide, that is, to the non-
being of the already present life, but not if conceived, at the same time, in both 
axes, suicide and abstention; because even though our life is a fact, the life of our 
possible children is not. If life becomes ethically problematic, we can avoid the 
appearance of another life through a decision that arrives perfectly “on time”. There 
is no reason for a supposed solution to the problem of continuing to be also a 
solution to the problem of coming for the first time into the world. 
 
But the question of non-being and its several forms may easily get trivialized if 
it is argued only in the intra-worldly level; the level of philosophical reflection is 
certainly the worldly-structural one. The non-being that primarily matters here – as 
explained on Part I – is the non-being of being and not any kind of intra-worldly 
specific non-being. It matters here the several kinds of letting-not-to-be, making-
not-to-be, making-oneself-not-to-be, etc., affecting the very being of the world. 
More concretely, what matters here are what we can call formal suicide and formal 
abstention, and not only empirical suicides and abstentions. The issue about the 
value of life‟s structure – and not of “what goes on in it” – is so presented in two 
fundamental axes: Are there structural ethical-ontological motives for making-
oneself-not-to-be and for not-letting-others-non-yet-existent-to be? Or, presented in 
all its strength: Is there any moral obligation of continuing to live and of giving life to 
others based on the very structure of the world as elucidated by fundamental 
ontology and not only based on ontic advantages or on some furtive affirmative 
prejudice of religious order? Or on the contrary, is there any kind of “right”, 
structural-ontologically founded, to ethically and rationally realize these forms of 
non-being? 
 
In order to show the internal connections between ontology and ethics, it is 
necessary first to make an ontological description within what I propose to call 
“naturalization of ontology”, but in a different direction from the contemporary 
analytic philosophy, which also uses this expression sometimes. From that, on a 
second moment, a presentation of the ethical figures that are possible after the 
structure thus elucidated of the world is in order. The “naturalizations of ontology” 
in the analytical field are much more “socializations” or “social conventionalizing” 
(in the sense, for example, of a “scientific community of investigators”) of ontology 
than, strictly speaking, “naturalizations” in the sense of crude nature. When I speak 
of “naturalization”, I refer literally to nature, in the sense of generation, death, the 
distinct forms of animal conflict, stain, aging, assimilation and expulsion of 
elements, metabolism, blood circulation, and so on. It is a common sense in 
current philosophy saying that we constantly live in an already totally cultural world, 
distanced from the natural; and, therefore, “nature”, in its strong and literal sense, 
should be considered, beyond the metaphysical and theological references of the 
past, as a traditional and dogmatic element of thinking that must be presently 
dispensed with, overcome by categories connected to language, symbolic 
activities, hermeneutic, critique of ideologies, and so on.   
 
Without denying the oppressive truism of this persuasion, what I ask here is if 
a total disconnection of the ethical-rational universe of people from crude nature is 
even thinkable. That means: if given certain “natural” characteristics of ontology, 
certain kinds of ethical directions keep being viable or not. We may accept 
contemporary thinking gets free from metaphysical and theological structures of 
thinking without accepting it should also be totally free from nature.  
 
In reality, the three things – metaphysics, theology and nature – are usually 
gathered under the same philosophical condemnation, on behalf of the criticism 
against traditional “fixed” or “immutable” structures of thinking. However, in 
philosophy, as I conceive it, we are not searching for the mutable (or for the 
immutable), as we neither seek something edifying, emancipator, uplifting, anti-
nihilist or anti-relativistic. Philosophy should not be made in a movement of 
escaping from anything, for example, from “the immutable”, but simply following the 
thread of its own arguments. The “immutability” of nature could be of an essentially 
distinct kind from the immutability of God and from the immutability of Aristotle‟s 
substances, for example, and this could turn desirable getting rid of those 
metaphysical references without ignoring the firm framework of nature. On the 
other hand, we may be in accordance with Husserlian and Heideggerian criticisms 
against the naturalization of conscience or the naturalization of being. But what 
matters here is to visualize the most general and basic natural structures of being, 
flying at the same time from the empiricist conception of nature and from the 
temptation of describing the being in metaphysical-theological terms. It is the world 
itself what is searched to propose a radical reflection on the value of life, not the 
mere empiricist intra-world or any ultra-world in the sense of the traditional 
theological metaphysics.   
 
In this “naturalized ontology”, human beings are included in a description in 
terms of their natural affections towards the world, that is, in the perception of how 
they are affected by it. It is not the case, in a natural level, but to strictly describe 
the commerce of humans with nature in the most basic, elementary and trivial 
terms. In this level, this strictly sensible-natural commerce with nature has currently 
been understood by philosophers in the light of the dualism pleasure/pain, or 
acceptance/rejection, and this seems to be a good clue to be followed. Even 
though this world would not have any kind of “intrinsic ethical value”, it has, 
inevitably, natural characteristics, some of relational character concerning the 
particular receptivity and elaboration of sensible stimuli by human beings. Kant, 
following a Stoic tradition, has insisted on a clear difference between the order of 
what is pleasant and delightful on one side, from what is ethically good on the 
other; and what is painful and unpleasant from what is ethically wrong. From the 
world itself we may only obtain something like a “value of sensible affection”, in the 
sense of an impact. Utilitarian ethics have been much more concerned than the 
aprioristic ethics in establishing links between those two fields that should not 
however be mixed. The most important link for my purposes here between the 
sensible-natural level and the ethical one is the following: 
 
The intense pain (in a sense relative to the quantity and strength of pain that 
each person is able to stand), if understood as the own pain (not as someone 
else‟s pain, even of the “closest” ones) and understood as strictly physical pain (not 
just as any kind of “moral pain”) may have an inevitable effect of moral 
disqualification.  
 
Certainly pain does not lessen a human being (and who would once sustain 
such an absurd?), but it could put her on a situation of inevitable immorality (as 
extraordinarily shown in George Orwell‟s “1984”). A human in a situation of torture 
may accept humiliation, betrayal, corruption and extreme moral diminution, even 
the very contempt of the ones she loves, etc. It is only about, as said the Great 
Inquisitor of the mentioned novel, reaching the adequate degree of torture, or 
increasing the volts or tightening the ropes a little more. Every human has his own 
limits in front of the instruments of torture, and torment is the end of all ethical 
organization of the world, compulsively replaced by a crude empirical and urgently 
present organization, of total adaptation to the stimulus of the moment, without any 
possibility of introducing the so typical “postponements” of the conceptual 
organization of the world. 
 
When we suffer physical pain, we get completely alone, disabled to practice 
any kind of morality, Kantian, Utilitarian or even Stoic. And we are urgently thrown 
on ourselves with no one to go with us. At the same time, not even those outside 
the situation can ethically condemn the person who betrayed or lie in a situation of 
torture, even when continuing to condemn, abstractly, this type of action as wrong 
in general. Even considering X as morally wrong, we may not consider wrong the 
actions X takes under a situation of torture. Here, I intend to indicate to a kind of 
post-moral level of analysis, a level where the domain of morality has already been 
opened but it cannot be made effective for structural motives. Intense physical pain 
is, this way, the terminal point of morality, in the sense we can always be disposed 
to go against our own interests (the fundamental moral demand) to the extent the 
integrity of our own body is not drastically threatened. Ethics is not in conditions to 
ask me to be disposed to “go unlimitedly against the integrity of my own body”, 
even when, physically, I could be able to endure extreme pain.  
 
The situation of intense pain obliges me to “ardently defend my own 
interests”. Hannah Arendt points out intense pain brutally withdraws us from the 
public arena and, in an unrecoverable way, buries in the private. “…the most 
intense feeling we know – intense to the point of eclipsing all other experiences, 
which is the experience of great physical pain – is, at the same time, the most 
private and less communicable of all… it deprives us of our perception of reality to 
the point we may forget it more rapidly and easily than any other thing” (Arendt, 
Hannah, The human condition, chapter II, 7). 
 
As a consequence of this, running away from pain is not a merely sensible 
conduct people do simply to satisfy their own “self love” or “selfishness”, as the 
Kantian ethics seems cruelly to think, neither to increase the gratification and 
happiness of the greater number, as occurs in Utilitarian ethics, but it may 
constitute, when it refers to the own intense physical pain, the pure and simple 
recovery of the person‟s moral capacities. Not all people do for their own benefit is 
done in order to satisfy the sensible selfishness, or to obtain happiness. Between 
the pure searching for sensible pleasure and the strict obedience to pure moral law 
or to the principles of happiness of the largest number, is located the simple and 
minimal level in which we run away from pain in order to maintain our basic 
conditions as ethical persons. It will neither be “benevolent” with human sensible 
selfishness (Kant) not a procedure to increase my happiness in harmony with 
everyone‟s (Utilitarianism) the simple fact of intending to withdraw a human being 
from the situation of intense pain. Removing humans from intense pain is not an 
attempt to make them happy or worthy, but an attempt to conserve them human. 
The ignorance about this fundamental connection between sensible characteristics 
(pleasure/pain) and the ethical level is a sign of lack of radical character – in the 
sense pointed before – of Kantian and Utilitarian ethical thinking in general, which 
always imagine human actions in situations of evaluative middle term but never or 
very seldom in dramatic and conflictive situations in which one‟s own values get 
radically put to dramatic testing. 
 
However, one might certainly think a situation of torture is exceptional and, as 
such, a sort of “useless pain” that could be avoided within a certain development of 
human civilization ethically and politically evolved and well constituted. Even 
though this is highly doubtful, we admit it. But maybe it is not exceptional the 
mutual aggressiveness among natural beings, whose one of manifestations is 
torture, and there might be other kinds of it when torture no longer exists. Being 
regularly submitted to other‟s aggressiveness, under its different styles, certainly 
does not seem exceptional, but one of the current features of our being-in-the-
world. We may suppose a mythical civilization in which the mutual aggressiveness 
among natural beings such as humans is totally suppressed. Nevertheless, all of 
them would be still submitted to the situation of wearing and sickness, given the 
fragility of human organism up against the vicissitudes of the world and the 
consequent difficulty of protecting themselves in a reliable way. An illness can lead 
us to degrees of pain as intense as the situation of torture. And neither is illness 
exceptional but a regular event in any human life (beyond the progresses of 
medical sciences and the raise on “life expectancy”) and, therefore, a part of our 
very being-in-the-world. Illness and its consequent threat of intense physical pain is 
a structure internally connected to human condition.  
 
In the structural level, there are no “healthy” people, in spite of the intra-
worldly discourse that makes the ontologically unsustainable distinction between 
healthy and not healthy. It is ontically administered the dysfunction which keeps all 
of us regularly ill, that is the point. The ontic-political administration of pain cannot 
cloud a more radical ontological analysis. (Certainly, in the most optimistic 
alternative, we can also imagine a society in which illness is totally suppressed, but 
what we soon realize is that, in fact, we continuously “move” suffering from one 
place of reflection to another) 
 
Wilhelm Kamlah has presented human beings as structurally indigents, with 
independence from their intra-worldly specific indigence (given by their socio-
economic, racial, cultural conditions.): “In descriptive anthropology, it has been 
formulated the general proposition: human beings are indigent beings always in 
need; that is to say all of them are put in a situation of indigence… we humans are 
all indigent beings and reciprocally dependent on each other…” (Kamlah, 
Philosophical Anthropology. Part II, chapter 1, p. 97; my translation from Spanish). 
Human being is presented as helpless, insecure, decadent, ill and at risk, and such 
determination is structural, in the sense it is independent from the particularities of 
this or that life. Being fragility structural, it must appear in any ontological-natural 
description of the world. This fragility organizes, in a necessary way, a structural 
domain of “ailment”, the always open possibility of pain and, as we have seen 
before, of the consequent destruction of morality in the extreme point of ailment.  
 
In fact, even when we are not submitted to a specific painful illness, we are 
always submitted to its current and constraining possibility, an ontologically 
tormenting possibility (beyond ontic “hypochondrias”). And the single possibility of 
intense pain has already a certain minimum level of moral disqualification. It is 
correct to think humans morally disqualify themselves to the strict extent they suffer 
and feel bad, in the sense of already living, from ever, the structural pain of being, 
that becomes enormous and unavoidable in the case of an effective and declared 
illness. (Those issues are masterfully seen in the film of Ingmar Bergman, Screams 
and whispers.) Thus, structural pain determines levels of moral disqualification. 
 
Certainly, those structural characteristics of ailment may be lived with stoicism 
or serenity until a certain point, but that possibility does not suppress anything in 
the structural-worldly level, however “controlled” those characteristics might be. 
The fundamental and relevant ontological fact is: these characteristics can reach 
uncontrollable levels. The stoic and the skeptical might keep their phlegm and 
arrogance for a while in contact to the structure of the world, but the counter-proof 
ad absurdum of that ataraxy is precisely intense pain. The very intense physical 
pain demonstrates everything, refutes everything, ends with all skepticism and all 
stoicism, it is strictly the absolute. The characteristics of human condition may be 
submitted to the usual relativist skepticism of “all depends on the attitude taken 
before difficulties or pain”, since one does not come to the very intense physical 
pain (in the relative sense explained above, “what is intense to someone might not 
be to another”).  
 
There is no ethical theory that can be practiced by a man with hands and feet 
tied, receiving electrical shocks, not even “stoicism”, even when there might be, for 
example, some theory for living in Auschwitz but only while one does not come to 
that extreme point of pain yet. Faced the very intense physical pain, all humans are 
equal (or, I insist, only different in terms of voltage, as exposes the Great Inquisitor 
of Orwell‟s novel), because we are put in a situation where neither subtlety nor 
humor fit. The own intense physical pain does not depend on “the attitude taken” 
because it is pain that determines and makes uniform all the attitudes in the 
extreme case.  
 
This does not mean there is merely pain in the world, but that the world itself 
“hurts”, the world itself is pain situated in different levels of intensity and 
commitment. The hurting-of-the-world is visualized, for example, in the necessarily 
conflictive relations among natural beings imprisoned in a common and forever 
scarce space, in the regular situation of being-ill, in the “evidences” of the fragility 
which constitutes their being-in-the-world, and so on. It seems possible to show the 
painfulness of the world as such and, at last, its consecutive opening of moral 
disqualification (a much weaker thesis, no doubt, than the Gnostic thesis of a 
possible “ethical evilness of the world” or than the thesis of a “radical evil of human 
nature”). The so called “evil” is an unavoidable result of the fundamental “lack of 
space” and “lack of time” of the structural human condition, and not of an 
“intrinsically evil nature” of humans. In the daily and concealing regularity of our 
lives, we can exercise a certain morality for “times of peace” because we still have 
time for postponing, for giving ourselves the hope: “tomorrow yes, tomorrow will be 
different”. When that space is closed (not only in the extreme case of intense 
physical pain but in daily life), it is automatically produced moral disqualification.  
 
Seeing things radically, out of the regular concealing of every-day life, human 
being is structurally put in a situation impossible to be solved only with ethical 
categories without intervention of intra-world politics or ultra-world religion: in the 
very world, it is not allowed for human beings to be. The world itself is, in that 
sense, inhabitable, unlivable. World is pain and pain regularly produces moral 
disqualification. In the light of a radical naturalized ontology, the “ethical evilness of 
the world” shall be, in the better case, a completely derived outcome. Traditionally, 
it has been thought that either human beings were “naturally bad” or the 
“circumstances” turned them bad. In the first case, they would necessarily be bad, 
in the second, empirically or circumstantially bad. But opening the worldly-
structural dimension within naturalized ontology, we see human beings turn bad 
not by their nature or by intra-worldly causations, but because of the structural-
worldly situation in which they are found since ever. They are “situationally bad” but 
in the scope of a “situation” in which they cannot, in any way, not to be. 
 
In the ontological-worldly level, the force of the trivial sea-saw of ontical 
“pleasures and pains” is over, the sea-saw currently expressed in the vulgar 
sayings: “After the bad moments, come the good ones”, “Life is a succession of 
pleasures and pains”, “Tomorrow will be another day”. This symmetry of 
possibilities finishes in the structural level, because tomorrow will absolutely not be 
another day but the same day as yesterday, and the same as the day before 
yesterday and the same as always. The being-towards-death has only one 
direction, ontology is “one-way”. There is not a death-life direction explainable by 
naturalized ontology. “Being alive” is a dimension of being-towards-death, as being 
“wealthy” is a dimension of being-towards-illness and “being at peace”, a 
dimension of being-towards-aggression: they are all of them ontical postponing, 
small route corrections. Finitude and helplessness are not in oscillation with their 
contraries, we are not older some day and younger the next; the following day of 
helplessness is always helplessness. In the ontological level, we can never be 
“better” or “worse”. The so called “pleasure” is not a part of the structure of the 
world, but of the postponing strategy of humans.   
 
There is no being-towards-pleasure, all pleasure is ontic and intra-worldly, 
and therefore the beings (estantes), on their forgetful run away from being, search 
precisely for refuge in the middle of the beings within the world. Only in the intra-
worldly level one could also speak of pain as postponement of pleasure. But 
however “independent of beings” that pleasure might seem (this sensation of 
feeling good simply “for being”, for being alive, without any particular motive), 
pleasure does not succeed in dispensing with beings and establishing an internal 
rapport with the proper being of being. If we give some time to beings, in the form, 
for example, of illness or any other feature of natural ontology, that apparent 
“ontological pleasure” will be destroyed; structurally it cannot happen; because the 
same beings that give “pleasure” are also in charge of hampering it. On the other 
hand, pain, in the worldly sense, does not postpone anything. Of course, the world 
could have been structured in a radically different manner than it is now, and other 
ontological tendencies (like, for example, the world as being structurally pleasure) 
would take place. But we are here talking on the world as it is, and not as it could 
possibly be.  
 
The painfulness of being has to do with the narrowing and limitation 
connected to its own emergence. Pain is connected to a fundamental lack of 
space, a space that used to be abounding when non-being was in vigor and that 
now scants. And it is this same lack of space that, as we saw before, settles the 
conditions for moral disqualification. In order to be moral it is necessary to have 
enough space and the world itself, in its structure, as elucidated by naturalized 
ontology, consists of a fundamental “lack of space”. (The most despairing torture 
invented by human beings against others does not consist in leaving someone in 
contact with unpleasant beings (as electroshocks or clamps), but in simply leaving 
him alone with being, with his own being and without beings of any kind (for 
example, in a dark cell where there is nothing to hear or see), with nothing to do 
and with no opportunity to run away and embrace beings, as our troubled daily life 
conveniently allows. Observing this case, we will see with surprise that the pure 
and immediate contact with the “good being” of affirmative society… despairs! The 
contact with pure being is enough to torture. 
 
The naturalized ontology only describes the direction of nature in terms of its 
raw and trivial sensible-natural mode of being. The being wears out and gets worn 
out, brakes, wrinkles, passes, decreases, withers, gets older, steals, limits, 
evacuates, gives up, cracks. The results of that naturalized ontology are certainly 
not “interesting”, but they are, so to speak, the most trivial, something that cannot 
be made subtle in an “intelligent” way, but only boringly repeated. Intelligence will 
return only in the level of ethics, in the moment of thinking in ethical ways of 
behavior that could succeed in being “interesting”, against the natural and 
disturbing trivialities of nature. In certain way, every ethical theory in the usual 
affirmative sense has always proposed “to make life interesting” in the sense of 
regular concealment of natural triviality. A “negative ethics” will have to show how 
to deal with the radical lack of interest of life without falling into affirmative 
impositions, since it seems impossible to “affirm” the world in the sense of 
“considering it good”, but only in the sense of a “firming” (afianzar) on it.   
 
Pain is obviously neither good nor bad ethically, but it can totally suppress the 
spaces of morality and, in that sense, be the empirical-natural condition of evil (not 
in the stingy sense, denounced by Kant, of the man who proclaims, self-
benevolently, “he cannot do anything against” the temptation of evil, like the 
alcoholic or the adulterer). People in a situation of torture or tied to a hospital bed 
suffering a terminal illness literally can do absolutely nothing in order to preserve 
themselves as ethical persons. All apparent counterexamples of that are always 
imagined in a not extreme level of pain, contrary to what is required in my reflection 
here. 
 
Throughout fundamental ontology it is also suggested a manner of passing 
from “being” to “ought”, from nature to ethical theory, without “naturalist fallacy” (in 
the sense of G. E. Moore). In the first place, it is shown pain is structural, which 
means, it forms part of the very natural world. Secondly, it is proved pain, as 
intense, physical and own, can ethically disqualify. From this, it follows that it is 
ethically good to run away from self intense physical pain, and not only “sensibly 
advantageous”. This last is a moral rule that has emerged from natural facts. Thus, 
when it is radically asked if being itself is good, independently from the traditional 
questions about how to be, or how to be good, now we can answer that being itself 
is neither good nor bad, but it is possible to show, through a naturalized ontology, 
that the very being is painful; and, to the extent the intensity of pain can ethically 




Excursus on nature. Concerning nature, affirmative ethics had entertained 
an ambivalent attitude: on one side, they liked to emphasize there are certain 
impulses that are legitimate, to the extent they are “natural”, for example, the 
“impulse of staying alive”. “…maintaining your own life is a duty and, moreover, we 
all have an immediate tendency to do so…”, Kant affirms (“Fundament of 
Metaphysics of Morals”, BA 9, 10; my translation from German). And: “…man 
experiences a natural repulsion against suicide; only when he puts himself to 
consider the question subtly he thinks in the possibility of committing suicide…” 
(Lessons of ethics, p. 160; my translation from Spanish). So in this scope, nature 
appears as something good, as when one talks about “living according to nature”. 
But, on the other hand, within the same affirmative vein, nature has frequently 
been seen as source of immorality, in the sense humans should not live only 
“according to their natural tendencies”, but according to certain norms of conduct 
that “fight against mere nature” in a permanent attempt to “humanize it” 
(humanization of sexuality, of feeding, and other primary functions, on the direction 
of an appropriation of them to a human level). From this perspective, nature 
appears as something bad. Thus, the same human being who should seek “to live 
according to nature”, should, at the same time, “fight against the purely natural 
determinations” of actions. 
 
It is usually admitted that something that is done by simple natural tendency, 
cannot be ethically qualified neither as good nor evil, for not being subjected to 
option. Thus, even though maintaining life by duty might be considered as a moral 
motivation, by contrast, making those actions simply because “we feel an 
immediate tendency to do so” is not moral because of this. So we see there has 
been an ambiguous attitude regarding nature in affirmative traditions. Sometimes 
conciliation has been sought through the notion of a “properly human nature”: 
human beings should try to live “according to their nature”, fighting against the 
natural “non-human” tendencies. That way, in the case of our problem here, it 
would be the case, from the affirmative position, that continuing to live and 
procreating are actions determined by human nature, and committing suicide and 
abstaining from procreating would be, in that sense, “anti-natural tendencies”. 
 
Nevertheless, this separation of nature in non-human and human is highly 
problematic. The expansive force and friction seem to be present in the totality of 
nature, but in the case of human beings the first appears under the form of a will to 
live, and the second as suffering. It is plausible to think animals are also subjected 
to structural pain; however, in the case of humans, structural pain gets into 
relations with the moral dimensions of life. The “natural” characteristics elucidated 
by naturalized ontology do not allow deciding whether it is “natural” or “more 
natural” to keep on living or stop living, to procreate or to abstain from doing it. The 
only thing ontology deals with is structural pain, in the sense of deprivation and 
decaying. If we want to take this result into account in the philosophical 
consideration of a possible morality of forms of non-being usually condemned by 
the affirmative approach (the stop being the own being (suicide) and the not letting 
be other people who are not yet (abstention from procreating)), we should ask 
ourselves again the question we have made from the beginning of this book: is 
there a moral duty of continuing to live and of giving life to others based on the very 
structure of the world?.  
 
But if radical and naturalized ontology gives us a structurally “painful” world 
that, in its intrinsic painfulness, can ethically disqualify, this allows us to say that, to 
the extent a certain kind of suicide and a certain kind of abstention are performed 
taking strictly in consideration the painful structure of the world, these two actions 
can be considered as ethically valuable actions to the extent they cut off the 
passage towards moral disqualification openly allowed by the extreme painfulness 
of the world (letting aside, of course, ontic suicides and abstentions we can 
abandon to their usual affirmative condemnations). 
 
It seems, therefore, there cannot be an unconditioned ethical duty of 
conservation or proliferation of life, to the extent they may open the scope of 
physical and extreme pain able to lead to moral disqualification. What should be 
ethically condemned is undoubtedly neither conservation nor interruption of life 
itself, but the conservation or interruption which leads to that disqualification. 
Considering “natural” the conservation or interruption is a not critical position, and 
would indeed cause a return to the traditional ambiguous use of the notion of 
“nature”. It is neither the case of “living according to nature” nor “fighting 
systematically against nature”, but of taking nature into account at its most general 
and trivial features in the moment of ethically evaluating actions. Neither stop living 
nor continue to live, neither procreate nor refraining from doing it seem to 
constitute “moral obligations”, if we consider the pure ontological-natural structure 
of the world. Nature – as elucidated by naturalized ontology – shall constitute only 
an ultimate and insuperable reference point of our moral evaluations, but in any 
way should we put nature in benefit of one or another of the options of human 
beings in their being-in-the-world. 
 
Nature is not committed to any direction of action in an absolute sense. 
Perhaps what counts in that context is the pure inertia of the starting situation: 
when we ask about being, we already are. If in any fantastic situation (as the one 
imagined in my short novel, The Report Office) we could start that evaluation from 
the perspective of non-being, maybe the initial non-being would be identified with 
the “natural” and the subsequent being with the “anti-natural”. That the question 
about the (own) being is inevitably put as a question of “continuing or not” to be, 
does not commit us to accept pure continuing as being “natural”. If non-being has 
rationally supported rights, it will not lose them under the fact of “having arrived too 
late”, that means, under the fact that, when one asks about the being, one is 
already “being”, instead of “not being”. 
 Note 3. Tribute to Schopenhauer. 
 
The classical European philosopher of a “naturalized ontology” is Arthur 
Schopenhauer, whose extraordinary contribution to ethics and ontology has not 
been recognized yet, neither by contemporary German thinking (in spite of Adorno 
and Horkheimer) nor, in general, by the rest of the world. Due to his easy and little 
technical style and the irrelevant particularities of his philosophical temperament, 
Schopenhauer is considered by many as the prototype of the “superficial 
philosopher”. But it is exactly from that quality of the Schopenhauerian thinking a 
negative ethics can take exhaustive profit. Before the incredible subtleties of 
affirmative ontology, from which not even Heidegger is free, what is most needed is 
an exhaustingly “superficial” negative philosophy like Schopenhauer‟s. To him 
belong the ideas of the empirical character of metaphysics and the structural 
nature of pain, capital to the present reflection:  
 
“… Metaphysics has not as its aim observing particular experiences, but 
explicating exactly the totality of experience. However its fundament shall 
essentially be of empirical kind… the empirical origin of metaphysics deprives 
itself, really, of the apodictic certainty which only corresponds to knowledge a 
priori” (Schopenhauer, A., The world as will and representation, volume II, chapter. 
17, p. 178; my translation from Spanish). What Schopenhauer calls “the totality of 
experience” (Erfahrung im Ganzen) is approximately the level which I have called 
“structural” or “worldly”. This naturalized metaphysics adopts, in the case of 
Schopenhauer, the form of a philosophy of the “will to live” that in its insatiability, 
not different in nature from hunger and reproduction instinct, necessarily produces 
pain and, at last, some brief moments of pleasure among uncountable misery.   
 
It is strictly this instinctive mechanism of desire that establishes the realm of 
pain. The core of each thing is this identical aspiration of will, but true satisfaction 
does not exist, since it is the starting point of a new desire, also difficult to satisfy, 
and the origin of new pains. (The world, I, 56, p. 405) This is why for its origin and 
its essence, will is damned to pain. Each human being is determined by certain 
types and intensities of desire in an internal manner, which does not depend on 
external circumstances. Schopenhauer criticizes, from this volitional version of the 
structural character of pain, what I call the affirmativeness in philosophy and in 
everyday life: “However most of the time we deny to accept that knowledge…that 
pain is essential to life and does not come from outside, but each one of us carries 
this non exhaustive source within ourselves…we always search for an external 
cause or excuse for pain…until we find a desire we can neither satisfy nor 
renounce to; so we achieve, in a certain way, what we desire, which is: something 
we can always blame to be the cause of our pains, instead of accusing our own 
being…” (I, 57, p. 415). And: “Every satisfaction… is, for its very nature, always 
negative, never positive… satisfaction or happiness can never be anything else 
than the suppression of a pain…” (I, 58, 415). 
 
The pain of existing is of a worldly, not intra-worldly, character, and the 
persistent attribution of structural pain to intra-worldly external causes can be read 
as a chapter of the history of the oblivion of being (not in the Heideggerian vein, but 
as oblivion of the non-being of being, in my own terms). This result of the structural 
character of pain as pain of living will be crucial in the passage to rational 
demonstration of the ethical character of some forms of instauration of non-being 
(as suicide and refrain from procreating). Only the idealistic-transcendent 
prejudices of Schopenhauer, mixed with his Platonic Buddhism, in particular on the 
idea suicide only affects the phenomenical being and not the noumenon, prevented 
him to pass from the idea of structural pain to a morality of suicide, in the first 
volume of his masterpiece. Removing these concepts taken from Transcendental 





In intra-worldly situations, it is considered we act in a morally reprehensible 
way when we put someone in a situation which we know is painful when it was 
possible to avoid it. What prevents from applying that evaluative criterion to the act 
of procreation, since, in the light of natural ontology, we have copious structural 
information about the possible being, referent to its structural helplessness and 
pain and the subsequent moral disqualification that will inevitably follow? If it is true 
Dasein is fundamentally a being-towards-death, what is the point in giving birth to 
someone to be-towards-death? If the very transference from the punctual 
conception of dying to the structure of the being-towards-death implies a so 
dramatic and conscientious effort for current and effective life, what would be the 
point of creating someone who would have to make such an effort?  
 
If life itself consists of a fundamental directing to constitutive non-being, why 
withdrawing someone who is completely and absolutely placed in the pure non-
being of being, in order to painfully fulfill that which he already represents, by not 
being, in his very constitution? Why disturbing someone who already does 
something in a perfect way in order that he, by being, could do it in an imperfect 
way? Are we not putting him under an evitable pain (since we can refrain from 
doing it), in a pain not worth-while, or in a situation where such disvalue is 
constituted in a situation that, literally, “is not worthy”?  
 
These are the fundamental ethical-ontological questions previous to each and 
every question about the morality of how to live, or of how to be in general. I intend 
to understand here how the usual affirmative categories would be able to face 
those questions and to provide for them any convincing answer; and I make myself 
the question of until which point, in order to answer them, will it be necessary the 
introduction of “negative categories”, in the relative sense mentioned above. 
 
In the light of natural ontology, it is not correct the argument that we do not 
know anything about our possible offsprings, for example, about the capacity they 
will have to overcome structural pain; because even we do not know, for example, 
whether they will enjoy traveling, working or studying classical languages, we do 
know they will be indigent, decadent, vacating beings who will start dying since 
birth, who will face and be characterized by systematic dysfunctions, who will have 
to constitute their own beings as beings-against-the-others – in the sense of 
dealing with aggressiveness and having to discharge it over others – who will lose 
those they love and be lost by those who love them, and time will take everything 
they manage to build, etc. By giving birth to someone, we impoverish her 
ontologically – if our previous considerations are correct about the problematical 
character of a “primacy of being over non-being” – and we also limit her ethically by 
putting her into the structural space in which, in addition to being always subjected 
to the possibility of moral disqualification, she will permanently have “to expand” in 
detrimental of someone and to inevitably elaborate a project of self-assurance, not 
always morally guided, in the sense of a purely strategic fulfillment, at most, of the 
fundamental ethical articulation.  
 
Moreover, it would not mitigate anything of our moral procreation onus the 
fact that we suppose the newborn will have a sufficiently strong structure to bear 
the non-being of being, in a similar way we undoubtedly would not morally justify 
the behavior of someone who sent a colleague to a dangerous situation by saying: 
“I sent him there because I know he is strong and he will manage well”. The 
“strengths” of the newborn do not relieve in anything the moral responsibility of the 
procreator. Anyone would answer: “This is irrelevant. Your role in the matter 
consisted of sending people to a situation you know was difficult and painful and 
you could avoid it. Your predictions about their reacting manners do not decrease 
in anything your responsibility”. 
 
In the case of procreation, the reasoning could be the same, and in a 
notorious emphatic way, since in any intra-worldly situation with already existing 
people in which we send someone to a position known as painful, the other one 
could always run away from pain to the extent his being is already in the world and 
he could predict danger and try to avoid being exposed to a disregarding and 
manipulative maneuver. In the case of the one who is being born, by contrast, this 
is not possible at all because it is precisely his very being that is being 
manufactured and used. Concerning birth, therefore, manipulation seems to be 
total. Kant has condemned suicide, among other motives, for the usage of life itself 
as a mean, by committing suicide to run away from the hardships and boredom of 
life. Why not condemning, with the same argument, procreation to the strict extent 
it uses the life of the child as a mean to run away from the hardships and boredom 
of life?  
 
We do not need to listen to intra-worldly motives that clearly present the 
manipulation of offspring (of the kind of “having a child who will do what I did not 
succeed doing”). Even when this is not ontically the case, it is ontologically 
inevitable that the newborn is manipulated, restricting his being and ethically 
putting him at risk, independently from eventual intra-worldly manipulations and 
from good intentions of claiming of non-manipulation (for example, saying the child 
will be left in “total freedom” to do “whatever he wants”). Even though the 
ontological manipulation of newborn is absolutely inevitable, it is evitable, for sure, 
to give birth, and that precisely indicates to a morality of abstention, to the extent 
this form of non-being seems to constitute a feasible way to free someone from 
structural pain and its consequent moral disqualification. 
 
It seems there is no philosophical-rational argument (not, for example, 
religious or juridical) to recover the rationality and morality of making-someone-be, 
of birth, of appearing in the world. (See note 6 later about Leibniz and the problem 
of world creation). We can understand all forms of “salvation” developed by 
affirmative philosophy, but none of them allows us to understand what means 
giving life to someone in order to save him or her. Nietzsche has taught us to 
detect a mechanism of some behavior, elucidated by the genealogy of morals, 
consisting of putting-someone-there-in-order-to-help-her, to dispose of someone 
there in order to be good and moral with her, and our consequent frustration if the 
other does not allow us to help her.  “I need you there so I could help you. If you do 
not let me help, I abominate you, because you exist there to be helped.” That 
mechanism, if used in a radical way, may be useful for understanding the morality 
of procreation. To people who are thinking in procreation affirming they will love 
intensely and take much care of future child, it is necessary to soberly remind that 
taking care, loving and saving someone who is already in the world makes full 
sense, but it is difficult to see the justification of giving birth to someone in order to 
love, take care and save him or her. This attitude seems to discard ab initio that the 
best way of helping, taking care, loving and saving someone is… not giving him or 
her birth! Through the Nieztschean suspicious, it looks like people are disposed to 
do all sort of things to avoid their children suffer, anything except… not bringing 
him or her to the structural pain and to moral disqualification. 
 
Bringing someone to being in order to protect him or her from this same 
being, inaugurates, in a possible way, what I call “second degree morality”. It 
seems all we can do is to build morality and rationality from that point, from birth 
onwards. Thus, one may certainly be a good father, without never answering the 
radical question of whether it is good or not, in general, to be a father. However, 
being a good father will be based on some intra-worldly morality that will drag with 
it the shadow and stigma of being a second degree morality presupposing a 
fundamental moral questioning, never answered in a more radical level. The act of 
giving to procreation only a secondary moral justification could not satisfy our moral 
concerns, to the extent even from war, death penalty and even crime, it is always 
possible do develop a second degree morality. If there are second degree moral 
justifications for the violence of making-not-be-in-the-world, the fact there might 
also be such kind of justification for the violence of making-be-in-the-world will not 
satisfy us.  
 
It is important to say here that the current affirmative ethics, when concerned 
about suicide, homicide and birth, seems to inevitably constitute a secondary 
morality, and, by contrast, a “negative ethics” will make an extreme and radical 
attempt to establish itself as primary morality or morality of first degree (maybe an 
impossible enterprise). Part of this “negative” morality, in the relative sense 
mentioned above, will adopt towards procreation, as shall be seen, the attitude I 
propose here to call formal abstention; so I call the act of not-making-be someone 
when based on a concern of avoiding morally disqualifying structural pain, making 
a relevant distinction between this kind of ontological abstention and ontic-intra-
worldly abstentions, in the line, for example, of “birth control”.  
 
One of the most unpopular intuitions of my Project of Negative Ethics (1989) 
has been precisely that ontological manipulation, the manipulation of the very 
being of humans, constitutes a common point between the making-be and the 
making-not-be: we dispose of the being of others when we make them appear in 
the world as much as when we eliminate them. If someone replies that the 
difference between eliminating life and generating life resides in the fact that while 
people kill each other for hate, they procreate for love, the question about the 
relations between the ethical distinction good/evil and the sensible distinction 
love/hate has been posed. As we have seen before, Kant taught us to never 
confuse the level of pleasure/pain (or of pleasant/unpleasant) with the level of 
ethical or non-ethical articulation; so it seems we should have the same kind of 
precaution concerning the relations between ethics and love; because someone 
can be lead to quickly set ethics on the side of love and hate on the side of non-
ethical, but this is not right.  
 
Fernando Savater, in the last part of his Invitation to ethics situates love 
among the things that would be “beyond ethics”. “…I can more or less abstractly 
recognize myself in the other, respect him by principle, feel compassion for him… 
but not love him! It would be asking too much: nothing can demand me love…” 
(Savater, Invitation to ethics, p. 118; my translation from Spanish).  And: “There 
where love imposes itself, ethics has practically nothing to say… love…destroys 
and loses as well as it builds, annihilates and creates, sometimes in a same 
impulse…” (p. 119). “Love discovers the value of the other, but such „value‟ is not 
its ethical category, the level of its virtue” (p. 120). “Where love resides, ethics is 
left over, and virtue ceases to have sense. The objectives of virtue, what they aim 
to obtain of value, generosity, humanity, solidarity, justice, etc… is achieved by 
love without even intending it, without neither effort nor discipline. And it does it in 
its own way, in a non (or very little) moral way, cowardly, rapaciously, unfairly, 
inhumanly… in the relation of love,  it is revealed to us, at last, the true content of 
ethics…but we must not elude ourselves: ethics is irreplaceable, it cannot be 
supplanted completely by love…” (p. 121). I think love cannot supplant ethics at all.  
 
The coincidence or approximation of ethics with love is accidental, in the 
sense I can have extreme consideration for those I do not love (most part of 
humankind) and, by loving, I may break moral rules. In the basis of these 
coincidences, we are disposed to be ethical to the ones we love (the “limited 
generosity” of Hume) and to be maximally tolerant and benevolent towards their 
self-defensive and hetero-aggressive mechanisms. However, at any moment, love 
can make us lose dignity, freedom, responsibility and the rest of our moral values. 
Nothing more erotically justifiable than a certain dose of voluntary slavery 
(manifested, for example, in the very common attitude of parents who enjoy “letting 
themselves dominate” by their small children), connected to the masochist 
component of Eros, but ethical justification is another thing. Can there be pleasure 
without a minimum sacrifice of dignity? The “going against oneself” of the voluntary 
slave is not the same as the “going against oneself” of the fundamental ethical 
articulation.  
 
An erotic “deviation” (a perversion) is not of the same order of a “moral 
deviation”.  Being ethically bad is not the same as being erotically perverse, or 
vice-versa, even though this connection is made regularly. Of course perversions 
are “unworthy” from the moral point of view, but this is a sign it is absurd to apply 
ethical-rational categories to forms of sexuality. It would be the same absurd as to 
condemn an ethic theory by not enriching our forms of eroticism: it is clear that all 
ethical theories drastically reduce our vitality by force of their imperatives, but this 
is just a sign it is an absurd to apply erotic categories to theories of ethics. And 
what is said about love should equally be said about hate. Hate drives us out from 
the sphere of morality, not by its content or its intentionality, but by its own 
instinctual mechanisms, as well as love does. 
 
Thus, whoever has said to procreate for love, as others kill for hate, might 
have said a truth, but, no doubt, this person has not given any moral justification for 
procreation. Saying you have had a child “for love” is a manner of saying you have 
had him or her compulsively, according to the wild rhythms of life. In a similar way, 
we might intensely love our parents and, at the same time, consider fatherhood 
ethically-rationally problematic, and visualize we have been manipulated by them. I 
may continue to love after having detected immorality, there is nothing 
contradictory on that. Neither would morally justify a homicide saying we have 
done it for hate, nor a suicide saying we have done it “for hate against ourselves”. 
Something can continue to be ethically problematic even when guided by love 
(Setting aside the very complexity of those feelings themselves, so well studied by 
Freud: love turns easily into hate and vice-versa in a scaring fluid way). 
 
Kamlah has written: “…we can only recognize those obligations we have 
freely and independently contracted ourselves or those ones that can be 
reconstructed afterwards as we had contracted them independently. For example, 
some obligations within the scope of family and State, which we have already born 
with, can be reconstructed that way…” (Kamlah, Philosophic Anthropology, p. 117; 
my translation from Spanish). Nevertheless, all that can be “recovered” that way is 
just intra-worldly, the being itself, creatio ex nihilo of our progenitors, is 
unrecoverable (On that line, it might be absurd the idea of Sartre, in Being and 
Nothingness, that, in a certain sense, “we have chosen to be born”). As we shall 
see further on, in the discussions with Habermas and Tugendhat, each one of us 
maintains with our progenitors, in the ontological level, a relation of infinite 
dependence regardless how much we manage to “set us independent from them” 
in the ontic-intra-worldly level. Each one of us is a newborn forever, someone who 
is here in the world inevitably through manipulation (“loving” or not) of his or her 
own being.  
 
Concerning manipulation, progenitors have searched, through the generation 
of another being, a kind of recognition of the similar order as the one Hegel 
describes in the fight against the enemy, in the famous servant/lord dialectic. 
Humans seek to be recognized not only by the ones they defeat on a battle, but 
also by those they make appear in the world. Notwithstanding, the son is already 
born as that who nobody can be, that means, as a thing; and throughout his whole 
life he will fight in order to get away from the scopes of the manipulation which 
defines him from the very manufacture of his being, and not in its mere ontical 
details. From that point, a struggle to death is waged between progenitors and their 
offspring, an ontological fight, in the sense the son does not have any space to 
develop himself or herself as a human being except, precisely, that space of 
opposition to his or her progenitors, in spite of the kind of affective character their 
intra-worldly relationship might have. 
 
Thus, the progenitors‟ attempt to be recognized through their children fails, 
because the fact the offsprings, in virtue of their own beings, can never accept to 
assume this being which, for being born, they already are. Yet, in spite of that 
internal refusal to be what they have to be and already are, they remain 
necessarily an infinite dependency on their own generator‟s project. Their own 
humanization process is performed in permanent and inevitable conflict against the 
necessarily reifying forces of their birth, and the “being” the progenitors intended to 
obtain through the appearance of the son in the world turns out to escape through 
their fingers by the strength of the necessary ontological offspring‟s demand, not 
less violent for being a priori failed (or, perhaps, more and more violent because of 
that). The son‟s being, far from recovering some “lost” being (in reality, never 
possessed) represents the returning of non-being tried to be postponed – 
according to the usual affirmative mechanisms – through birth, showing the 
systematic failure of concealment. In certain sense, the violence of the offspring‟s 
demand is an evidence of the enormous quantum of moral responsibility of his or 
her birth, or the extent of manipulation – “loving”, we may accept – which such birth 
has inevitably consisted of.  
 
The negativity the son represents for his progenitors is like the ontological 
reflection of the abstention that was initially discarded, although this abstention 
seemed to represent the maximum of moral responsibility concerning the 
temptation of making-be. That is why the mere reproducing of life, without doing 
anything with it, is incapable of fostering the values of men, constituting a minimal 
and miserable way of life. In order life becomes human, it is necessary to make 
with life something else than simply life. The ontological sorrowing of a conscience 
will not be cured through the infinite generation of more and more consciences, 
because in this compulsive generating, the human being incessantly searches for 
something another human being neither has nor could provide. Every human being 
is the spot of an impossibility. There are pacts and negotiations a human being 
may establish with all persons except her progenitors, because her struggle is 
internal, and it is waged in the very heart of the constitution of her conscience, her 
language and her being human. 
 
The son, who has been expected to be the life of his parents and their 
mediated self-recognition, turns to be the generation of their own death. As seen 
by Hegel, the son becomes the unexpected self-suppression of his parents. Within 
education, the parents‟ conscience is the matter whose expenses the son is raised 
and educated. The parents suppress the simple and undivided being-within-itself, 
of the son, and what they give him, they lose; they die on him; and parents 
contemplate, on the becoming of the son, their own dialectical suppression.  Even 
when, from the point of view of a negative ethics, a human being admits afterwards 
moral principles of great ontological parsimony (as shall be seen on the chapter 
about “Negative survival”) in the sense, for example, of the structural abstention 
and other negative attitudes concerning the others, in his condition of “newborn”, 
he will not have been able to avoid, notwithstanding, this self-constituting as the 
death of his progenitors. When he decides not to change the ontology of the world, 
he realizes he has already changed it simply by being. Of course he is totally 
innocent of the “destruction” of his parents. When we make someone else be, we 
radically impoverish him in an ontological sense, we put him at risk of moral 
disqualification and, from ever, we constitute him as the inevitable ontological 
vindication - on which he may not be personally interested - against those who 
have given him birth. 
 
Thus, in a strictly rational perspective, a birth can be seen as a kind of ethical-
ontological moral transgression of the most fundamental character (and, therefore, 
abstention could be seen, if structural, as an ethically-rationally justifiable act). This 
could show ad absurdum, so to speak, life cannot be rationally sustained, saying 
yes to life must be an act of emotional nature, as proclaimed by Nietzsche: in its 
internal fight, ethics condemns life, and the strength of life disentangles from all 
moral impositions (See Epilogue II). It is significant that it has never been 
presented, along all the history of philosophy, a truly rational prove (which means, 
without the introduction of affective or religious elements) of “the value of human 
life”. On the contrary, philosophers have been in general much cautious or 
definitely pessimist about it. Kant is very careful as he affirms morality is totally 
independent from the recognition of an intrinsic value of life, and contemporary 
moral philosophers, like R. M. Hare, also try to decouple both, on Utilitarian 
grounds (See Part IV, 3). Schopenhauer suggested something stronger: maybe the 
opposite evidence (a proof of the disvalue of human life) could be available.   
 
That is what I am trying to outlining here, applying – and that is crucial - the 
usual affirmative categories themselves, but in a radical way. I do that not by an 
"existentialist" morbid attitude, but for logical purposes or with the intention to bring 
those categories to a kind of quality test, a sort of Experimentum Crucis which can 
prove the effectiveness and, ultimately, the truth or falsity of the usual statement 
about philosophy as a radical enterprise that seeks truth unconditionally, and not 
the comfort or the consolidation of some state of affairs (political, religious, etc). So 
my intentions here are not only ethical and ontological, but also, ultimately, meta-
philosophical.  
 
If the radical application of the current affirmative categories leads - as Nietzsche 
saw in his criticism against "European Nihilism" – to the ethical condemnation of 
life or, at least, to its fundamental questioning, does it mean that, in order to 
recapture something as a “value of human life”, we must introduce – paradoxically 
– “negative” categories, in the relative sense, in our moral considerations? This is 




Note 4: About Children and works of art. 
 
There is something in common between the intention of creating a work and 
that of procreating a child: a deep conviction that what cannot be worth living (or 
what stopped, at some point, being worth living) may be worth being contemplated 
from outside, or somehow “re-produced." Thus, to the Nietzschenian question 
"How much truth, can a man support?" the answer could be: "Lived truth, very little, 
but contemplated truth, much". Both children and works are, for their creator, 
"contemplated being" in the sense of being we are not obliged to be. 
Contemplation produces the strong impression the being is finally livable...by 
others, when you have not the hard job of living it. The being of the child and the 
being of the work are beings I can observe from a safe place, far from danger 
(although artists succeed in maintaining this position better than parents). A child 
and a work are delayed negativity, the renewed transfer of an impossible search. In 
both cases, however, life becomes livable, but only when it is no longer my own. 
 The moralism we find, for example, at the censoring of literary or movie 
works often stresses the moral responsibility of authors for everything they write or 
shoot, considering a work can exert a pernicious influence on its audience. On this 
line, one might raise the same question of abstention that was put in the case of 
the procreation of people, i.e., the possibility of not creating any work at all. This 
literary and movie "abstention" (subject-matter of Fellini‟s masterpiece Otto e 
Mezzo) could be considered "formal", in the above mentioned sense, since a 
person would refrain from writing a book or shooting a film not for intra-worldly 
motives (not finding a publisher, not having budget for filming, etc..) but because it 
might affect someone in his or her own human condition. However, this moral 
scruple of affirmative society over literary and cinema creations is odd, before the 
strange ease, lightness and automatism which the world is daily and constantly 
filled with children as if this kind of creation carried less responsibility than the 
making of books and films.  
 
It is curious that the possibility, much more indirect and remote, any reader 
of our books commits suicide after reading it is considered more tangible than the 
possibility children suffer the structural pain and moral disqualification in which we 
have inevitably placed them. What is created by writing a book is the mere 
possibility of influencing a conscience, whereas what is created when generating a 
child is a conscience. The influence on conscience procreation exerts is located in 
the level of the very being of conscience, as no writer creates the being of the 
conscience of his readers. At most, he influences already formed consciences, 
without excluding the possibility such influence is beneficial, while we have no 
chance to save our children from the structural pain of being. Furthermore, if ethics 
is committed not to the mere maintenance of life, but to the morally decent life, the 
fact a reader should refrain from having children or commits suicide as a result of 
reading a book (if such things ever happen!), this still means nothing from the 
ethical point of view, neither could be proclaimed, from that fact, the "bad moral 
influence" of the book. 
 
I point out here the phenomenon of the “aesthetic of procreation” as one of 
the more regular and daily mechanisms for concealment of the moral responsibility 
towards birth. It consists of the frequent attempt to turn children into "works of art", 
because children are beautiful - even ugly ones - as, in general, are beautiful the 
miniatures and living beings with graceful movements. No one can resist a little 
hand clutching a toy or the wobbly walk or the mumbling and charming talk of a 
child. However what is evaluated in the question of the value of being is certainly 
not the beauty of the product, but the morality of the production. Ethically, it should 
not be possible to have children as we have pictures and vases. The ethical 
question is not on the beauty but on the having. It is unethical to turn a moral 















In modern philosophy, only David Hume – among the more important 
European philosophers - tried to argue for the possible morality of suicide. 
Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein have qualified suicide, 
respectively, as an act driven by inadequate ideas, heteronomy and use of one‟s 
own person as a mean, product of moral disturb, self-delusion of will and 
fundamental sin. In a particularly extemporaneous and, as we have seen, scarcely 
justifiable way, Heidegger's ontology, despite its negative character, is closed, ab 
initio, to any ontological grounding of an ethics of the stop-being-the-own-being. To 
prove this, it will be necessary to show again the problematic character of an 
alleged ethical-evaluative “neutrality" of Heidegger‟s existential analysis. 
 
As we know, according to that analysis, while Dasein lives, he is in the state 
of “unresolved” and his totality remains only as “a possibility”. “In Dasein, while he 
is, there is, in each case, a lack of something he may and will be. That is what the 
'end' itself is regularly inherent to. The 'end' of the being-in-the-world' is death". 
(Being and time, § 45; my translation from German). Here, death is removed from 
its vulgar punctual conception, as an event in the world, and put in the domain of 
"proper possibility", and as the most peculiar of all, as the one capable of 
“consummate” Dasein, or of "resolving"  his totality, not as a being that merely 
"dies", but as a being that “is-towards-death”. This concept is so distant from the 
ordinary, that Heidegger considers being-towards-death connected to care (Sorge). 
Following the line of "totality" and of the "yet unresolved," Heidegger says: 
"However, as soon as Dasein exists so absolutely nothing is missing in him, he has 
turned into a being that is no more. If something in his being is no longer missing, 
that means his annihilation. While Dasein is a being who is, he never achieves his 
„totality‟. But once he gains it, his greed converts into pure and simple loss of the 
„being-in-the-world‟” (§46). 
 
The much usual intra-worldly experience of the “being replaced by” or of 
“having a representative” (fundamental property of symbols, according to modern 
semiotics) is completely strange to death, if seen ontological-existentially. Part of 
the “property” of death consists of its being mine, in each case, in a not 
transferable way; but that being mine of death shall be obtained through the 
abandonment of the ordinary conception of death, according to which only 
unreflectively and automatically we may still speak of the death of a person, when, 
in reality, people die, all of them - within the non-property – the same death. 
Nevertheless, speaking about totality suggests there is something missing to 
Dasein. What would it be? Dasein can only miss something that structurally 
“belongs to him” (§48) and that may not consist of ontic characteristics or 
“belongings”, because death can always take them away, and instead of 
“completing” or “resolving” Dasein, they actually despoil him. It might be something 
death does not interrupt but “consummates”, whatever the moment that punctual 
death may happen.  
 
To Dasein, evidently, absolutely nothing “lacks”, in intra-worldly terms, for 
being able to die: his being is, from ever, complete for carrying out this possibility 
“at any moment”, even when he may perhaps not have finished what he was 
ontically doing (he dies “without finishing his book”, without “meeting his son”, 
without “having traveled to Paris”, etc). In fact, what “lacks” to Dasein, in worldly-
ontological terms, is precisely and only dying. The “not yet” is already included in 
his peculiar being, not as some ordinary determination, but as a constitutive 
ingredient. Similarly, Dasein also is, while he is, in each case, his own “not yet”” 
(Idem). It does not matter he has already done “all he set out to do”: he is never 
“complete”, even when it seems he is only “waiting for death”. On the other hand, 
for the one who still has many things to finish, death will not “interrupt” anything, 
because the forgotten being cannot “resolve itself” in ontic tasks. “The ending in 
death does not mean Dasein „has come to the end‟, but it is a „being-towards-the-
end‟ of this being” (Idem). “Thus, death presents itself as the most peculiar, unique 
and unsurpassable possibility” (§50). 
 
However, in the Heidegger‟s text on being-towards-death, at least as I read 
him, there is a fundamental ambiguity: in a first moment, the possibility of willing 
death is simply ignored, because this same possibility is excluded from the very 
description made about death, as we shall see. In a second moment, Heidegger 
explicitly excludes it in what I consider a clear rupture of the alleged valor-neutral 
character of the existential analysis. Indeed, when we analyze the first moment, it 
seems the possibility of wanting to stop being the own being should stay a priori 
excluded from the existential analysis, since in this same analysis it seems the 
“indetermination of when” is crucial: “To the certainty of death is joint the 
indetermination of when… The final exegesis of the one‟s everyday speech about 
death and the way it gets into Dasein leads to the characters of certainty and 
indetermination. The full ontological-existential concept of death may be now 
defined in the following terms: death as the end of Dasein is the most peculiar, 
unique, guaranteed and, as such, undetermined and unsurpassable possibility of 
Dasein” (§52, my italics).  
 
Analyzing the second moment, Heidegger develops a subtle argument, not 
exempted from some existential humor, to decouple “wanting death” from the 
“appropriation (make it my own) of death”, with which, in any case, suicide would 
not be a way of dying in the sense of the being-towards-death.  “…death is not, as 
anything possible, something that is „at hand‟ or „just there‟, but a possibility of the 
being of Dasein. Nevertheless…the taking care (Sorge) of the realization of that 
possibility will necessarily mean an effective stop existing. But with that, Dasein 
would get deprived from the very basis of a „being-towards-death‟. If, however, with 
the „being-towards-death‟, one does not mean a „fulfillment‟ of that, it cannot mean 
this either: stopping together with the end, taken in its possibility.” (§53). 
 
The text continues: “A similar behavior would be „thinking about death‟. Such 
behavior thinks about when and how will this possibility take place. This musing 
over death does not take from it, no doubt, its character of possibility: death keeps 
being considered as something that will come; but death is weakened by the will of 
disposing of it in calculation. As being possible, death should present the less 
possible of its possibility. In the „being-towards-death‟, on the contrary, if one has to 
open, by comprehending, the characterized possibility as such, the possibility has 
to be understood without any weakness as possibility; it shall be developed as 
possibility, and in conducing our relation to it, it must be endured as possibility” 
(Idem).  
 
As a negative philosopher, Heidegger presents the notion of “totality” of 
Dasein trying to show such totality is only achieved within non-being, being 
incompatible with being. But in the second moment mentioned before, Heidegger 
surprisingly returns to the affirmative vein of thinking through a new concealment, 
this time “existential”, of non-being. This concealment occurs at the moment 
Heidegger transforms death into “my possibility”, and demands, notwithstanding, in 
the way of “property”, that death be “maintained in indetermination”, that is, in the 
not fulfillment of the possibility. Furthermore, he said the being-towards-death has 
to “foment the indetermination of uncertainty” (Idem). This marks, I think, the great 
moment of “affirmative nihilism” in “Being and Time”; because the being-towards-
death seems to be a possibility that should not consummate in a concrete fact. If 
Dasein effectively committed suicide, he would stop being-towards-death to turn 
into a dead, thus breaking his property, shifting out from it. The “property” is 
affirmatively defined as a “staying in the possibility without fulfilling it”. From that 
“neutral and purely descriptive” ontological-existential analysis, it seems to arise a 
clear existential advising in the sense of the behavior to be taken, in favor of a 
patient and arduous “wait for death”. 
 
But willing death, or to voluntarily stop being the own being, if critically 
considered, seems perfectly compatible with all Heidegger said about “property”, 
“proper being” and “being-towards-death”. Leaving aside other characteristics of 
the suicidal act that could transform it into a simple and ontic interruption due to 
intra-worldly motives (for example, the refusal from a woman or the loss of a 
fortune), willing death seems connected to a strongly critical attitude over the usual 
collapse of personal death into the anonymous One of “one dies”, vividly criticized 
in Heidegger‟s existential analysis. Suicide seems ab initio a conduct of extremely 
strong appropriation of death, as a possibility authentically mine, in each case. It 
breaks into pieces the irritating everyday category of the “not yet” and the mediocre 
and inauthentic “escaping from” death as something strange, that does not define 
anything. It highlights the non-substitutable character of my death, because it 
seems there is no death with more chances of being authentically mine than the 
one I voluntarily determine: one does not commit suicide as people habitually and 
regularly do. Suicide is difficult to impersonalize. A philosophy that highlights 
property, authenticity and the responsibility for the own dying as defining existence, 
and the struggle against concealment in the median “One dies”, such philosophy 
should exhibit better reflexive considerations concerning the voluntary stop being 
the own being; it does not seem there can be any way to philosophically justify the 
inclusion of the “maintaining indetermination” of death within “property”. 
 
The affirmative character of this Heideggerian piece of thinking shows the 
determination of Dasein concerning death, once rejected or put aside the ordinary, 
punctual, notion of death as a mere event among others, is presented only as 
determination in order to keep living and not also to stop living; without seeing 
there is no clear barrier between life and death, as the traditional affirmative 
philosophy imposes and the whole existential analysis had put in question. Within 
the pure neutrality of the ontological analysis, nothing – except a religious prejudice 
perhaps – allows saying Dasein‟s voluntary death harms property and the being-
towards-death instead of precisely accomplishing them properly. In his argument, 
Heidegger emphasizes the character of possibility of the being-towards-death, and 
using a logical artifice, expresses the mere tautology that fulfilling a possibility is, 
certainly, to end it as a possibility. However, this is not the point. The non-
tautological matter resides in that the pure possibility of dying and its effective 
realization shall both belong, in a really neutral ontological analysis, to the structure 
of the being-towards-death and, consequently, to the own possible “turning 
proper”, within the perspective of an ontological re-appropriation of being by 
Dasein. 
 
More recent authors, as the mentioned Patzig and Kamlah, among others, 
have argued on the direction of a morality of stop-being-the-own-being, however 
remaining in total “world structure blindness” when they consider as exceptional 
what is, in reality, completely regular and internally connected to the very form of 
being. Both authors talk about the most plausible ethical justification for suicide as 
being the suffering for terminal physical and/or mental illness, in which the human 
possibilities of a person are irreversibly withdrawn. But they talk as if falling, dying, 
depriving and gradual loss of physical and mental potentialities, were “exceptional” 
facts, as if this was not an inextirpable part of every human life. As a matter of fact, 
each one of us will inevitably face that progressive “structural helplessness”. It is 
important, at this point, to remember that in the case of painful diseases, the strictly 
moral justification of taking your own life in those circumstances does not reside in 
the fact disease causes suffering, since this is only a sensible-empirical motive 
which, if universalized, could lead to the moral justification of any attitude that 
escapes from pain. The moral justification resides in that, as seen before, in cases 
of intense pain, the moral capability might completely be disqualified: to avoid this, 
the person commits suicide.  
 
That kind of suicide I will call formal suicide, in order to distinguish it from 
ontical-intra-worldly suicides (professional fail, love suffering and the other 
statistical suicides). Formal suicide is exactly co-related to the formal abstention 
mentioned in preceding sections, in the sense they are forms of non-being (not-
making-be and stop-being) internally connected to the ontological-natural structure 
of the world. World structure gives something like permanent motives of formal 
self-suppression and formal abstention. It is only those kinds of suicide and 
abstention that are defined, in the present work, as morally justified. 
 
The moral disqualification motivated by our own intense physical pain is a 
constant and regular possibility of being-in-the-world, which could manifests at 
absolutely any moment, regardless official predictions based on age, physical 
conditions, social circumstances, etc. Since birth, this possibility is already 
constituted and intra-worldly events just make this possibility concrete. In this 
peculiar sense, formal suicide needs no “time” to constitute itself as an ethical 
reason for stop-being-the-own-being, because, from ever, there is available the 
ethical reason of removing from moral disqualification which is constantly ready to 
attack in the mere letting oneself living. There is no need for special intra-worldly 
reasons; intra-world provides only concrete motives to make the permanent reason 
effective. In the level of structural information, there is and there always had been a 
reason, equally structural, for not continue to be. Certainly, sensibility mediations 
connected to intra-worldly motives can intervene in the punctual moment of the 
suicidal act, not as the basic radical reason, but as sensible effectiveness to the 
realization of the act.  
 
The impression of “lack of motives” of the suicidal act – that gets people 
speaking of suicide as an “enigma” and of suicidal as someone who “lost his mind” 
– precisely arises from the fact the last reason of suicide is formal and as such 
belongs to human condition in which we are since always and not precisely “just 
now” or “some moment ago”. When own intense physical pain puts us at risk of 
taking away all space necessary for being a moral person, for doing what I want, to 
love and hate as I please, etc., the one who has “lost his mind” and makes 
something “enigmatic” seems to be the person who does not do anything, even 
when possible, in order to get out from this situation with some dignity. Far from 
“losing his mind”, the suicidal recovers the mind and exercises it in a moral way. 
Sometimes, from the rational and affective point of view, in some situations it may 
be madness to stay living. 
 
My rupture with the conceptual framework of philosophy of existence 
consists in this: in my view, human condition has no temporal nature, even though, 
as for all things, it elapses on time. There is no such thing as an “experience of 
human condition”, in the sense of a progress by stages. The miserable pseudo-
philosophy of “enjoy while you can”, “while you are still young”, should be 
overcome by one structural reflection on life. The non-being is neither theologically 
hypothecated nor transformed into a metaphysical prize: it belongs to our 
condition, constitutes a “negative patrimony” which we can use at any moment 
without requirement (and if we observe the background of our condition maybe it is 
our unique available patrimony, the only one we can really always use). As any 
other right, I may enjoy it whenever I need, or I may never use it, if so I wish. I do 
not have to do anything to deserve it nor am I destroying any moral law when I 
exercise it. (If Philosophy is conceived as a reflection about finitude, we may say 
that, if Minerva‟s‟ owl only starts flying at sunset, it is departing late. Academic 
philosophy may, no doubt, depend on the course of time to begin its fly, but 
philosophical amazement concerning being can perfectly occur very early in the 
morning, even when the better categorical mechanisms to put the amazement in 
golden letters are maybe not available at this time). 
 
As Hume points out well, it is curious that, in the condemnations of suicide, it 
is always said it is not morally worthy “to dispose of one‟s own person”, as if 
continuing to live was not “disposing of one‟s person” as well. This seems to be a 
typical asymmetry of affirmative thinking. Although committing suicide is 
considered an anti-natural decision and “disposing of one‟s own life”, continuing to 
live indefinitely is not considered a decision, but a “natural” tendency. “If disposing 
of human life was something reserved to the All mighty, and if it was an infraction 
against the divine right that people disposed of their own lives, it would be as much 
criminal that a man acted to maintain his life as to destroy it.” (Hume, “On suicide”, 
p. 127; my translation from Spanish).  
 
Formal suicide could be seen in the same perspective of humanization of 
nature, as a kind of humanization of death, like the praiseworthy humanization of 
sexuality and food. In a similar way, humans do not pretend simply to reproduce or 
have animal pleasures in their sexual intercourses, but to provide sexual relations 
a human dimension, as they do not intend only to feed themselves but to transcend 
the pure assimilative functions in order to transform feeding into something 
culturally meaningful, in the same way humans would refuse simple animal dying, 
a “natural death”, vindicating their right to introduce cultural meanings into their 
final departures. But this seems not viable without any kind of “intervention” from 
our part, without some “interest in the own death”, instead of waiting for it in calm.  
 
In the sense of the humanization of nature, death is, perhaps, what we 
should “wait for” the less, precisely for its natural and unmovable certainty; 
because there will be absolutely nothing that can modify or change it, so the way 
towards its cultural elaboration is from ever open. In any other case, we could still 
“wait for news”, forcing us, until we had heard these news, to postpone our 
purposes of enculturation. The attempt of formal suicidal is to dispose of the 
natural process of decaying, giving to it a strong human meaning that keeps a 
profound connection with what had been lived, and that is not a simple 
“interruption” of possibilities. It acquires, therefore, the meaning of a free 
administration of indetermination, taking into account considerations brutally 
ignored by “natural death”. Nature decidedly has no good manners. If “continuing 
to live” (or “giving life to somebody”) is visualized as a “natural impulse”, from an 
ethical point of view we should answer to this argument as it has always been: we 
should try to resist natural impulses on benefit of our humanity. 
 
But what was presented above as being “suicide” was conceived in much too 
narrow sense. As a fact, what has habitually been called like this is only a way of 
understanding the stop-being-the-own-being, and this is the structure to be 
understood, and not only “suicide” in the ordinary sense. This enlargement of the 
concept will sensibly help understand the morality of the stop-being-the-own-being 
in general, and particularly the reasons for a morality of the stop-being of a being 
not effectively contracted by extreme concrete threats of moral disqualification, as 
disease or physical torture. In his Lessons, Kant has explicitly condemned suicide 
from the moral point of view, through arguments I will analyze elsewhere. 
Notwithstanding, he has made an important remark: “…the one who faces death in 
order to protect his beloveds is not a suicidal, but someone magnificent and noble, 
since the highest esteem of life is based on being worthy to keep it…” (Kant, 
Lessons of ethics, p. 190; my translation from Spanish). And: “Living is not 
necessary, but it is necessary to live with dignity; he who cannot live with dignity is 
not worth-living” (p. 192). And also: “… it is not suicide risking the own life before 
the enemy and even sacrificing it in order to observe the duties to oneself… the 
intention of self-destruction is what constitutes suicide… there is a remarkable 
difference between lack of prevision or imprudence – in where it still remains a 
desire to live – and the purpose of killing oneself… the suicidal produces a kind of 
repulse, while the one who dies because of fate engender compassion” (pp. 190-
191).  
 
But the difference between “willing not to be” and “not-willing-to be” is subtle. 
For example, the ascetic who fasts – who is, according to Schopenhauer, the 
ethical man par excellence – might suddenly die of starvation. Is he a suicidal? We 
would say not because he actually “did not want to die”. But how do we know it? 
Does not the one who fasts on an extreme demanding manner for his own body 
flirts with death in such an inevitably dangerous way as the suicidal that plays with 
a loaded gun? How can we be sure that, within the ascetic‟s fasting, is not 
concealed a secret “willing to die this way”, “in that manner”, or at least in virtue of 
“no matter if dying this way, if it happens”? And in the case of the heroes and 
martyrs that put themselves “under the wolf‟s fangs”, like Martin Luther King, 
Gandhi, Giordano Bruno or even Christ, how can we know they are not suicides in 
the sense “they do not have the intention of dying”? Is the distinction raised by 
Kant legitimate, or is it only about a subtle difference of degree? Kant pretends the 
distinction is clear to a point that, in his ethical theory, the suicidal is morally 
condemned but the hero and the martyr are praised. (This problem would not 
perhaps emerge out of an ethical theory different from the Kantian, which morally 
condemned the voluntary interruption of one‟s own life, both the suicide‟s and the 
hero‟s). 
 
By dying as a hero, martyr or ascetic, a person prematurely avoids, as 
obvious, the usual morally disqualifying risks brought by aging and terminal 
diseases. But that is not the direct ethical motivation of this kind of dying. The 
motivation, in those cases, seems to consist of the following: the hero and the 
martyr, much possibly, die by the hands of someone, of another man, whereas the 
ascetic fades in solitude. However, in any case, the death of the other is indefinitely 
postponed, a death from ever programmed within the very “expansive” instauration 
of my own being. By being, I constitute myself necessarily and inevitably as a 
danger for the other, in an aggressive and destructive mechanism, and our relation 
is constituted as a conflict in which one of both must die; so, in the moral 
perspective and in the situations depicted, I should die. If I die, it means the life of 
the other has been spared, what is in agreement to the direction of the 
fundamental ethical articulation. My death, and not the other‟s death, inevitably 
alludes to a space that has been left vacant, to an expansion of my own interests 
that has not occurred. If I die, ending in asceticism or by a shot, I certainly have not 
changed the ontology of the world, nor have I offended the ethics based on it 
consisting of the unlimited respect for the inviolability of the other‟s being. The 
negative person tries to practice in his life a first degree morality, according to 
which the life of the other is absolutely inviolable, regardless of any other 
consideration (See Part III). 
 
The philosopher of conflict is certainly Hegel. What bothers the most in Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Jünger and others is that they make an apology – and give a “profound” 
meaning – to what, in the best of hypothesis, is an unavoidable natural fact: war. 
They transform this fact into a kind of “realization” and “process of self-
consciousness”. Hegel considers the very being of man cannot be constituted but 
through war, in which is searched the recognition of the own being by another. It 
seems extremely beautiful, from the moral point of view, the idea that the very 
being of a human being can only be recognized in risk, in putting the own life in 
danger. But from this, it does not follow that this risk must end in the death of the 
others or in their slavery. In the inevitable conflict with the other, the negative man 
should, at the same time, maintain first degree morality and make himself be 
recognized by the other in the risk of his own life. Hegel starts from the idea it is 
only possible to obtain an ethical victory through death or slavery of the other and 
this belief is in the antipodes of a negative ethics; because, in spite of being Hegel 
a negative philosopher, his ethics is irremediably affirmative: it preserves as sacred 
the typical aggressiveness of affirmativeness. What is important in a negative 
ethics is, precisely, to obtain an ethical victory that my own death is able to 
perform. The idea is that the one who dies can ethically win the fight (even if he or 
she loses it politically or strategically). How can we conceive this kind of victory? 
 
In reality, Hegel himself gives the proper indication, but he sees the question 
only from one of its angles. When Hegel says that, if an adversary kills the other he 
no longer can be recognized by him and, therefore, it is important to keep him alive 
so he recognizes me, he is clearly outlining what I call the defeat of the survivor, 
the moral defeat of the one who kills. It is not the case of falling into the rhetorical 
sentimentalism of the “it is a shame to win a war”, but only of taking notice of 
something that seems to be literally true: that, in the level of effective human 
experiences, when he kills, as much as when he enslaves, the survivor – the so 
called “winner” of the fight – is disappointed (the typical disappointment of being) 
for not obtaining really what he wanted to obtain: in the first case, because a dead 
person cannot recognize anyone, and in the second, because a slave does not 
recognize spontaneously, but by obligation, considering that, as Hegel said, what 
would truly satisfy the “winner” would be being recognized by another master, not 
by a slave; being recognized by a slave contradicts the very definition of a master. 
If the one who has killed or enslaved has not obtained what he wanted, it is 
possible to think the other, the adversary, has won the fight in spite of having died, 
or perhaps because of it; certainly not the slave, but indeed the dead.  
 
If the dead cannot recognize the one who has won, the winner stays in life as 
an eternal recognition of the one he has killed. What the adversary wanted was to 
enslave the other, in order to, in Hegel‟s terminology, determinately and 
dialectically deny him, having-the-other-over-there to deny him through 
enslavement. However the other has thrown on his backs a heavy burden, 
because he has withdrawn his body from slavery offering it directly to death. By 
killing the adversary, the winner is situated in the impossibility to deny him as he 
intended to do, dialectically and determinately, and he is forced to deny him as he 
did not want to do, that is, absolutely and indeterminately. Once the dialectical 
contradiction, the opposition, is the very movement of life, the dead leaves his 
“winner” without life and, therefore, “kills” him symbolically, which is the only way a 
negative human being (someone committed, until the end, to perform a first degree 
morality) can “kill” another. This is the only form of ethical victory, in the primary 
sense, because it has been accomplished against the other without killing him, but 
on the contrary, leaving him alive and letting himself get killed by him, stuffed with 
his own affirmativeness (and this is the ethical victory of Christ, Gandhi, Bruno and 
so many others, a victory that can only be seen as absolute stupidity by the current 
affirmative and strategic prevailing ethics).  
 Hegel has said the slave is the moment of negativity, the very place of death. 
However, he is not so in the absolute sense, since he stays alive. The one who 
dies in combat, or the martyr, manages to be what the slave only “represents”. The 
dead does not  let himself be preserved, he makes himself be totally eliminated 
and, therefore, he does not leave the other any dialectical space, no possibility for 
the other to develop himself under his expenses, nothing the other can do to him 
except recognizing him infinitely. That shall be the victory of negativity, carried out 
by a kind of human being that has introduced negativity into his life until the 
ultimate consequences. The one who puts himself by the side of the negative can 
never lose, because it is the unique kind of life which wins with the own death, with 
what would be a defeat for any other form of life. 
 
Thus, even admitting, with Hegel, each one of us resolves ourselves in 
conflict, in a struggle until death, there is no reason to accept this is a struggle until 
death where each one of us must win, in the sense of death or enslavement of the 
other. Perhaps it is a struggle until death each one of us has the moral duty to lose. 
Instead of each conscience seeking the death of the other, every conscience 
seeks, in reality, its own death through the conflict against the other. My own death 
is, thus, my only weapon, and that weapon consists in condemning the other to life 
after having killed me, certainly not speculating with occasional ontic “regrets” or 
“guilt”, but ontologically communicating with him through this “lack” which 
constitutes human being as such, the very lack that I, with my attitude, have 
succeeded to be. My ethical triumph consists of letting the other survive the lack, 
die the lack in life, whereas I constitute myself as the lack and in the lack I live 
forever. And all that, without having touched a single hair of the enemy, respecting 
the inviolability of his life and simply attacking him with the very affirmativeness in 
which he, mistakenly, has dared to believe, refusing morality. Through that act, I 
represent with my own body the very subversion of the negative.  
 
Different from the slave, I turn into the non-being of being; I am the absolute 
master of all men (death). One could say to the adversary: if you submit me, I am 
your slave, but if you kill me, you will be my slave forever. By dying, I totally escape 
from the illusion of making myself be recognized by the other. Following the 
common language use, we can, thus, consider the hero, the martyr or the ascetic 
(following the current use of words), as being “suicides” in the formal sense, not 
only because they radically run away, through their actions, from a situation of 
moral disqualification, but also because they die according to the structure of the 
world, admitting from the root their own finitude. That outlines a kind of ontological 
ethics of the stop-being-the-own-being against the usual “policy of beings”, 
basically homicidal and self-preservative. 
 
It is necessary to see the convenience of extending the ontological form we 
call “stop-being-the-own-being” beyond the stingy and narrow scope of the ordinary 
notion of “suicide”. In that sense, it has been interesting to include in that 
ontological form the “risky” lives, and not only deaths of those who put a gun on 
their heads. But going further in that experiment of enlarging the notion of suicide, 
we can visualize signs that indicate the very structural self-destructiveness of 
humans, and also of the world and perhaps of the entire universe. Actually, the 
kind of life we “have chosen” to live, the types of food we prefer, the style of our 
relationships with others, of our sexuality, of the administration of our mind and 
body, of the particular susceptibility of our nerve system, of the resonance we 
accept the events of the world to have on our decisions, and so on, prepare, 
throughout our lives, a determinate and very well chosen way of dying. We keep 
choosing, as any suicidal does, our own death, and we keep killing ourselves in the 
ways of our actions and passions in the world, incubating in our bodies precisely 
the kind of diseases our system of life accepted to include. If we see human lives 
inside the framework of natural ontology, we may visualize them as natures 
destructing themselves in a determinate way, self-preserving always within a 
fundamental self-destructing.  
 And what is thought about human beings may be thought about the whole 
world. It could be the case the world – after the fall of theological points of 
reference – was not a “harmony” or a “system” at all, but a “suicidal” mechanism 
that must necessarily suppress itself. This is already outlined, for example, in the 
serious ecological issues the planet currently faces. We have come to them 
through an exploitation of nature that was considered (rightly or wrongly) as 
necessary for survival, even when different policies of beings talk about the 
“irrationality” of this or that exploitation. Perhaps cutting trees might lead to the 
death of the planet and not cutting them too. We may try policies of “rationalization” 
in nature exploitation, but how long? No rational idea can assure the planet has to 
achieve a balance that supports life on its surface. This myth of “balance” is the 
same that guides the feeding practices of vegetarians, who think they can avoid 
diseases through a diet; but there is no diet that can change the structure of their 
being-in-the-world: the only thing vegetarians may reach is to pick the diseases 
transmitted by vegetables, avoiding the diseases of meat: to die a green death. 
Each diet chooses the color of its death. Those considerations might make us think 
the structure of the stop-being-the-own-being is much wider and more complex 
than what its identification with what ordinarily is called “suicide” may suggest. 




Note 5. Esquisse for a theory of radical non-communication 
 
In a naturalized ontology, there are others (or: there is the other). 
They “are” not by simply “being there”, but as a part of world structure. They 
have to do with the original limitation of being and with the open possibility of moral 
disqualification by the simple fact of being; because the others are a fundamental 
part of the limitation and narrowness of my birth, to the extent I am already born 
without place and in the places I want to live “there are already others”. In big cities 
as much as in open country, the places I want to inhabit are already taken, there 
are no more vacancies. The others are the ones before whom I get disqualified by 
being. Since ethics is fundamentally a matter of otherness, what should I do with 
the other people‟s life? is the main ethical question. By assuming a first degree 
morality, I accept that, facing the other, I in principle can (and maybe ought to) 
disappear, desisting of the space we both incompatibly intend to occupy. My 
departure from the world is, therefore, marked by the presence of the other. In any 
moral, affirmative or negative, the ethical approach to the world will inevitably have 
to do with the structure of otherness. 
 
In some texts from the twenties, collected in the second of the three volumes 
of Husserliana, dedicated to the “Philosophy of Inter-subjectivity”, Husserl has 
offered a “solution” to the problem of otherness in his transcendental 
phenomenology, and he has approached the subject again in his famous “Fifth 
Cartesian Meditation”, as well as in Formal and transcendental logic. The basis of 
the solution is “egological” (from ego) or solipsistic; he talks on “transcendental 
monadic science”, recovering Leibniz‟s doctrine according to which the world is 
constituted by incommunicable monads (“without windows”), that only can know 
each other through divine intervention, the famous “pre-established harmony”. 
Husserl tries to construct Leibniz‟s idealism without metaphysics, as a pure logical-
epistemological idealism. It means monads will continue without windows and now 
also without divine intervention. How will they communicate?  
 
The theory of transcendental constitution shows the way: the ego constitutes 
the other as another ego through a technical device Husserl calls “double 
reduction”. I can never be the other, or have his life experiences, his past, 
anticipations, desires or projects; the other is definitely opaque to me; and 
notwithstanding I can constitute him within his absolute transcendence in my own 
conscience, due to its intentional character. The “egoical” constitution of the other 
would be impossible if it was not mediated by the construction of a “common world” 
to me and to the other, to which we always refer together and that co-constitute an 
“inter-subjective objectivity”. The transcendental inter-subjectivity itself pre-
establishes harmony, even when the monads continue radically without windows, 
and transcendent to one another.  
 
But the others are “original”, not in the sense of “originally given” (the only 
originally given, according to Husserl, is my own conscience), but in the sense 
every conscience cannot refrain from constituting the consciences of the others. 
Husserl knows that, sustaining this conception, he takes risks of provoking the rage 
of philosophers – in my terms, affirmative philosophers, although Husserl is one of 
them – because of this “solipsistic” explanation; as it is already known, according to 
current affirmative philosophy, solipsism – together with relativism, skepticism, etc. 
– are the villains of philosophical reflection, in the sense of positions that must be 
eliminated on behalf of some kind of logical-moral imperative; they are forbidden to 
constitute genuine and fruitful philosophical positions. But Husserl does not 
succeed in understanding any other way of encounter with the other except by this 
ego constitution, as a copy of myself within my own conscience.  
 
If the monad does not have windows but it communicates, what does it have? 
The answer is somehow surprising: the monads have mirrors on which the other is 
reflected. The mirror metaphor transmits the characteristic of opacity as inevitable 
medium for communication between monads. Different from the idea of windows, 
transmitting transparency, opening and “passing through”, the mirrors do not offer 
to the other the possibility of “entering into”, but of “reiterating” indefinitely: 
communication is not an “access”, but a repetition. (Precisely, the spell of Lewis 
Carroll‟s descriptions reside in the wonderful fact protagonists are able to “pass 
through the mirror”, modifying the opacity structure, something impossible for real 
humans). Nevertheless, the mirror metaphor has its limits. The mirror of the 
monads is not like our empirical mirrors, on which I reflect, in a certain way, as I 
want to (if I move an arm, so does my reflex, if I make a gesture my image 
reproduces it), but it is a transcendental mirror on which I reflect as the other 
establishes and stipulates; I reflect myself in the other‟s terms, and the same 
obviously happens to the other when reflected on my own mirror. “My” image is not 
mine, but only to the strict extent it attends to the conditions in which the other can 
reflect me, keeping “my” image on “his” or “her” mirror. Overusing Frege‟s 
terminology, we could say the other is never only reference (Bedeutung) but also 
meaning (Sinn), “way of presentation”: the transcendental inter-subjectivity is an 
opaque context in which the other may not be freely replaced, and where I may 
never visualize the others in themselves, “regardless their presentations”. 
 
Husserl considers mathematical logics as the domain in which inter-
subjectivity typically occurs, to the extent a common world is constituted there and 
may be shared by all, allowing communication by performing the same operations. 
Does not logical-mathematical communication prove, after all, monads have 
windows and transparency exists? Husserl thinks this is not true. In the case of 
logic, consciences have managed to constitute a common world of manipulative 
operations and objects, through a so clear and systematic language that, far from 
situating them in a field of communication, consciences drastically lose all need to 
communicate. What logics grants is to dispense, by higher abstraction, all 
elements that, in the common contexts of speech, make communication opaque: 
logic does not resolve communication, but makes it dismissible, because in 
mathematics the other is absolutely “anyone”, he is not qualified in any way. And 
the question of communication arises precisely when the other is not anyone, but 
this one. In the logic-mathematical level, the opaque mirrors get lined up in a 
perfect way, producing a kind of formal compatibility between opacities, something 
very different from transparence. To the extent we distance ourselves from the 
privileged pole of logic and walk towards the psychological-social domains, the 
mirrors lose their alignment, we are not capable of defining inter-subjective 
operations, and the others disappear in the field of “specular” conjecture. 
 It is important to see Husserl‟s transcendental “solution” of inter-subjectivity 
employs instruments connected to action, provided by the theory of intentional 
constitution. Also in analytic contemporary philosophy, especially since 
Wittgenstein‟s intermediary period, the solution of the issue was to appeal to 
“pragmatic” elements as language games, contexts of use, application of rules, etc. 
But Husserl‟s conception of conscience is an open one. This might surprise those 
who consider the “solipsistic” and “egoical” solution as connected to closed 
structures, but the fundamental piece of Huserlian solution of inter-subjectivity is 
“intentionality”, which can be seen as a dynamic and “pragmatic” notion. In 
transcendental phenomenology, the other does not need to be “reached” by 
making a great effort, as in a kind of “trip”, but intentional conscience “puts” the 
otherness of the other by constituting a community. In the pragmatic vein, 
community is constituted through the communal usage of rules of a language that 
cannot avoid being “public”. We can understand, therefore, both solutions as 
affected by the “pragmatic turn”. The important step has been taken not from the 
“philosophies of conscience” to the “philosophies of language”, but from 
substantialistic and static philosophies of conscience or language to interactive and 
dynamic conceptions of both. 
  
Thus, both analytical and phenomenological philosophies easily “solve” the 
basic problem of inter-subjectivity, and they do it easily because this is not the real 
problem at all. What is truly serious is communication and inter-subjectivity is only 
a minimal condition for communication, what we may consider as its last 
transcendental condition. (In that sense, I believe Apel and others systematically 
confuse these two levels when they speak, for example, about a priori 
communication and the unlimited communication community. It seems to me what 
they call by those terms could at most be defended as the most basic and last a 
priori of inter-subjectivity (or, as I say, of interaction), providing only the necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for communication). I do not accept here the well 
known objection of “all depends on what you understand by communication”, 
because I think this notion has some basic and not dispensable characteristics. 
 
Inter-subjectivity is, purely and simply, a two-way actions field, going from 
some subjects to others and vice-versa. It is mere interaction, or reciprocal action. 
It is the interaction, for example, occurring in a boxing fight, a tennis match, or the 
relation between the person buying tickets for the theater and the girl who sells 
them, or the work of two or more workers who set floor tiles one over another in a 
building construction. In all these interactions, there is the recognition of a 
“common world” of reference, shared by participants: it is the domain of the rules of 
a game or sport, or of small commercial transactions or of the work relations, 
including the language spoken, gestures, etc, which are, within certain limits, 
“shared”. All this is very clear and out of question, but it is an extreme fragile 
strategy, intending to define with that, in a necessary and sufficient manner, 
communication. The reference to a “common world” or to a “public language”, as 
observed before in the case of logic, far from granting communication, points to a 
kind of socialization that makes the effort for communication dispensable.  
 
Communication is not that, and it is not that in a completely minimal sense, 
not in some sophisticated conception; because the constitution of communication 
is presented, in the first place, when someone, called A, posses some 
informational content, articulated in different manners, more or less specific, which 
she wants to transmit to B, and – in the second place – such content is stressed by 
A in some way, or reinforced by some specific “strength”. In order to have 
communication, it is necessary that B receives this informational content with the 
same meaning that A has given to it, and with the same stressing or “strength”. B 
has to understand what A means, and she must capture also the particular 
stressing A had put on it; or, saying it in another way, she has to figure what A is 
presenting, and what is the importance or relevance for A to put it this way.  
 
This is not a heavy or very sophisticated demand. For example, in a 
discussion among logicians who talk about Gödel‟s theorem, one of them, A, might 
say the sentence: “Gödel‟s results have a vast influence on philosophical issues”. 
In order to accept the others have captured what A wanted to say and, in that 
sense, they have communicated with him, it seems there must be at least the 
following minimal conditions: (1) The others have to understand the sentence in the 
same meaning B understands it, for example, they have to understand which is the 
notion of philosophy A is employing, and they have to understand when, according 
to A, something can have a “vast influence” on something, and they have to be 
using the same version of Gödel‟s theorem, and so on; (2) The others have to 
understand the emphasis in the sentence the same way as A: for example, they 
have to understand this influence is something completely crucial, to the extent A 
intended to establish close relations among mathematical and philosophical results 
with all its implications; and the others have to understand A is not joking or being 
ironic, etc. It is useless if the others say: “Yes, yes, we understand”, but they shrug 
with indifference or laugh.  
 
These two conditions express, the first one, the connection to the 
understanding, and the second, the connection to will. I do not believe this last 
condition is excessive, as suggested by some. If A comes shouting: “There is a 
bomb in the building!” and B replies phlegmatically: “Yes, it has been pretty 
frequent lately” (assuming, for example, this occurs in some region attacked by 
terrorism), it would not be strange affirming there was no communication between 
A and B (although there certainly was interaction), or B has not understood what A 
said, to the extent the other has only kept the meaning of the content without its 
specific emphasis. There is an intellectualist tendency to define communication 
exclusively in terms of understanding, but even in every day and not sophisticated 
situations, we also include a condition of will: it is not only about understanding the 
meaning of the information given, but also of capturing the will emphasis on it, the 
role our interlocutor wants the information to play in the situation. 
 
To demand only interaction or inter-subjectivity (the “sharing of a common 
world”, in Husserl‟s terminology, or the mastery of a “public” language, in 
Wittgenstein‟s terms) is not enough. If depending only on this concept, the notion 
of communication will be systematically hypo-determined: it is not enough that all 
the logicians of the example spend all afternoon talking about Gödel‟s theorem to 
convince us they have actually communicated. From the “common world shared by 
all”, each one of the talkers could be giving emphasis to different aspects, or using 
different parts of the same “public language”. Among the logicians, one could 
understand “philosophy” as “a device of clarifying language” and other as “a 
foundation for sciences”, so they will not be communicating to each other when 
talking about the “philosophical influence of Gödel‟s theorem”, even when they are 
certainly “interacting” (and cannot stop interacting). Even mistake and nonsense 
require something so minimum like a “common world inter-subjectively shared”, or 
a “public language subjected to rules”, as masterly shown in the plays of Ionesco, 
Pinter, Tchekov and Beckett. I do not believe these requirements are excessive, 
and the mere inter-subjective demand is clearly not enough.  
 
(There is usually, in current intercourses, a “recreation” of the information and 
of the stressing of what the other has said, by the part of the one who listens. That 
could be interpreted as a positive feature because this is what differentiates 
machines from human beings, precisely the possibility of not receiving information 
inertly, but of processing it in an intelligent way. However – as seen in the 
examples of Gödel‟s theorems and of the bomb – this wonderful “recreation” ability 
may lead to dramatic mistakes and misunderstandings). 
 
My theory of radical non-communication presupposes the question of inter-
subjectivity as already resolved (analytically or phenomenologically or in any other 
way), and it is an important part of my radical analysis of structural human 
condition, in the sense the communication to which I refer is not intra-worldly, but 
connected to the very otherness of the other, independent from the content of 
concrete situations of intended communication (Certainly, the issue of structural-
worldly non-communication constitutes an important element for the evaluation of 
formal self-suppressions and abstentions from the ethical point of view; for 
example, in the sense part of the “structural information” we have about possible 
people consists of knowing that, when someone is born, he or she will radically 
non-communicate with the otherness of the other). The thesis affirms that, for 
structural reasons, our relation with the other (whoever and wherever he or she is) 
faces systematic problems to accomplish the minimum conditions for 
communication and that, in reality, the world only works, to all effects, under the 
guarantee of mere minimal “interaction”. So, there is not non-problematic 
communication in the radical level, but at most, a kind of “policy of intra-worldly 
interaction”. 
 
I will call here “semantic” the pure requirements of understanding, in the level 
of sending and capturing signs referred to codes, interpretation of signs, the 
domain of message transmission techniques, and so on. I mean with this that I do 
not have any kind of communicational skepticism in that level. Moreover, I would 
be in agreement with a full optimism in the level of message understanding, given 
the sophisticated devises of construction of sign systems we may use today. If a 
person “does not understand” a message or some aspect of a code, or has 
suffered the effects of a distortion or a defect in reception, or knows another 
version of the code and not the one that is being used, etc, it is just a matter of 
time, money and diligence to solve these kinds of problems. The level in which 
communication begins basically to be problematic is the level of will, not the level 
of understanding. Therefore it seems so myopic a theory of communication 
conceived as “directed to understanding”, to the extent understanding is defined in 
a restricted sense without including volitional and pragmatic aspects. The level of 
will I also call “wanting to understand” and a theory of communication that 
deserves some interest should be a theory directed to the “wanting to understand” 
and not merely to the understanding. 
 
Those two levels are usually distinguished - it is not absolutely a 
sophisticated or academic distinction - as when someone says: “It is pointless to 
continue discussing, she simply does not want to understand”, and it is completely 
current talking about “bad will”, which might perfectly go together with “good 
understanding” (moreover, one of the requirements to detect “bad will” can be 
being perfectly aware of good semantic understanding). Everyone knows that, 
when there is an obstacle of will, even if the level of sign understanding works 
perfectly well, communication stops. “… even the rules of logic, which are 
considered as a paradigmatic example of scientific knowledge that „imposes itself‟, 
appeal to the open spirit of an interlocutor that must be „neither unwilling nor 
imbecile‟. Who voluntarily and independently does not understand two plus two 
equals four cannot be compelled to understand the truth of this proposition.” 
(Kamlah, Philosophic anthropology and ethics, p. 100). 
 
Now I am going to surprise my reader by manifesting I am not skeptic 
concerning communication in this volitional level either; because, even if someone 
demonstrates notorious “bad will” towards the understanding of some information, 
such obstacles may even be taken out from the way, even when difficult. We can 
talk to the person, convince her to put out her negative and misleading attitude, 
make her see she will have more advantages if she decides to understand what 
she declares not to understand, and so on. But we stop trying to develop with her 
strategies of understanding; we try to make her see we found out her game, we 
know she really understands us perfectly well, she cannot fool us anymore, and we 
will not keep wasting our time explaining once more the content of the same 
information. Now we are attacking her in the very level of will, and we try to disturb 
her laziness or to touch the willing basis of her intransigence. We make her see 
she will not be in danger by accepting what she refuses to accept, she does not 
need to continue concealing a wanting under a cognitive disguise. We get her in 
the moral level, not anymore in the epistemic one.  
 
I do not fear to appear too much optimistic by accepting we might succeed 
also in this kind of attempt, to the extent the intra-world provides elements to 
overcome these kinds of impasses; because this moral level is still, to a certain 
point, rational and free. The person, at least deep inside, knows she is acting 
“unfaithfully” and she knows what we are talking about when we try to make up her 
mind so she changes her attitudes concerning the matter in question; because her 
“unfaithfulness” is connected to elements the person has been constituting in the 
intra-world through her actions, that is, in connection to the particular kind of 
person she has become along the time. Anything constituted in the intra-world, 
even “unfaithfulness”, can be, the way I see it, modified or improved. 
 
The most serious problem is not there, but in a third level I suggest to call “ to 
be able to want to understand”, a will of deeper level (“meta-volitional”) than the 
mere “wanting to understand”. A radical theory of communication should be one 
that studies actions directed to the “being able to want to understand” and not only 
to understanding or even to wanting to understand. And this is precisely the theory 
that shall fail. It is in his level radical non-communication arises. Not all we would 
like to understand is within our reach; but also not all we would like to want to 
understand is within our grasp. We just have to remember the ontological basis of 
the analysis developed in this chapter and in the previous one. In effect, by simply 
being, two fundamental things have occurred: (a) we have self-limited ourselves in 
comparison to the level of pure possibilities, (b) we have radically exposed 
ourselves to the risk of moral disqualification by constructing ourselves as 
necessarily in conflict against-the-others in favor to ourselves. But also a third thing 
occurs: (c) by simply being, we are, inevitably, someone. To be is always to be 
someone, to be a non-other, the negation of the other in our own being, not by 
being this or that, but simply because the others are someone who is not me and 
who I could never be (certainly, this is a triviality, one of the important trivialities 
that characterize human condition (see further on Part III, [a]).  
 
However, “being someone” consists, among other things, of having a certain 
sui generis willing structure, not only in the sense of wanting certain things instead 
of others, but also in the more radical sense of not being allowed to want certain 
things and being allowed to want some other things without taking the risk to deny 
yourself as this particular being-someone who you are; not by someone‟s “fault”, 
mine or someone else‟s, nor by “the circumstances”, nor for what I have done to 
myself throughout my life, etc, but due to the very constitution of my being-
someone, of my-being-this-one-and-not-another. We find here a kind of 
““unfaithfulness which does not know itself” for which there cannot be any way out, 
because it is an “unfaithfulness” that does not even deserve this name, a not 
chosen instituting and constitutive feature of human condition, so the person is not 
even conscious about it as a modifiable property. This is simply himself or herself, 
without further considerations. There is no space where the person could say: 
“Well, they are right, I will change my attitude”, since this change, even if possible, 
would ipso facto make the very being of that person come to an end (The ordinary 
statement: “We all have our shortcomings”, is just an intra-worldly statement, since 
no one is able do visualize her own “deficiency of being”, her own “bad making”). 
Those trivialities – as they should absolutely be from the empirical-representational 
view – are parts of any naturalized ontology that could have ever been proposed, 
like the present one, in order to understand the logical structure of the world. The 
logic of the world is composed of these pure not analytical trivialities. 
 
In fact, the structural-worldly non-communication could be seen as a previous 
state in a continuum that ends in conflict against the others, because the “enemy”, 
who we try to eliminate in affirmative societies, is, from this perspective, the same 
with who I keep the greatest radical non-communication. The “enemy” is a kind of 
exacerbated “someone-else” and war is the very apotheosis of radical non-
communication in the third level. But while strong conflict can be postponed, or one 
might have the luck to never get involved in it, the radical non-communication is 
daily and we cannot get out of our house without suffering it regularly and 
immediately. The enemy in a war is only the strangeness of the other or the 
alienation of the “fellow humans” taken to its more extreme manifestation. 
Therefore, there is no war monstrosity that presents material difference relatively to 
the usual and daily communication misunderstandings, but only differences of 
degree, intensity and consequences.  
 
Within usual radical non-communication, I can make agreements with the 
others without losing too much or without suffering expressive damage; I can 
tolerate the insolence of the other consisting of not-being-me, because, among 
other motives, the other two levels we have examined – the understanding and the 
will to understand – work well or can be improved in any moment of the process, 
and also because the founding inter-subjectivity was, some way, as we saw before, 
phenomenologically or analytically solved. I simply cannot avoid getting in conflict 
against the others because I cannot stop radically non-communicating with them, 
and this occurs in our own beings and not by occasional decisions. We could never 
find a “responsible” for not-being-allowed-to-want-to understand, as much as it is 
indeed possible to find a responsible for not-wanting-to-understand and for not-
understanding. It is useless to put the other or yourself in the place of “guilty” of 
radical non-communication. 
 
In addition to not being able to understand everything we want to, neither can 
we want all we are willing to want, and that is the radical point. While the 
impossibility to understand all we want is intra-worldly, the impossibility to want all 
we want to want is worldly. Here the demand is not something as much as “being 
like the other”, by a kind of identification (that would result in a mythical 
“communion”, more than communication). Actually, radical non-communication is 
the impossibility of communicating with my own self as the impossibility of being 
the other‟s being as well, and both things are correlated. In his “egological” solution 
of inter-subjectivity, Husserl supposes we have a direct and immediate access to 
our own self, whereas our access to others is always mediated and problematic. 
But this is an intellectualist prejudice that sees the whole problem only in terms of 
understanding. In an exceeding optimism, we can maybe concede the self has an 
immediate access to everything it knows, but it has undoubtedly no immediate 
access to all it wants, since what someone wants is not reducible to an objective 
and a given set of contents (this is a naiveté in Schopenhauer‟s philosophy of will, 
the idea that will is something “immediate” to itself). However, to the strict extent I 
cannot control what I can or not want to understand, I am as separated from my 
self as from the others‟. That is why the egological basis can only solve inter-
subjectivity, but not communication. In fact, in a non-intellectualist approach, there 
is absolutely nobody like me in the entire world… not even “myself”. It is not the 
impossible demand of being-the-other, but the equally impossible demand of 
“being myself” (the so called “authenticity”). 
 
Heidegger and others have insisted in an ontological-existential structure they 
call Mit-sein, to be-with. If the thesis of radical non-communication is true, in the 
light of it, humans can be seen as Ohne-sein, as beings-without, each one of us 
structurally without-the-others, even when we can never be empirically without 
them, not even when we are alone in a desert island. We are structurally alone, 
because, together with being, we have also received a determinate someone – 
“our” being – whom, whether we want it or not, we are obliged to be deeply 
interested on and involved in.  In the direction of being “involved-in-ourselves”, the 
others are fundamentally “not interesting”, they decidedly do not interest me; they 
cannot interest me beyond empirical assistances and compromises. My lack of 
interest on the others is ontological. I listen to them absentmindedly, I postpone 
them, I misuse them, I disguise a yawn when they talk, and the same occurs to 
them concerning me, I am not interesting for them, they are compelled to feign 
some interest with their better talents.  
 
In limit situations, such as wars, shipwrecks, etc, there is a strong tendency 
towards communication as reaching its greatest succeeding pole, because these 
are situations in which humans try (successfully or not) to make efforts to 
understand the content and the emphasis of the other‟s messages due to the 
dramatic urgency of decisions, aiming salvation; in these situations, the concealing 
mechanisms are drastically suspended and the relationships among humans are 
set in the level where, rationally, it should always and in every moment be situated, 
in the very level of the constitutive non-being, in the profound interest in the other‟s 
speeches. In everyday life, we only get from the others an “absentminded 
attention” and some yawning. Inter-subjectivity allows someone to constantly 
withdraw, from the other‟s speeches, only some parts or aspects for benefiting his 
own “being involved in”, as in the mode of convenient “suggestions”. Thus, the 
others simply wait until I am finished my talking, so they start their own one, in 
which I might recognize some words, aspects or features of my own speech, but 
situated in a new framework where I cannot recognize them any more, because 
they belong to the “being involved in”  of the others. 
 
I believe it is an unacceptable abuse to call this process “communication”, 
because when we do so, as concluded for example by the authors of Pragmatics of 
human communication, “it is impossible not to communicate”, since it is impossible 
not interacting some way, not suggesting something to the others when we talk. 
“…behavior has no opposite. In other words, there is no non-behavior… if we 
accept all behavior, in an interacting situation, has the value of a message, which 
means, it is communication, it turns out that for the most  individuals make efforts, 
it is impossible for them not communicate” (Watzlawick, Jackson and Beavin, 
Pragmatic of human communication, cap. 2.2.2, p. 44-45; my translation from 
Portuguese). I believe, in general, any notion X that allows everything to be X, 
loses its explicative power, because, in the case of communication, it does not let 
chances to differentiate two small dialogues as these:  A: “There is fire there”. B: 
“I‟m going to call the firemen”; and A: “There is fire there”. B: “In Joseph Conrad‟s 
novels there is also fire”. To this kind of communication theory, there is 
“communication” both in one case and in the other, and the term loses, this way, all 
discriminative and conceptual value. The authors are calling “communication” the 
mere transmission – partial, fragmented and suggesting – of information. 
 
The belief in communication is a typically “affirmative” tendency of thinking. 
The “fact” of communication is accepted and it is only its effective development 
what is to be explained, or how it is possible that communication occurs (just as 
Kant considered freedom, in the second Critique, as a fact that shall be 
investigated only in its manifestation, not in its undeniable reality). It is part of the 
concealing mechanisms, typical of affirmative organization of society, to conceal 
the highly problematic character of communication among human beings. Adopting 
a negative posture, by contrast, communication can be saved in two levels, the 
intellective and the volitional, but it gets stuck in the third level. It is interesting that 
while communication is identified with mere instigating of information, every 
intercourse in the world can be seen as communication; but when minimal 
requirements are added (for example, that the transmitted content must be 
intellectively-volitionally, at least approximately, the same), it is difficult to find one 
unique situation that is really communicative.  
 
I believe, therefore, otherness is a part of “negativity”, in the relative sense 
which interests in this book, something connected to human condition and a part of 
the logical structure of the world. As such, as in the case of other theories referring 
to that structure, the theory of radical non-communication should be completely 
trivial as any other radical truth. (The present note formulates only an esquisse of a 




Note 6.  Leibniz and the innocence of the Father 
 
Leibniz was admitted in the Faculty of Law in Leipzig around 1664, when he 
was 18, and graduated two years later in Altdorf. In 1667, at the age of 21, he 
published a project of reform of the juridical studies and, together with Lasser, a 
project of review of the Corpus iuris: Ratio corporis iuris reconcinandi (1668). This 
early vocation to Law and jurisprudence will have a strange metaphysical 
application in Leibniz‟s life, when in his work Essay of theodicy, about the 
goodness of God, the freedom of man and the origin of evil, after realizing God‟s or 
Goddess‟s uncomfortable situation under the responsibility of having created such 
a problematic world as ours, he takes His or Her defense in the juridical sense of 
the term, trying to show definitely the innocence of the Creator. I will try to 
demonstrate here, on the contrary, that it is impossible to prove the total innocence 
of God concerning these responsibilities, and that they should be, in any case, 
distributed between the Father and the creatures. 
 
In spite of his frequent warnings against anthropomorphism in dealing with 
divine issues, Leibniz starts from some fundamental anthropomorphic 
presupposition that will never be overcome in his argumentation: the idea God and 
men share the same logic. This logic is objective; its laws cannot be mastered at 
will, neither by God nor by men, since they are developed in an autonomous and 
independent level concerning essentially conceptual possibilities. The creation of 
the world by God is conceived as a work of engineering, guided by mechanics, 
logics and mathematics, sciences frequently mentioned throughout the 
argumentation (the world as manufacture or artifact). 
 
The prosecution claims God has created a world where there is evil, and 
being Him (or Her) infinitely powerful, intelligent and good, He could have created a 
world without evil; and since He had not done this, it was because He has left 
exercising some of His divine qualities. That God has such qualities, we know by 
definition. That there is evil in the world, we know by the existence in it of natural 
disasters (diseases, death, sufferings) and “cultural” disturbances (injustice, 
murders, wars). The argumentative line of the defense is approximately the 
following: since the creation of the world is a work of engineering that must be 
guided by the laws of logics, God does not want to create a world in an absolute 
manner, through a totally arbitrary Fiat (Let there be…), but He wants to build it 
carefully so it “fits” in the rational possibilities available. On the contrary of what 
philosophers of will could think, divine glory would not be increased in anything by 
the creation of a world in an arbitrary way, that is, by transgressing the laws of 
logic, something God could do, but He does not want to. The world without evil 
would be, in absolute terms, a good world, but this is the world God does not want 
to create, not because He does not want the world to be good, but because He 
wants a world that has all the goodness compatible with the laws of logics, with the 
functioning of its objective structures, the “eternal truths”, and so on. If creation was 
absolute and arbitrary, the result could be a good world, but God wants to create 
according to the laws, so, the only world He can create is a world which is not good 
in absolute terms, but the best possible.  
 
The best possible world is not necessarily good, but it follows a logical-
rational approach on goodness within the general economy of world construction. 
Thus, “the best possible world” might still have evil, much evil, and also might be a 
world full of evilness, without contradicting the divine plans of world creation. All 
evil that finally comes to the world constitute just the “holes” of the construction, the 
empty spaces without proper entity, an inevitable byproduct of a creation guided by 
rationality and not by pure will. An arbitrary creation of the world – aiming to 
establish goodness in an absolute manner – would demand a much too deep 
intervention of God on creation and a strangulation of the mobility of things and 
humans inside it. In order to avoid this, God has allowed – with what the Defense 
has called His “consequent will” – evil (the “holes”) to exist, although He did not 
“previously” want this (because in this case He would be a bad God).  
 
God gets afterwards to a kind of agreement with human creatures: since the 
presence of evil in the world has been a consequence of God‟s desire of not 
stealing human‟s freedom, now humans have to deal with the holes of evil in order 
to reduce them the most, through ways of behavior that should honor the freedom 
conceded by God to humans. From that agreement between God and His rational 
creatures, a beloved daughter is born: ethics. Ethics may only exist in a world 
hollowed by the spaces open for the exercising of freedom. Those spaces are, 
precisely, evil. That is because Leibniz says it is understanding that gives the 
principle of evil, “… it represents all natures as they are in eternal truths, which 
have within themselves the reason why evil is allowed, although  will wants nothing 
but goodness” (Leibniz, Essays of Theodicy, Part II, p. 200. The translation from 
French is mine).  
 
This fascinating moral novel is, in its own way, irreproachable, and it comes to 
us from the past, wrapped in different versions, sometimes with emanation 
paintings and other in creationist colors. It is a scheme according to which the 
being has “appeared” (sometimes from the non-being, sometimes from the supra-
being), but when it appears, it has already been “corrupted” or “perverted” or 
“ruined” and, therefore, someone has to do something, an effort to a certain 
direction – a kind of corrective “journey” – to return things to their right places. In 
general, all versions of the scheme accept it was good that the being comes to be, 
that the being itself is beautiful and good. Evil has appeared in the entity – 
“originally” or through something human beings have freely done or abstained from 
doing – and so they have now to strive for a reconciliation. Ethics is an attempt to 
fill the existing spaces between the emergence of being – accepted, in spite of 
everything, as good – and the need to guide it back to a final conciliation. Thus, 
man “travels” through the scales of an ontological hierarchy, trying to complete an 
uncompleted world. This scheme, in their strongly creationist versions, has a 
decisive influence on the argumentation of the defense lawyer Leibniz. 
 
   The notion of evil emerges from the comparison between the effective world 
and the world that should be morally the case, and in this comparison our world 
always is diminished, deprived of something, degraded, etc. “… evil is a 
deprivation of being, as much as the action of God is always towards the 
positive…” (Part I, p. 120). One of the “engineering problems” God has to solve to 
create the best of worlds has to do with the very limitation of what He creates: “… 
every purely positive or absolute reality is perfection; imperfection comes from 
limitation, which means, from the privative… now, God is the cause of all 
perfections and, as a consequence, of all realities, to the extent we consider them 
as purely positive. However, limitations or deprivations arise from the imperfection 
of creatures, which limits their receptivity.” (p.369-70). Within this scheme, it is 
crucial to see evil coming from the vision that the world has emerged from 
something and goes to another thing: evil is connected to characteristics of the 
very “making” of the world, or with its own manufacture. 
 
In Leibniz‟s defense of God, man is responsible for evil, by not dealing in an 
adequate manner with the inevitable “holes” of a world created for humans could 
be free. God could have said to humans something like this: “I would like to have 
given you a completed world, but with it you would not be free. I preferred to create 
one world so you complete it with your own freedom. And I will help you with this”. 
The most recent “help” God has given to human beings, in his endless task of 
“morally completing” the world, was sending His own son to Earth, in such way he 
represents, in his painful person, an exemplar form of ethical life.  
 
I believe this defense is impeccable and, once accepted its very basic 
principles, God would be absolved in any court. Certainly, I believe any affirmative 
argument would fail if the accusation intended to use it. The prosecutor has to be a 
negative philosopher if he expects God to assume His responsibility over creation 
(and be submitted to the correspondent punishment, which could be atheism or the 
indifference of humans). One of the first useful elements for the prosecutor‟s 
allegation is Leibniz‟s tri-partition of evil in species. Leibniz has distinguished 
among metaphysical evil, moral evil and physical evil. What should specially 
interest the prosecutor is the first one, the metaphysical evil. This evil is “original”, 
and inevitably arises from the same divine decision of creating a world according to 
the laws of logic and protecting human freedom: metaphysical evil is identified with 
the “holes” of a creation thus conceived, as its byproduct inevitably present, 
whatever can be the world that has been created, for the mere fact of having been 
created. It connects anyway to the very “original limitation” of creatures which 
imposes receptivity conditions to the divine creative act, so that “…deprivation 
constitutes the form of imperfections and inconvenient which are found in 
substance, as well as in the actions” (p. 121).  
 
Leibniz appeals, at this point of the allegation, to the example of the boat that 
carries a certain charge and is impelled by the stream on the sea. Creatures are 
like these boats, they always have a certain “ontological heaviness”, a burden that 
might retard the stream action, or accommodate the impelling force of stream to 
the difficulties of human constitution. However, as well as the stream is not the 
cause of the boat‟s delay, but only of its advance (that is, only of the positive), in 
the same way, neither is God the cause of metaphysical evil, but only the cause of 
the moral advance of humans, who, with their “heaviness”, constitute the formal 
cause of evil. But as in the creation of any world, there will always be a relation 
creator/creature, and in any of those, the action of the creator will be limited by the 
constitution of the creature, there will always be in the created an original 
imperfection, in the sense God – as His creation was conceived – does not want 
(and cannot want) to create an absolutely good world, that is, without the original 
evil, which means, a not metaphysically bad world (pp. 126-127). 
 
Having the world already been created – metaphysically bad, as inevitable -, 
within the world appear the other two types of evil, the moral and the physical. 
Humans were considered as guilty of metaphysical evil in a receptive and passive 
way, through the very limitation which defines them (by their “heaviness”); now 
they are considered as active guilty – according to Leibniz‟s argumentation – of 
moral evil also, which means sin, consisting of the inadequacy with which they face 
the task of “completing” the world that was created uncompleted by God on their 
benefit (in order they could be free and give themselves their own dignity, 
happiness, etc.). God does not ignore this task of humans and tries to give them 
the conditions for salvation. Moral evil, which consists of getting apart from the 
divine plan for the world, has frequently received the intuitive assistance of a 
mythical representation within which some crucial fact is produced (original sin, the 
fall, etc.), symbolizing that “getting apart”. The world has the metaphysical evil by 
the fact of being, but moral evil appears because humans have done certain 
things. Moral evil emerges directly from human freedom, with no intervention from 
God.  
 
Finally, physical evil – suffering -, which has so much importance in some 
modern philosophies (as Schopenhauer‟s) and in contemporary bioethics, gets 
from Leibniz a tenuous and indifferent approach, as if it was difficult for him to 
visualize physical evil with independence from moral evil, of which he sometimes 
considers physical evil as a simple consequence. Thus, humans – as if their faults 
and sins were still little – appear also as indirectly guilty of physical evil as well, of 
their own suffering in the world, to the extent physical suffering follows from moral 
evil committed by human freedom. This difficulty of Leibniz to think on physical evil 
is seen at the moment he declares the greatest physical pain is, no doubt, 
condemnation (Part III, p. 276), as if it was easier for him to think on the pains of 
hell than on the pains of torture, injustice and diseases in the world. With surprising 
phlegm, Leibniz refers to the natives of America and other exemplar men who have 
enormous control over physical pain, suggesting we should, no doubt, learn from 
them. 
 
Leibniz‟s defense seems particularly sound in what refers to the justification of 
moral and physical evil through the argument of harmony of the Whole, the famous 
universal optimism; since if God has to create a world, and has to do it not 
arbitrarily (which means, respecting the laws of logic, etc), He is completely 
innocent of the world‟s moral and physical evils, however horrible. The problem 
resides in the metaphysical evil, which means, the evil inevitably produced when a 
world is created (any world, even the best possible). Leibniz admits in many 
moments of his text – without ever developing the idea – God faces the option of 
whether creating a certain world – which would always be metaphysically bad, 
regardless its content – or not creating anything. Metaphysical evil should be faced 
because God decided to dismiss, without analysis, the possibility of not creating 
any world at all, avoiding, this way, metaphysical evil, moral evil, physical evil and 
any kind of evil we could think of; that is, God started from the clearly affirmative 
presupposition that being (anything) is always better than not being, or, saying it in 
another way, being bad is better than not being anything at all.  
 
This is a crucial point where Leibniz must be quoted at length. Let us read: 
“Some will say it is impossible to produce the best because there is no perfect 
creature and it is always possible to produce a better one. I answer that what one 
can say about a creature or about a particular substance, that it can always be 
overcome by any other, should not apply to the universe as a whole, which, having 
to extent itself to all future eternity, is infinite… therefore, we do not talk about a 
creature, but about the universe, and an adversary will be compelled to sustain that 
a possible universe might be better that other in the infinite… if this opinion was 
true, it would turn out that God would not have produced anyone, because He is 
incapable of acting against reason, and that would be actually acting against 
reason” (Part II, p. 234-35).  
 
Another crucial text is the following: “… I admit that if God was compelled by 
a metaphysical necessity to produce what He has done, He would produce all that 
is possible or nothing… but as all possible are not compatible to each other (…), 
that is why all possible could not be produced, and therefore we shall say God is 
not compelled at all, metaphysically speaking, to the creation of this world. We 
could say that, as God decided to create something, there appears a struggle 
among all possible candidates to existence…” (Part II, pp. 237-8).  
 
The last text in which Leibniz contemplates the possibility of not creating 
anything is the most interesting one, because it clearly presents the issue which 
interests me here the most, for it seems to show a serious expositive error: “… this 
supreme wisdom, united with a goodness which is not less infinite, could not avoid 
electing the best… as in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor minimum, 
nothing to be distinguished, everything is done in an equal manner, and when that 
cannot be done, nothing is absolutely done; we may say the same when we talk 
about perfect wisdom, it is not less regulated than mathematics: if there was not 
the best (optimum) among all possible worlds, then God would not have produced 
anyone” (Part I, p. 108).  
 
The most curious thing is that those texts, in 300 pages, are the only ones in 
which Leibniz remembers the possibility God could have to create absolutely no 
world at all, and each time he mentions that, he does not consider this possibility 
deserves a particularly important comment from the moral point of view. At the 
moment of creating the world, God has to decide, absolutely alone, the alternative 
of creating something necessarily (metaphysically) bad or not creating anything at 
all. God cannot decide this in agreement with His creatures. It is fundamental to 
note that nothing in Leibniz‟s argumentation about moral evil and physical evil can 
be applied to metaphysical evil, because we can accept as sound the 
argumentation which proves that, once it is decided to create the world, God has 
acted rationally and kindly by choosing the best of all possible, but this does not  
justify however, that He has decided to create one world (the best or the worst 
possible, it does not matter), knowing that, in any case, it would be imperfect and 
metaphysically bad.  
 
Thus, the optimistic story about the parts and the Whole (that parts shall be 
bad so the Whole may be good etc., all the stuff that irritated so much Voltaire and 
Schopenhauer) is all perfectly fine, but it does not provide any explanation about 
why the entire Whole must be created even knowing it would be metaphysically 
bad to create it, and even when it could be later turned into the best of all possible, 
through a skilled manipulation of its parts. Choosing the best of worlds is no doubt 
a moral choice that should be exalted in God; however it does not exempt Him 
from having yet to explain why it is better to create a (metaphysically bad) world 
than not creating anything at all. This needs an independent argumentation we 
shall not find in any part of the Theodicy. In creating the world, God seems to have 
some affirmative prejudices, difficult to justify. 
 
The last text mentioned is particularly intricate, or completely tautological: 
given a group A, B, C… n of objects whatever, and given any criterion of 
excellence between them, it is logically impossible that no one of the elements of 
the group is the best of all according to the given criterion; at least one of them 
must be excellent in those terms. The non-tautological claim should be saying: “If 
there was not, among all possible worlds, one that was good, then God would not 
have made anyone”. In this case, according to the definition of metaphysical evil, 
each and every created world would be metaphysically bad, and therefore, the 
logical God of Leibniz should have opted for not creating anyone. Once He decided 
to create (for necessity? for goodness? for vanity? for irony?), of course it is moral 
for Him to create the best of possible, but this is a clear case of what we call 
morality of second degree, or morality inside a more radical undecided moral 
situation: the very morality of the choice between creating something imperfect and 
bad or not creating anything.  
 
Leibniz has explained how God has resolved rationally and morally the 
conflict among the different worlds that claim for existence, but he has not resolved 
anything about the conflict between some world and no world at all. God‟s 
rationality and morality were clear in His free and responsible choice of this world, 
our world, but nothing has been clarified about the rationality and morality of God in 
His free and responsible choice for one world in general, by force metaphysically 
bad. The morality of abstention is never considered by the defense lawyer of God. 
 
Could one formulate rational and moral motives for refraining from creating a 
world (any world)? Let us first ask if there are motives for creating it. It is supposed 
that Leibniz‟s Christian God does not create by compulsive necessity or by 
emanation, but freely and responsibly. Neither could He, by His very definition, 
have created the world by pure will, as we have seen, because that would break 
the laws of logic and the very nature of the divine “engineer” Leibniz has 
conceived. Leaving aside the ironic motive (God could be an stylist, a frustrated 
baroque), we only have goodness left, goodness not totally exempted of vanity: 
“Actually, God, having planned to create the world, has intended only to manifest 
and communicate His perfections in the manner most effective and most worthy of 
His greatness, wisdom and goodness… He is like a great architect that aims the 
satisfaction and glory of having built a great palace…” (I, 146). Now leaving vanity 
aside, the “goodness” of that creation is enormously problematic. Goodness is not 
presented only in the level of moral evil, but still in the metaphysical level: to 
consider as “good” the act of creating a world (any world), one has to start from the 
presupposition that “being is good” (to be is better than not to be). But God knows 
perfectly well that, giving up to the temptation of creating, the creature will 
inevitably be affected by metaphysical evil: can we call “good” a person (even a 
divine Person) who gives other people something He knows to be inevitably bad 
when he could refrain?  
 
On the contrary, it seems there would be good arguments to say that, to the 
extent He abstained from creating, in this case He would indeed be doing 
something “good”: protecting possible creatures from inevitable metaphysical evil. 
On the contrary, God cannot declare He is innocent of metaphysical evil (escaping 
this way from His moral responsibilities) by saying this is only the price of creating 
and claiming – through the fallacious example of the boat and the stream – that He 
does only the positive, and original (metaphysical) evil should be imputed to the 
creature for being “heavy”, “receptively imperfect” and so on; because God knows 
perfectly well (and one does not need to be God to know it!) that a boat always has 
a weigh, that the creature will always have receptive limitations (that the pigeon will 
always fly against air resistance, in the famous Kantian metaphor); which means, 
God knows the obstacle is not the exception, but the rule. This is not an “original 
defect” of the creature; this is what the creature simply is. The world (any world) is 
not about a natural deviation, but something that, for structural reasons, could 
never work. Can it be called “good” the act of creating a world one perfectly knows 
will not work, not for being like this or like that, but simply by being? From the 
rational point of view, from the idea that “a world with evil can be better than a 
world without evil”, we cannot conclude that “a world with evil can be better than no 
world at all”. 
 
In the strictly moral level, God does not compel human beings to act like this 
or like that – and, in this sense, “let them free” -, but in the metaphysical level, God 
compels humans to having to act (some way). In this sense, metaphysical evil is a 
formal condition of possibility of moral evil (and of physical evil, as a consequence 
of moral evil, as presented by Leibniz). God did not succeed in refraining Himself 
and finally created the world, although, as we see, it is difficult to understand the 
rational and moral reasons of that sort of rushed decision. After seeing what He 
had done (or, better said, after seeing He had done), He charges man with a 
“moral task”. But this is an impossible task to perform: of course now the free 
decisions of humans lead to moral evil, but its formal possibility is given by the total 
impossibility of not acting or acting “in vacuum” without “receptive heaviness”. 
Those impossibilities are given by metaphysical evil in the world – that is, by the 
evil of having created – which, as it seems up to now, is the Creator‟s full moral 
responsibility, not the creatures‟. There is, moreover, the aggravating that very 
frequently moral evil – effectively carried out by humans – is used as a shield to 
conceal original metaphysical evil, which does not seem imputable to humans 
except by fallacy: the creature is curiously guilty of simply being a creature, of 
having been created, as a body could be guilty of having a weigh and an 
extension, and as the air could be guilty of offering resistance to the breast of the 
pigeon.  
 
In the terms of the present book, metaphysical evil shall clearly be situated in 
the worldly-structural level and moral and physical evil in intra-worldly one. In the 
light of those concepts, moral evil can be visualized as an intra-worldly 
specification of original metaphysical evil and, at the same time, as its fundamental 
concealment… for benefit of the imprudent Creator whose original sin is 
dissimulated by the sins – much more “visible” – of His creatures. Now God is 
concerned – having His morality already been redefined in the intra-world – in 
assisting humans in order to “save” them from their moral sins. The fact all humans 
can be considered as morally bad (or, as Kant would say, the fact there has never 
been in the world a single moral action) shows moral evil is simply the intra-worldly 
mise en scene of metaphysical evil, an evil only effectively produced by humans 
but formally made possible by God, not for having created the world like this or like 
that, but just for having created a world.  
 
It seems reasonable therefore that the responsibility for evil in the world is 
shared between God and the creatures: those might understand the vanity of their 
divine Father or simply respect His decision – undoubtedly dramatic – of creating a 
bad world instead of not creating any. However, God is eternally responsible for 
that choice. On the other hand, humans take their responsibility in what refers to 
the effectiveness of moral evil and physical evil. Leibniz has started from the 
presupposition that God and humans share the same logic. I am therefore allowed 
to suppose they also share the same ethics, the same theory of responsible 
freedom. Thus, God may and should be considered responsible through the same 
mechanisms of moral valorization we apply for judging men. If not, we will need 
two theories of freedom, one for God and another for humans, something 
undoubtedly sustainable but about which there is no suggestion throughout 
Leibniz‟s text. 
 
The belief that “being bad is better than not to be” is a dramatic moral option 
and not some “natural” or “self evident” datum. We can understand God and, no 




Note 7.  Kant and the antinomy of suicide 
 
1. In front of antinomies in general, the Kantian transcendental analysis, as 
we know, leads to the discovery of a “topical” confusion: both thesis and antithesis 
are true, if we distinguish two levels of analysis, the intelligible “noumenic” level 
and the purely phenomenical one. That is why Kant said Transcendental Idealism 
(whose core is the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon) is the key to 
what he calls skeptical solution for antinomies. In the particular case of the third 
antinomy, on determinism and freedom, Kant states that if phenomena are things 
in themselves, freedom is not possible, and nature becomes the complete and 
sufficiently determinant cause of all knowledge. But there is in “Transcendental 
Idealism” a fundamental ambiguity in the understanding of the very nature of 
freedom‟s antinomy and in the use of the “skeptical method” for its solution, as we 
shall see. 
 
An antinomy is a structure that does not allow any “dogmatic” solution in the 
theoretical level: in the case of freedom, we do not really know if there is only 
natural causality or if there can also be some “causality by freedom”. The “skeptic 
method”, by definition, could not provide any solution for this antinomy, in the 
sense of breaking their balance in favor of antithesis or thesis. The task of the 
skeptical method is limited to showing antinomy has no theoretical solution, 
because the thesis and the antithesis are put in different levels. In this sense, the 
skeptic method applies (or should apply) a purely formal procedure to resolve the 
problem. Notwithstanding, I hold that, in Kant‟s case, the application of this 
allegedly “formal” method turns out, inevitably, favoring the thesis and prejudicing 
the antithesis (finally configuring a “material” decision of the question), because 
what the very distinction between phenomenon and noumenon achieves is to show 
that freedom, in the long run, is possible in spite of the world‟s natural determinism, 
against what was explicitly affirmed by the antithesis. The distinction between 
intelligible and sensible, which seemed just a philosophical-logical piece of a purely 
formal solution, transports subreptitiously within itself a material element favoring 
the content of the thesis. 
 
This ambiguity between formal and material in the “skeptical” approach of 
antinomies – and that, if I am right, is not as skeptical as it seems – could be seen 
as a fallacious move to the extent that, at the moment of confronting the thesis and 
the antithesis, the greatest embarrassment and the most clear need to justify itself 
were certainly on the side of the thesis, of freedom and not of natural necessity. 
This last, according to Kant himself, was never really in embarrass: “The force of 
the principle which affirms the complete interdependency of all events of the 
sensible world according to immutable natural laws has already been established 
as a principle of transcendental analytics and does not admit any infraction” (Id). 
What has always been embarrassed is freedom: “The question is thus reduced to 
whether (…) there may be freedom or if on the contrary, freedom is completely 
excluded by this inviolable rule” (KRV 564. See also the Grundlegung, BA 114, 
115). The “skeptic” solution, by declaring both thesis and antithesis to be true in 
different levels, inevitably favors the thesis, which had no chance to be true alone, 
whereas the previous texts seem to show antithesis would have this possibility; but 
being the antithesis true alone, we are in conditions to declare the thesis as plainly 
false. The “skeptical method” saves the thesis from this danger. 
 
When Kant claims, in the same place, that the transcendental idea of freedom 
serves as a fundament to the practical concept of it and its suppression would 
mean the destruction of all practical freedom, he is saying it is not acceptable that 
the antithesis could be true alone; or that, in any case, the truth of the antithesis 
should be maintained within the limits of the merely phenomenical, so it cannot 
spread its bad influence out of that scope, harming all possibility of freedom. This 
approach shows a clear partis pris and not a purely methodic-logical approach to 
the issue of freedom. 
 
But this means the very step from theory into praxis is, in Transcendental 
Idealism, “hypothecated”; because freedom is, from the theoretical point of view, 
problematic and, notwithstanding, Transcendental Idealism succeeds in passing 
from theory into praxis with that problem already resolved: freedom can exist (and 
it will be, in the second Critique, as we know, admitted as a fact of reason, not 
discussable and not questioned in its effective existence). Freedom passes to the 
practical domain strongly connected to the intelligible level – which is the domain 
where the defense of the thesis is developed – and, therefore, with an explicit 
refusal that there can be a defensible ethicity in the antithesis level (to the extent 
freedom is accepted as a condition for the very opening of the domain of morality). 
The content of the antithesis is, ab initio, eradicated in the pure domain of the 
natural, sensible, heteronymous, anthropomorphic, etc.  
 
In order to make ethics possible, in Kant‟s perspective, the theory had to 
break the analytic symmetry that should characterize it as a genuine theory: the 
only thing a theory could do was to give the entire antinomy to the practical use, 
and not to the thesis (nor the antithesis). What this inconsequence of theory 
produces is passing from the theoretical to the practical level already favoring  
certain type of ethical theory (characterized by an intelligible conception of 
freedom), instead of simply inaugurating the practical domain in such way free 
human actions could choose to imbalance antinomy in favor of one side or another 
under their entire responsibility (certainly, if some Humean philosopher, for 
instance, had done any “skeptical” distinction that, in the passage from theory to 
practice, systematically favored antithesis, my criticism would be exactly the 
same). 
 
In the first Critique, the theoretical reason has done enough to put in safety 
the concept of noumena, that is, the possibility, and even the necessity, to think 
freedom. However, the empiricist who sustains antithesis has arguments to attest 
that the concept of freedom cannot even be thought (that, for example, what we 
call “freedom” is a certain handling of the natural necessity to which we are always 
submitted). Kant seems to think – in a curios overestimation of the strength of the 
antithesis – that this kind of move would definitely condemn the concept of freedom 
and of ethics in general. But what he should remember is that the only thing the 
empiricist has for defending the merits of the antithesis is exactly the same 
Kantians have for defending the thesis: arguments. 
 
The “skeptical” solution used by Kant allows defining, already in the 
theoretical level, the very notion of freedom as an action “free from empirical 
elements”, and this seems to forbid, ab initio, the very possibility of an empiricist 
ethics in the sense of an empiricist theory of freedom. In the light of the game of 
transcendental analysis definitions, this expression, “empiricist ethics”, appears as 
clearly contradictory, as a non-concept. All the structural is connected to the 
rational domain and the sensible-empirical level have no structures, being only the 
domain of the arbitrary and particular. However, the defender of antithesis does not 
represent the destruction of morality, but other conception of it, which the 
transcendental analysis ignores without careful consideration. 
 
As it seems evident that antithesis has the best logical arguments on its side 
or at least good arguments, the way Kant finds to strengthen the thesis is trying to 
show it as having the most powerful practical interests on its favor. On the very 
well-known section named “The interest of reason on the conflict it sustains”, Kant 
admits ab initio that, since the theory does not allow deciding anything, in the pure 
logical level, between thesis and antithesis, the question of the choice of one or 
another should refer to the level of interests. Kant seems kindly “unconscious” 
about the fact that in the theory, as we have seen, there has already been taken 
decisions about the issue, and what the doctrine of the “interests of reason” will do 
afterwards is only confirming a choice already carried out. Seeing the issue 
critically, it should appear as completely irrational the idea that there cannot be a 
practical interest for antithesis, that is, the position that believes in a world without 
beginning, in a complex and corruptible self, in a freedom as mere controlled 
necessity and in the non-necessity of postulating an Absolute God. Kant said 
antithesis takes off those pillars “of moral and religion”, but he could possibly 
shorten his sentence: it is religion what seems to be affected, more than strictly 
ethics.  
 
In these texts, Kant considers there is something as one practical interest and 
not diverse “practical interests” in plural. He has on his favor, to sustain that, the 
argument that the practical interest is shared by the educated as by the common 
people, in what Kant calls the “advantage of popularity”, that would be on the thesis 
side. This approach to the “popular” is strongly connected to the very strange 
Kantian idea (on which I will insist later on) of what is good and wrong does not 
represent any problem but something every human knows perfectly well (GR, BA, 
21, 22, 23). Of course Kant does not present the argument of “popularity” as the 
only one, not even as the most decisive, but it seems to be an inexcusable task of 
a critical philosopher trying to understand what could consist a possible morality of 
the antithesis, even if this morality might take away the peace and the support of 
the “common man” (if such entity really exists).  
 
It is evident that, to the extent the moral philosopher advances on his 
reflections, he acquires an evaluative complexity and an acute conscience of the 
problematic character of ethical matters, and of the determination of good and 
wrong, which may achieve high levels of sophistication. Regardless what is said 
about the moral philosophies of Spinoza, Hume and Nietzsche – to mention three 
thinkers who questioned freedom - those are reflections that honor the 
philosophical activity. The capability of managing unexpected ethical possibilities, 
even shocking for the average sensibility, does not turn the philosopher into a mere 
“expert in moral issues”, before whom the “common man” should feel humiliated, 
submitted or excluded. 
 
2. Is not there any inconsistence, in Kantian exposition, between, on the one 
hand, the conviction freedom and moral law are previous to the determination of 
good and wrong (KPV, A 113) and, on the other hand, the conviction good and 
wrong are something “any man of good will already knows”? We could say there is 
not contradiction if we accept the famous Kantian ethical “formalism” is a formalism 
of the motive, not a formalism of the object. The moral law has the scheme “I must 
do X, with total independence from the content of motives”, because the motive 
has to be formal, the sole reference to the pure moral law. However, the “I must do 
X” itself is not considered in the discussion: for example, that lying, prostitution and 
suicide are abominable immoralities seems to be something already determined 
and they do not need, at first, any proof of their badness, or at least Kant never 
opens the slightest possibility to ethically justify those activities. The only thing 
“formalism” will control is whether those abominable sins are rejected simply for 
empirical motives or for authentic a priori moral ones. It is clearly a partial 
“formalism”. Assuming those immoralities are absolutely wrong, it is impossible that 
they may be saved by any argument a priori, intending to support their legitimacy. 
From the point of view of motivation, suicide shall be rejected not for causing fear 
or repugnancy, but by arguments based on considerations about the human 
person, the ultimate aim of humanity, the fulfillment of reason, and so on. 
 
In order to better clarify this problem, I will analyze here the texts Kant 
dedicated to the issue of suicide in Grundlegung, in the second Critique and in the 
Lessons of ethics, considering that, in some way, the issue of freedom is the main 
moral problem and the asymmetry of its determination should have large 
consequences on other moral issues as suicide. Thus, I take the moral problem of 
suicide as Experimentum Crucis for the methodic functioning of the above 
mentioned asymmetry. It is useful to consider the issue of suicide in antinomical 
terms (even when this antinomy is not, of course, in the Kantian text), to situate this 
matter in the context of the present discussion. 
 
 
ANTINOMY OF SUICIDE 
 
THESIS ANTITHESIS 
In the world, there cannot be any 
motive, based on free causality that 
leads to the self-annihilation of a 
human being. 
In the world, there can be 
motives, based on free causality, that 
lead to the self-annihilation of a 
human being. 
 
The three Kantian arguments against suicide may be seen as a defense of 
the thesis of this imaginary antinomy. They present rational reasons a priori for the 
rejection of suicide, as an abominable act common man usually rejects only for 
empirical motives. It is sometimes difficult to maintain completely separate the 
three arguments, but they can be formulated approximately in the following terms: 
 
Argument A: The motivation for suicide is always and inevitably empirical and, 
therefore, a posteriori. 
 
Argument B: Suicide is an action which does not succeed in the test of 
universalization of the maxim, inevitably contradicting itself. 
 
Argument C: Suicide harms the dignity of human beings by taking them as a 
simple mean, instead of considering them also as an end. 
 
 
Concerning Argument A, Kant thinks that the one who commits suicide can 
only do it for “unhappiness” or “fastidiousness” or, better expressed, to escape 
from these unpleasant experiences. The connection between suicide and 
unhappiness is current in Kant‟s texts (GR, BA 53, 54, KPV, A 122, 123, Lessons 
of ethics, p. 192 and 195 of the Spanish edition). But, on the other hand, Kant 
kindly grants, in the Grundlegung, and in the second Critique, life itself does not 
have a “value” which could ground the decision of continuing to live. Coherently to 
the principles of his moral theory, he considers such lack of value irrelevant when 
someone tries to present a motive for not continuing to live. According to Kant, to 
keep living or maintaining life is a duty, an imperative of pure practical reason (and, 
in my opinion, the categorical super-imperative of all Kantian morals and perhaps 
of all Western ethics in general). “…maintaining your own life is a duty, and, 
moreover,  we all have a tendency to do so…; when adversities and an 
inconsolable suffering have taken from a man all taste for life, if this poor man, with 
strong heart and feeling more indignation than lessening or discouragement, and 
yet desiring death, maintains his life without loving it, just for duty and not for 
inclination or fear, then his maxim has indeed a moral content” (GR, BA 9, 10). And 
more: “It is the effect of a respect to something totally other than life, in comparison 
to which, life, with all its pleasure, has no value at all. He lives only for duty and not 
because he finds in life the least joy” (KPV, A 157, 158). And: “Suicide is not 
something disturbing because life is a good, since in this case everything would 
depend on the value each one gives to that good…” (Lessons of ethics, p. 192). 
 
Moreover, Kant places human dignity above the pure conservation of life, in 
such way it shall be conserved until the moment when continuing to live puts 
dignity at risk. While such extreme circumstance does not appear, life is 
maintained only for duty, in virtue of a completely a priori motive. “It is not 
necessary to be happy during your whole life, but it is necessary indeed to live with 
dignity. Misery does not authorize man to get rid of life, because in this case,  
every light diminution of pleasure would give us the right to do so, and all our 
duties to ourselves would remain polarized by la joie de vivre, when in reality the 
accomplishment of such duties might also demand the sacrifice of life” (pp. 192-3). 
And: “… the one who protects his beloved ones facing death is not a suicidal but 
someone magnanimous and noble, since the highest appraisal of life is based on 
being worthy of keeping it…” (p. 190). “To live is not something necessary, but 
living with dignity is; the one who cannot live with dignity is not worthy of life” (p. 
192).   
 
Concerning Argument B, Kant tries to employ categories of logical type, 
especially the notion of self-contradiction. As we know, Kant considers all 
motivations not genuinely moral contradict themselves when they try to get 
universalized according to the first formulation of the categorical imperative. He 
submits the suicidal to the test of universality: “Try to see if the maxim of your 
action can be converted into universal law of nature. Your maxim is: I apply to 
myself, for selfishness, the principle of abbreviating my own life when it eventually 
offers me more pain than pleasure. It is now about knowing if such selfish principle 
can become a universal law of nature. We can promptly see that a nature whose 
law would be destroying life through the same impulse charged of keeping it, 
would, no doubt, be a contradictory nature that could not subsist. Therefore, that 
maxim cannot be performed as a universal natural law and, as a consequence it 
contradicts completely the supreme principle of all duty” (GR, BA 53, 54. Also: 
KPV, A 75, 76 (82)). And in the Lessons of ethics: “… the one who destroys his 
body, taking life away, uses his free will to destroy this same will, what suggests a 
contradiction. As freedom is a condition of life, this so called freedom cannot be 
used to finish life and, finally, to finish itself. In sum, life is used to provoke the 
absence of life, which results in a contradiction”. (p. 188). 
 
As for Argument C, Kant tries to connect now the issue of suicide to the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, as we can see, for example, in 
the Grundlegung: “Behave yourself in such way that you relate to humanity, both in 
your own person as in any other‟s, always as an end and never only as a mean.” 
(GR, BA 67 (104) and in KPV, A 156 (171/2). In the Lessons of ethics, Kant starts 
using this criteria of morality to condemn, for example, prostitution, that “… always 
depreciate the value of humanity, when a person let herself be used as a mere 
instrument… Nobody is hurt in this, but one depreciates the dignity of mankind in 
her own person” (p. 159). “Suicide constitutes the supreme violation of the duties 
towards oneself. What does the disturbing character of that act consist of? 
...Humans can dispose of all that forms part of their person, but not of their very 
person… Humans can dispose, no doubt, of their situation, but not of their persons, 
since they are themselves an end and not a mean; it is completely absurd that a 
rational being which is an end to which everything else is supposed to be a mean, 
uses herself as a mean…” (pp. 159-60). “…according to the morality rule, suicide is 
not licit in any way, since it represents the destruction of humanity and places 
humankind bellow animality” (pp. 191-2). 
 
I want to show the content of the antithesis, in the antinomy of suicide, can be 
defended by using a priori transcendental arguments, that is, with Kantian tools; 
and if Kant does not present the issue this way, it is due to the unjustified 
asymmetry mentioned above. The conceptual elements for the restitution of 
rational symmetry can be really found in Kant‟s texts and some of them are 
unexpectedly present in the same Kantian argumentation against a morality of 
suicide. 
 
3. Indeed, in Argument A, Kant shows the possibility of keeping two things 
separate: conservation of life and estimation of its “value”, two attitudes that usually  
go together: it is always supposed we do maintain that we attribute a value to. Kant 
shows, at least within the scope of a transcendental philosophy, it is possible to 
consider ethical the conservation of life without having to recognize a value to it, to 
the extent life is kept only for duty. However, if we accept this conceptual 
separation, it should be accepted both ways: it is also possible to separate 
interruption of life and not estimation for its value. In the same way that, from the 
act of maintaining life, it cannot be deduced it is valuable, one can also affirm that, 
from the act of interrupting life, it cannot be deduced it has no value. In other 
words, the issue of an alleged “value” of life should get totally independent from the 
attitude of keeping life or of interrupting it. Kant affirms life should be maintained 
even when it causes displeasure. Symmetrically, we should conceive life could be 
suppressed even when it causes pleasure. But this would be like starting to admit 
that, as there may be structural reasons a priori to maintain life despite its empirical 
displeasure, there may be structural reasons a priori to interrupt it despite its 
empirical pleasure.  
 
Kant presupposes that, while motives to maintain life can be rational 
(although sometimes they are not), the motives to interrupt life can never be 
rational, or grounded on a priori structures; they must be inevitably empirical. In the 
same way as one can maintain life for duty, is it never possible to interrupt it for 
duty? We have seen Kant condemning interruption of life through direct suicide, 
but not all kind of interruption. He praises the one who puts his own life at risk in 
defense of some moral value. Let us insist on the same quotation: “… it is not 
suicide to risk your own life before the enemy, coming even to sacrifice it in order 
to observe the duties towards someone…The intention of self-destruction is what 
constitutes suicide…There is a remarkable difference between lack of prevision 
and imprudence – where yet underlies a desire to live… Suicide causes a kind of 
repulse on us, while the one who dies because of fate produces compassion” 
(Lessons of ethics, pp. 190-1).  
 
However, as it was said before, the “intention of dying” seems to be the 
relevant point in the Kantian attempt to express the difference between the “willing 
to die” of the suicide and the “not willing to live (in this or that way)” of the hero or 
the martyr; but this intention might exist at some degree in all these cases, and it is 
very difficult, facing a concrete act, to differentiate those two types of attitudes 
neatly, the intentional and the non-intentional. The simultaneous sustaining, by 
Kant, of the acceptance of risking life in benefit of moral dignity, and the absolute 
repulse for suicide, makes the ethical Kantian valuation of interrupting life a 
valorization of a gradual and not absolute type (as it would be if each and every 
interruption of life, both of the suicidal and of the hero, were condemned).  
 
Thus, Kant himself seems to provide the rational elements necessary to 
defend the antithesis of the antinomy of suicide: the possibility of disconnecting the 
issue of “value” of life from the decision of keeping or interrupting it, on one side; 
and, on the other, the defense of a certain type of interruption of life for rational 
reasons that only differs from the suicidal attitude in degree, not in absolute terms. 
It is necessary to prove that, on the side of the antithesis, there can also be the 
support of rational motives of structural character, and not only empirical motives. 
In the particular case of the issue of the value of life, suicide, etc., there may be 
possible to show we can develop a not merely empirical argumentation in this 
sense. Such argumentation would be presented within what we could call a 
“metaphysics of life”, which should be added to the metaphysics of nature and the 
metaphysics of morals presented by Kant. The fundamental premise of this 
“metaphysics of life” is, as we have seen, that it is possible to differentiate – and it 
is necessary to make such difference – between the value and disvalue of the 
things we find in life, and the value or disvalue of life itself, of its pure structure, 
independent of its concrete and contingent contents. The strongest arguments for 
the content of antithesis – for example, in the case of the antinomy of suicide – are 
those which are developed in the level of the structure of the world, not in the intra-
worldly domain. 
 
It is very important to note that, although the difference worldly/intra-worldly is 
present in Kant‟s philosophy, the same is never applied to the issue of the value of 
life. Indeed, in the first Critique, during the proof of the antithesis in the first 
antinomy, we can read: “… several things may begin in the world, but the world 
itself cannot have a beginning…” (KRV, A 455). And in the observation of the 
antithesis, in the third antinomy, Kant states: “Even when it is granted a 
transcendental faculty of freedom, able to initiate the changes of the world, such 
faculty should, in any case, be found only out of the world… But those faculties 
should never be attributed to the substances in the world…” (KRV, A 478). And 
also: “Every beginning is found in time, as every limit of extension is found in 
space. However, space and time are only found in the sensible world. 
Consequently, while the phenomena in the world are limited in a conditioned way, 
the world itself is neither limited in a conditioned way nor unconditioned” (KRV, A 
551). 
 
Statements referring to the world as such may not be considered “empirical”, 
at least in the same sense in which ordinary intra-worldly statements are, for 
example, the ones about physical or social facts, contingent and accidental. 
Statements of the type “There are high percentages of indigents in developing 
countries” are not in the same level as, for example, “Humans are indigent beings”. 
If the statements about the structural helplessness of human beings are empirical, 
they are not so in the same sense as those which say something about accidental 
and contingent helplessness. The blindness towards this difference results, in 
Kant‟s moral philosophy, in the inflation of the term “sensible determination” or 
“determination of the inferior faculty of desire”. Statements about the structure of 
the world, if they are not synthetic a priori, they are not synthetic a posteriori in the 
sense common empirical statements are. 
 
Kant seems averse to apply this important difference to the domain of human 
pleasure and pain, because he is neither interested on a reflection about human 
condition nor, as a consequence, on the responsibility to recognize the existence of 
structural pleasures and pains, not merely empirical, in the level of this condition. It 
is a basic conviction of Kant‟s moral philosophy that each and every pain or 
pleasure is determinable only a posteriori, through experience (KPV, A 102, 103). 
The concept of a “pain a priori” or of an “intelligible pain” may be absurd in Kantian 
conceptual building. Notwithstanding, the idea is not absurd at all. We are, as we 
have seen before, in conditions to predict information about the unborn, precisely 
all that is connected to their structural condition, and independence from the vital 
specific contents of which this condition will be filled out in the future, after birth. 
And we can, based on this “structural information”, define something like a “a priori 
pain”, a pain connected to the very structure of the world and not to the intra-world 
of beings, that is to say, to the very fact of being human and not to the fact of being 
a human of this or that kind. 
 
In the specific case of Argument B, we have the impression that Kant‟s 
moralistic devotion would want the categorical imperative to be an analytical 
statement of formal logic, in such way that denying it would automatically produce 
a contradiction (it reminds the desire of Saint Anselmus and other medieval 
philosophers of showing that God‟s existence could be presented with the same 
mathematical precision as the properties of triangle). However, the alleged 
“contradiction” makes suppose a reference point: With what exactly does the 
maxim “contradicts”? The answer is: with the maxim itself. But, why is self-
contradiction brought about? Simply because maxims are generated within the 
asymmetry criticized before. Freedom is already born with a certain unjustified 
affirmative content: it is a freedom to maintain life. Therefore, making the option for 
the antithesis of the antinomy of suicide implies in self-contradiction! A nature that 
is fundamentally conceived for self-preservation obviously cannot destroy itself 
without contradiction. Kant has finally managed to transform ethical imperative in 
an analytical statement….through a definition. 
 
On the other hand, Kant inevitably passes from this allegedly “logic” level 
(which we should better call “definitional”) to a frankly empirical one, confusing 
logical (or definitional) contradiction with what would be better called empirical 
“self-invalidation” or “self-cancellation”, as in the famous example of money deposit 
(KPV, A 49, 50). It is obvious that, if everybody denied to have made a deposit of 
which there is no evidence, this would come to a point where there would be no 
more deposits at all and, therefore, no opportunity to apply the maxim. This would 
equally apply to lie and suicide: if everybody thought they had the right to lie at 
their convenience, after certain time no one would believe anybody and there 
would be no more occasions to apply the maxim. And, certainly, if the whole world 
committed suicide, no one would obviously remain in the face of the Earth to apply 
the maxim I may dispose of my life if “misfortune” or “dislike” occur. However, 
these consequences are totally empirical! Even the disappearing of the entire 
human race is still, despite its morbid relevance, an empirical reason in the very 
sense of Kant‟s theory. Following Kant‟s ethics faithfully, moral theory as such 
cannot have any kind of commitment to the survival of the species, but only to the 
instauration of morality in the world and with the fulfillment of reason, whatever the 
empirical consequences could be (pereat mundus).  
 
Yet nothing assures this instauration will preserve life instead of suppressing 
it, as it is shown by the fact that, in many occasions, life has been put at risk in 
defense of moral values. In the famous opusculum on lie, Kant admits that, in the 
empirical level, someone could send another to death in the strict accomplishment 
of the moral law, and the same could occur, following Kant‟s principles, with the 
totality of the human species, if that occurred in defense of rationality and morality. 
Certainly, if there were empirically no more human beings, there would be no 
exercise of morality and rationality in the world, but it is perfectly possible that the 
disappearing of human species had been due to a rational-ethical reason of 
greater elevation. An ethics of aprioristic kind should not condemn suicide under 
the basis that “it contradicts itself” because, if universalized, this ethics would let 
the world unpopulated, without having beforehand analyzed the possibility the 
suicidal act may have been performed in defense of the rational-practical values 
connected to the instauration of the intelligible moral order in the world. 
 
In what refers to Argument C, the last Kantian argument against suicide, 
there is no doubt the manipulation of a human being as an instrument and as a 
thing seems to be an excellent criterion for determination of immorality, and I am 
absolutely not going to contest this criterion. The manipulation of other in one‟s 
own benefit could possibly be considered, fair and square, as the apotheosis of 
immorality. But we cannot ignore that, in the birth of a human being, it is also 
possible to detect (if we see the issue without prejudices) structures of 
manipulative character. However, if manipulation in the generation of people is not 
denounced - as usually it is not – at least with the same vehemence and critical 
sense as manipulation in the annihilation of people, this makes us think it is not 
really manipulation what is being criticized in the case of suicide, but something 
that appears in the case of suicide and does not in procreation and birth. But if we 
can accept as immoral that a man uses his own life as a mean and kills himself to 
run away from the misfortunes and dislikes of life, in a similar way, we can accept 
as immoral that a man uses the life of his son as a mean, giving him birth in order 
to run away from the misfortunes and dislikes of his own life. Many people explicitly 
manifest they have had their children so they could run away from the nonsense of 
their lives, the same justification which is habitually given to suicides. Why, in one 
case, the motive is recognized as immoral while in the other it is not? (Additionally, 
in Kant‟s text, there is an indirect allusion to fatherhood when he mentions divine 
will and His obligation to consider His creatures not using them only as means for, 
say, exhibiting His greatness, wisdom, and so on). 
 
If there is manipulation in birth, we should demonstrate to the Kantian that he 
cannot morally condemn suicide only by using the criterion of manipulation, unless 
he is also presupposing some hidden moral (or religious?) super-imperative which 
is capable to unbalance the argumentation, saving procreation and condemning 
suicide. If we think on suicide in a structural way, it does not seem mandatory that 
the suicidal takes himself as a mean without carefully studying beforehand the 
content of his self-annihilation; and, in contraposition, nothing allows to assure that 
the one who decides to keep living is not taking himself as a mean and not as an 
end, except, as I have insinuated before, if additional premises are being 
presupposed. 
 
Let us resume the three points. In the first place, the motivation to suicide is 
not always fatally empirical, if we separate world from intra-world, the accidental 
content of life from the very structure of living. A suicide connected to this last one 
will not necessarily have been motivated by “empirical reasons” in the usual sense, 
and in the sense used by Kant. In this case, committing suicide could absolutely 
not be motivated by “displeasure for life” or “dislike” or “unhappiness” (in a similar 
way that, for Kant, preserving life does not necessarily manifest “satisfaction” with 
it), but that suicide could be related to the defense of the person‟s own dignity as 
an end in itself, seeing suicide on a continuity line with lives that risk themselves in 
behalf of moral values. Secondly, the defender of the antithesis could put in 
evidence suicidal does not get in any “contradiction” when suppressing himself, 
since what the universalization of his maxim puts at risk is the mere empirical 
survival of humankind, and not some a priori moral principle. Third, he must show 
that, in the radical level of the manipulation the suicidal would practice on his own 
body, we can also put the manipulation we do on the ones who are born, so the 
argument of manipulation cannot condemn only suicide without additional 
premises. All these lines are argumentative and rational and, moreover, fully 
coherent to the very formal principles of Kantian moral philosophy, leaving aside 
illegitimate asymmetries based on material prejudices. 
 
 4. Passing from the theoretical level to the practical one, we do not obtain 
now what we could not obtain before. In the practical domain, we do not get what 
we want, but only the possibility of wanting. Whoever saw the issue of God‟s 
existence falling into antinomy in the theoretical level, starting two argumentative 
lines perfectly balanced, should not expect to encounter euphorically with his good 
Lord in the “practical” level: what he will find there will be much less than that: just 
a domain where he may unbalance the antinomy using the objective arguments his 
practical interests prefer and select, under his exclusive responsibility. In the same 
vein, whoever saw the issue of life and the possibility of suicide argumentatively 
falling in antinomy, should not expect, in the “practical” level, to encounter the 
meaning of life and definitive reasons to preserve it, but only a domain where it will 
be possible for him to responsibly build a value for life and some reason to 
preserve living, if this is the particular “practical interest” this person has on the 
subject. This is all the practical level can, at most, provide.  
 
 
It seems strange to conceive a moral theory as a domain where we may turn 
false or senseless the theoretical truths. It seems more plausible to think that, 
passing to the level of action, we have only the advantage of getting “disinterested” 
– in the sense of the Kantian theory of “interests” of reason – on the true or false 
arguments that harm us in our free action, and also the advantage of getting 
“interested” on the true or false arguments that benefit us, but without having any 
power to change the truth-value of statements as they were determined in the 
theoretical level. Actually, there are arguments for and against, for example, a 
morality of suicide, in such way it is so rational, in the practical sense, to choose 
one alternative as much as the other. However, when choosing, say, the 
affirmative alternative, one has no right to affirm that arguments for the negative 
alternative are false, even when we have the full practical right of “disinteresting” 
on the content of the antithesis.  
 
With that, I try to show the “interests” on the affirmative alternative, as it 
appears in Kantian ethics and in most modern moral theories, cannot be defended 
as purely philosophical rational interests. The absolutization of the affirmative 
alternative can only be sustained through the introduction, more or less 
surreptitious, of religious structures of thinking, since religion (as seen by 
theologians like Hans Küng) has indeed a non-renounceable compromise with 
affirmation; but philosophy does not, if conceived, as usual, as rational enterprise. 
If “practical reason” also manifests a non-dispensable compromise with affirmation, 
a philosophy that seeks to preserve such kind of “practical reason” will not lead the 
project for secularization of thinking to its end, as proposed by Illuminism. 
 
In the basis of all “practical interest”, there is always a desire, a wanting-it-to 
be-this-way. The rational guarantee this desire would not be something completely 
wild consists of the person being able to ground this desire in the profit of 
arguments the theory provides, so he can legitimately desire on that direction. 
What the theoretical reason cannot say to the person (or should not be able to say, 
because it is precisely what I believe Kant and affirmative ethics in general have 
done) is which rational direction he should be “interested” on. Ethics should make a 
difference, obviously, between completely irrational directions of desire and rational 
ones, but it cannot determine which one of two equally rational directions human 
will should desire. In this rational sense (and not in the sense of Schopenhauer‟s 
crude voluntarism, for example), one cannot put bridles on will: the most one can 
do is, through arguments, to make it “unbridle” on a certain direction chosen by will. 
Ethics should be formulated in such level that all directions of desire had the 
opportunity to be rationally justified, successfully or not, instead of ab initio 
inhibiting some of them based on doubtful “universal” indications. The moral agent 
must certainly make efforts to fit in moral objectivity, but he has the right to choose, 
in completely secularized terms, objective moral orders on which he is able to “go 
against himself” or “against his own interests”, as required by the fundamental 
ethical articulation. 
 
One of the most expressive signs of the liberation of ethical theory from 
affirmative asymmetry would undoubtedly be the deactivation of the absolutely 
condemnatory mechanisms against suicide, although keeping, as obvious, the 
critical resources to contest or discuss the morality of particular suicides, as they 











The main points for a critique of affirmative morality 
 
Before outlining what could be conceived as a non-affirmative moral, I will try 
to summarize now the main thesis I had to sustain to guide my critical reflections 
on affirmativeness in ethics. 
 
1. There is a basic first thesis of methodological character concerning the 
type of “approach” here assumed: when one asks about the value of human life, or 
about being a human being or about what is it “to be human” (or assuming being 
from the human view), what this work intends is to ask about the value of this very 
being as such in its own emerging, in its coming-to-be, in its situating into time, in 
its “staging”, in its effective appearing. It is not the intention to make an evaluation 
of what occurs or should occur inside this type of being when it has already come, 
been staged, put into effect. It is not about asking whether it is possible to develop 
a valuable life – a valuable being – once it is already here, but of asking if it is or 
not valuable to be here as such. That implies it is not accepted that something that 
can occur or not occur within the already established being in the intra-world could 
ethically justify the being itself: the levels of evaluative consideration are different.  
 
The valuing of being could be affirmative or negative independent of the 
affirmative or negative valuing of what occurs inside being. It is necessary to 
conceive as perfectly possible and not inconsistent that a person considers better 
never to have been born, in spite of his present gratifying intra-worldly life; and 
also, on the other hand, that a person approves his simply having come to being in 
spite of his intra-worldly life being deeply unpleasant. (The present work will 
establish, in more advanced stages of the reflection, an important asymmetry 
between those attitudes, but by now, any of both leads to the methodological 
distinction I intend to design here). 
 I denominate “radical” or “structural” a moral-evaluative reflection which is 
placed in this level of the very being, and I sustain this is the proper level of 
philosophical reflection concerning the value of life. Aristotle introduces this 
difference when, in Nicomachean Ethics, he asks about the very function of being-
a-man, regardless the specific functions (“intra-worldly”) that people can later 
assume (as philosophers, carpenters, politicians); also Descartes, when he 
formulates his method of universal doubt, he presents it as  doubting about the 
very being of the world, distinguishing it from concrete and specific doubts; and, 
certainly, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, and above all, in the Conference of ethics 
(IV, 3) proposes the same distinction. Not I only believe this distinction is clear (I 
have tried to defend it on Note 2), but it is also indispensable if one intends to 
assume a philosophical attitude before the world. Certainly, the scientific-technical-
manipulative attitude in the world will only recognize the existence of the intra-
worldly dimension of things, without even being able to conceive what would be a 
“worldly-structural” approach. However, such attitude seems unintelligible in a 
philosopher (even a scientific philosopher like Frege was interested not on merely 
manipulating numbers but in knowing what is number as such). This here is my 
attitude before being, human being and life. The structural radical attitude, in this 
sense, seems to be implicit in the very philosophical viewing of the world. 
 
 
2. One of the most employed terms in the previous reflection has been 
“affirmative” and its derivatives. What has been understood as such? I understand 
by “affirmative”: (a)The non-critical acceptation of fundamental theses of the type 
“the being is good”, “to be is better than not to be”, “the more being, the better”, etc, 
as well as the conviction that the ethical theory should ask directly about how-to 
be, how-to live, how to conduct an “ethical life”, and never ask if life itself is ethical, 
if there is not an ethical cost in simply staying alive, in “living a life” as if the being 
was, so to speak, “granted” and immunized against criticism. The ethicity of being, 
of living, of emerging to life, of being born, is given, in affirmative thinking – in my 
sense - as a granted and never thematically exposed conviction, as something 
already positively valued. (b) In the second place, affirmative means assuming the 
task of thinking as “insuring” or “supportive” (and, maybe, as a solace, as a certain 
type of “conceptual edification”), in the sense that the conceptualization of the 
world shall protect us, for example, against relativism, nihilism, solipsism, 
skepticism and, in general, against all that may threat the continuity of the life of 
thinking.  
 
For affirmative thinking, it is not the case of pure and simple “looking for 
truth”, but of looking for all truth compatible with the continuity of life, with the 
enterprise of not allowing that thinking get blocked so it could keep developing 
itself indefinitely (I have used the word “affirmative” because it has, in Spanish, 
precisely these two meanings: “affirmative” as opposed to negative [in the sense of 
“positive”, of “saying yes”, of “assenting”], and “affirmative” as “affirming”, 
“supporting”, “finding something firm, or firming” [as in expressions of the kind: “It is 
necessary to firm on something, on some belief”, etc.].). 
 
In this sense, Kantian ethical theories as much as Utilitarian, Eudemonists or 
Skeptical (and combinations of those), independent of their specific tendencies, 
principles and contents, have been, without exception, affirmative ethics. My 
criticism to ethics in this work is, therefore, of fundamental character, and does not 
get into discussions about details in which I would have to put myself on the side of 
Deontological or of Utilitarian ethics. From the optic of the present book, what is 
interesting in those theories is they all are “affirmative” theories, in the explained 
sense (contemporary north-American Pragmatism is perhaps the philosophy which 
has most openly assumed the “affirmative” character – in the dual sense 
mentioned – of ethical reflection, through a pragmatist theory of truth [vide, for 
example, the attempt of reconstruction of moral theory proposed by John Dewey]: 
true is what protects us from danger, what can be used as an adequate instrument 
for successful survival. What pragmatism has openly exposed remains implicit, I 
think, in the rest of moral philosophies in general, including Kantian ethics). 
 “Affirmative” are theories in which the movement of the quest for truth is 
conceived as a vital process (even when this “Nietzchean” interpretation might 
seem offensive to many of the authors of these theories), in which the hypothesis 
that the quest for truth may lead us to an anti-vital result is rejected beforehand and 
not critically. The basic affirmative meta-thesis would be the following: life and truth 
go (or should go) on the same path, they never get in conflict; discovering truth is 
(or should be), at the same time, to discover the continuity of life, the uninterrupted 
process – however arduous – of vitality. There are not (or there should not be) anti-
vital truths. (The difference between Nietzsche and the Kantian and Utilitarian 
affirmative ethics is that this meta-thesis is openly assumed by the first one, while, 
in the case of others, it is systematically concealed through intellectualist strategies 
(See my Project of Negative Ethics, chapter IV, and see further on, the Epilogue II 
of this book).  
 
3. In order to consider the radical character of asking about the value of 
human being, of human life as such, it is not necessary to formulate an ethical 
theory able to generate judgments and concepts, among other things because any 
ethical theory that could be chosen would already be affected by the questioning 
open by radical reflection. It is necessary to formulate just what I have called a 
fundamental ethical articulation that, as I sustain, would be common to ethical 
theories regardless their contents and tendencies, ethics of principles or 
consequentialist. This fundamental ethical articulation (from now on FEA) is the 
following: behaving in such way that it is not the case that only the defense without 
restrictions of the own interests matters, being disposed – in case the 
consideration of other‟s interests so demands – to go against our own interests.  
 
My defense of this formulation of FEA is supported by the following: (a) As a 
methodological strategy to formulate the radical reflection which I intend to make 
here, it is important to adopt a FEA formulation that respects the usual way of 
morally valuing of current affirmative ethics, instead of producing – through some 
kind of Umwertung – new kinds of values and mechanisms of valuations. It is about 
showing that the moral questioning presented – in relation, for example, to self-
suppression and procreation – emerges from de exercise of values currently 
performed in the intra-world by affirmative ethics, and not by special “negative” 
values introduced ad hoc. (b) Second, I believe that, even in Greek ethics (Stoics, 
Epicurean, Platonic, Aristotelian), this FEA is in vigor, although in a restricted way, 
given the composition of Greek society at that time. Throughout the whole 
Nichomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle explains behavior schemes that 
suppose a self-controlling, an attenuating of one‟s own uncontrolled desires in 
benefit of something more general and public, a contention of the excessive 
satisfaction of one‟s own interests, etc., and that‟s the general sense of FEA (being 
irrelevant that in ancient Greece this exercise was not generalized to embrace all 
people). (c) In what refers to a possible objection to FEA coming from Nietzschean 
genealogical questioning, I will discuss it on the Epilogue II of this book. To the 
extent descriptive dimensions of ethics can have the primacy over the normative 
domain through a certain type of naturalization, I think such positions point to a 
possible limit of moral reflection as such, more than to an alternative moral theory. 
 
 
4. I hold that affirmative ethical thinking currently offends FEA and that, 
because of it, it has to constantly and regularly develop itself as what I have called 
a secondary ethics; after a fundamental ethical transgression, the only possible 
ethics is one of secondary character, or second degree ethics. 
 
Indeed, through the analysis of the manipulation on procreation, and the 
possible recovery of authenticity in suicide, there has being presented moral 
arguments which basically put in question the being, both under the form of giving-
the-being-to-another and unconditioned keep-living-the-own-being. This has been 
done, as I have indicated in the previous point, using the same current moral 
affirmative categories: the criticism of manipulation and the quest for authenticity 
are two ethical directions which perfectly fit in FEA, to the extent both of them 
accept, ultimately, a certain “going against the own interests” in benefit of 
something more general and public. So, when affirmative thinking - as indicated on 
topic 2 – passes directly to the issue of how-to-live without ever posing the subject-
matter of what-to-live, it has passed over this fundamental ethical questioning. 
Affirmative ethics have already accepted a certain manipulating people and some 
inauthentic sort of life, inevitably hetero-aggressive and systematically self-
defensive, attitudes which are taken together in any decision to keep living or to 
procreate.  
 
The manipulation of the other – both on birth and on death – will become 
basically necessary for the continuity of ethical affirmative thinking. Affirmative 
thinking considers this as “unavoidable” (since what lacks to the affirmative ethics 
in general is a component of abstention, of ontological economy. Affirmative ethics 
are maximal and expansionist). However, since manipulation is condemned by 
FEA, the only ethics affirmative thinking can now develop is a secondary ethics. So 
I call an ethics that develops moral norms within a transgression, of a more basic 
character, of moral norms (maybe the same norms that are developed afterwards 
to face ethical problems within the world). For example, the “well treatment of 
prisoners” is typically a secondary moral piece, since taking someone as a prisoner 
breaks FEA in a basic way (taking prisoners attacks the interests of the other), so 
“treating prisoners well” can only constitute a norm of a second degree morality. Or 
“killing someone without pain”, since killing someone breaks FEA, so “avoiding the 
pain of killing” is pure secondary morality; and so on.  
 
Secondary moral cannot avoid, on this formulation, the dangers of paradox 
and cynicism. In a more general sense, if affirmative thinking has never even 
considered, for example, the issue of the morality of procreation, the application of 
moral norms in children and the concerns for an accurate and respectful education 
for them, will be, despite their enormous quantum of morality, only pieces of a 
second degree morality. That is why a “first degree” morality cannot be affirmative; 
it must necessarily, in strictly contraposition to affirmative, be a “negative” ethics. A 
“first degree ethics” considers the issue of what before the issue of how, and it is 




5. The fifth thesis refers to concealment. Precisely for being constituted as a 
basic transgression of FEA, affirmative ethics are not only and inevitably 
“secondary”, but they are also compelled to develop themselves within the 
phenomenon of concealment. Affirmative ethics are inevitably “concealing” in the 
sense they must keep hidden all moral questioning radically affecting being, and, at 
the same time, they should hide also the ethical basic transgression they commit 
by omitting radical reflection. The secondary character of ethics is, itself, 
concealing: the concern for “being a good father” conceals the fact of never having 
asked whether it is good or not to be a father. To develop a “good life” conceals the 
fact of never having asked whether it is good to live, and so on. Since affirmative 
(positive-supportive) thinking considers those basic pondering as nonsense, in the 
concrete development of human conduct, all moral questioning emerging day by 
day from this fundamental reflexive omission must be concealed, which means, all 
transgressions of FEA that now allow to rigorously apply FEA within the world, in 
current intra-worldly situations, should be concealed. So a fundamental critical 
principle of a non-affirmative ethics is: not asking only about the raw morality of an 
action but also about the level in which the morality of the action is evaluated (This 
must prevent to morally praise, for example, a killer for the fact he uses a 
procedure through which her victims do not suffer, or a master who lashes her 
slaves only when necessary, and so on). 
 
 
6. Secondary character and concealment generate together, in ethical 
affirmative thinking, two moral faults directly derived from the secondary character 
of its norms, which we can name with their usual denominations of hypocrisy and 
pride; two faults which, if the issue is studied from the empirical view, are scarcely 
criticized in modern societies, maybe because these are edified on the cultivation 
and regular exercise of these two attitudes. Hypocrisy and pride may be 
considered the two main affirmative faults. The main difficulty of affirmative ethics 
is its structural inability of capturing the previous moral problems of basic 
character, connected to the very constitution of the being of the world and of 
humans, in such way that a great part of the moral incapacity (or, in traditional 
terms, immorality) which invades our world stays out of their critical scope, an 
incapacity which is not based on the non application of moral law, but on its 
secondary application. In affirmative ethics, it is always possible to judge and 
condemn immorality in the intra-worldly level, making lose sight of the basic 
structural breaking or transgression in which those justifications can be formulated. 
In this sense, the lack of radical reflection of affirmative ethics allows the almost 
free development of those fundamental faults, condemned, paradoxically, by 
affirmative ethics in the intra-worldly level. 
 
Hypocrisy is the fault which is most connected to the component of 
concealment in affirmative thinking, as much as pride is the fault which is most 
connected to the component of hetero-aggressiveness and unconditional self-
defense. It is impossible to carry out, for example, what is coldly called a “fair war” 
without admitting a high quantum of moral hypocrisy, since killing other humans 
basically transgresses FEA; the human I kill in a war is not just “my enemy” but 
many other things (a son, a father, a member of a club, a student in a university 
and so on). The “fairness” of a war is not feasible without the hypocrisy connected 
to concealment. Hypocrisy and cynicism are two closely connected attitudes. On 
the other hand, pride is transmitted through values as “legitimate self-defense”, 
constant incentive to “self-respect”, to “not letting oneself being oppressed”, “to 
courageously confront the enemy”, “to never be afraid”, “not being taken as a fool”, 
etc., attitudes strongly fed by the strong competitive organization of affirmative 
societies.  
 
Through the exercise of hypocrisy, affirmative ethics is false; though pride, it 
is belligerent. If we take a close look, those two faults are little criticized in 
affirmative societies, and to a certain point they are encouraged in the normal 
processes of socialization and education of young people. Hypocrisy and pride are 
two attitudes intimately connected to the mechanisms of constitution of affirmative 
ethics. We live in societies in which simulation, lie, fatuity, frivolity, consumerism, 
struggle, “effort”, the destruction of the other in the arena of competence, the 
undefined self-defense, the destruction of  “elements pernicious to society”, etc., 
are not criticized as much as, for example, defeatism, shyness, suicide, 




7. One of the main ethical consequences of the secondary character of 
affirmative ethics is certainly the break of the principle of inviolability of the other‟s 
person and the full assumption of a political administration of violence. Indeed, if 
we consider also the moral issues connected to what to live (and not only to how to 
live), we would see that being itself can be considered as ethically problematical, 
that in order to be (anything), it is necessary to transgress FEA, in the sense of 
expansion and aggression of the other, due to the basic “lack of space”, etc., which 
could lead to question the current policies of births and deaths, the affirmative 
ontological administration. The fundamental aggression of being shows that 
“cohabitation among freedoms” is, in the radical level, impossible. Affirmative 
ethics are constituted on the basic transgression of FEA, so they are inevitably 
compelled to use hypocrisy to hide transgression (and so they can edify secondary 
morality without basic disturbances) and also the systematically assumed 
aggressiveness (pride), by not accepting abstention or letting be killed as ethically 
advisable attitudes. (I insist on this point: it is typical of ethical affirmativeness the 
lack of a morality of abstention, of letting vacant, of withdrawing, of giving up, of 
setting free, attitudes which are systematically interpreted in terms of “defeatism” 
and “failure”).                        
 The affirmative concern on how-to-live (or the overwhelming concern of living, 
of finding, in any way and against any one, a way to be, to plant your own “right to 
live” in the middle of the world) drastically assumes that, in order to say yes to life, 
it is necessary not to consider the other‟s life as absolutely inviolable. Considering 
the other‟s life as inviolable is something that, given the conflictive structure of the 
world – as elucidated by naturalized ontology -, can only be done if we are willing 
to put our own lives at disposal, an attitude strongly contested in current affirmative 
thinking based on pride and hetero-aggressiveness. At most, affirmative ethics 
encourages dying in the full exercise of killing (in war, for example). This way, the 
how-to-live assumes total primacy over the what-to-live, and the how-to-live can 
only develop at the expenses of breaking the principle of inviolability of the other‟s 
life, to the extent ethics of how-to-live only conceives the respect for the other 
through strict qualifications; these qualifications allow some human beings to be 
drastically withdrawn from the domain where they should be considered only as 
human beings, to start being considered as human beings having the properties A, 
B, C, etc; and in the terms of these mediations, they are considered from the point 
of view of their possibilities of being or of stop being, of their inviolability or 
violability. In affirmative ethics, human life is “sacred” only through qualifications.  
 
From there on, aggressiveness is admitted and administrated intra-worldly by 
the organized affirmative societies, creating a “politicized ethics”, in the sense of a 
fair distribution of violence, typical piece of secondary morality since violence has 
been accepted in the radical level. Affirmative societies accept as morally correct, 
for example, the implantation of capital punishment and, in general, the 
extermination of people who are considered pernicious to society, struggling 
against all forms of what is narrow-mindedly seen as “self-destructive” (suicide, 
drinking, drugs and excessive exuberant hedonist forms of life in general), 
admitting the existence of “fair wars” undertaken by nations against “dangerous 
enemies”, and accepting competence and struggle as forms of social interactions 
par excellence, propitiating the struggle for “gaining favors”, where the less 
malicious are massacred by the more “intelligent”, quick and opportunist in a 
commerce where one should not allow “to be taken as a fool”. Institutionalized 
violence is, at the same time, concealed in legislation, public morality, institutions 
and public freedoms, apparently “at everyone‟s reach”. 
 
Kantian and Christian ethics in general tend to stress the affirmative hypocrisy 
component, whereas Utilitarian, Pragmatic and other empirical ethics tend to stress 
aggressiveness and pride (in reality, Kantian ethics are, in their very constitution – 
as I have tried to show on Note 7 – “negative ethics”, only illegitimately turned 
“affirmative” in the middle of the way. Utilitarian ethics are assumedly “politicized 
ethics”). 
 
One of the most basic manifestations of moral hypocrisy in affirmative moral 
consists of attributing to eventual contents, strategically and politically selected, the 
moral evil formally present always and in every moment due to the transgressions 
of FEA connected to the being itself. It is a kind of systematic concealment of the 
formality of evil, through the adduction of contents that apply to specific cases one 
wants to morally condemn but not to others, strategically breaking the formality of 
evil (moral disqualification, as transgression of FEA, by structural pain). This way, 
FEA receives a new formulation in the secondary level; the articulation good/evil 
turns now into this one: determined (pointed out, emphasized, highlighted, 
stressed, etc) evil versus undetermined (not pointed out, not stressed, etc) evil. 
The formality of evil makes the normative space saturated. It is inevitable to 
permanently fall into situations of immorality, not due to some “radical evil of 
human nature” or to a “perverse nature”, but because of our own structural factual 
condition – as elucidated by naturalized ontology – which does not leave us space, 
as we have seen, to be moral. The affirmative maneuver consists of denouncing, in 
a particular case, what could (and, morally – in the sense of primary moral – 
should) have been denounced in all other cases of the normative space, but it was 
not because there were not strategic motives for that (though there has always 
been moral motives available).  
 The strategic selection of a “corrupt”, and the highlighting of certain allusive 
contents, is an extraordinary form of concealment of the formality of transgression 
(the so called “evil”) and of the fact that what is being denounced is not an 
exception (what fallaciously suggests there is no corruption in the rest of the cases, 
or that evil is of exceptional character, something accidental and depending on 
contents). The evident immorality of what is denounced conceals, in a systematic 
way, the secondary strategy of the very denunciation, consisting of the purely 
strategic selection of people to be denounced; what is actually here and now 
denounced should have been also denounced in other cases – affected by the 
same normative saturation -, but that were however strategically “dispensed”. It is a 
kind of “unfair play” within the very heart of the formality of evil (what is vulgarly 
denominated “scapegoat” results precisely from the fallacious procedure of hiding 
the formality of evil behind the selection of an evil only emphasized for strategic 
reasons, but which had always been there).  
 
Affirmative societies, through strategic and political criteria, select some 
cases and leave others in shadows; they make a selection within the saturated 
normative space: where all is morally problematic, a non-moral selection will be 
done of who will be punished and of who will be dispensed. This way, a series of 
strategic and arbitrary manipulations are done – secondarily – in the name of the 
law, of the obedience of social rules, of the well-being of everyone and so on. The 
conduct - no doubt wrong and inadequate in most of the cases – of the 
condemned, serves to conceal the questionable character of the procedure 
through which these faults are emphatically pointed out, as if, out of that specific 
case, there were no other objects of criticism disguised by what was effectively 
denounced and exposed to punishment and shame.  
 
Thus, what affirmative societies do is a kind of politicization of the formality of 
evil, in the sense of its strategic manipulation. It is an administration of normative 
saturation. If transgression is formal, however not recognized – because it is 
precisely what affirmative ethics left aside in order to be established - the choice 
between the transgression that will be denounced and the one that will be 
concealed, forgiven or dissimulated will be whether political or strategic but not 
moral; or, better said, only of secondary moral. The immorality which is concealed 
or buried in the affirmative administration of faults is the injustice of omission, never 
denounced by affirmative theories of justice, the injustice of what is omitted in the 
very application of the law, and  committed by what we abstain from doing when 
we judge and punish what have been effectively done.  
 
 
8. In the field of philosophy, we can consider as the masterpiece of affirmative 
concealment the systematic struggle against “nihilism” (understood in a very large 
and not technical sense including strong skepticism, relativism, solipsism and all 
theoretical attitudes that undermine the possibilities of knowing, living, developing 
something, etc.). In the critique against “nihilism” in this large sense, the basic 
moral questionings of being, systematically left aside by affirmative ethics already 
in its very constitution, are now interpreted as “adventitious and accidental 
negativity”, as constituting the phenomenon of “evil”, as a set of evitable questions 
which could be bypassed through intra-worldly managements, and as though 
someone – some people or groups – were “guilty” of them, and should be adverted 
and punished by having introduced negativity into the world. The otherness of the 
negative, or the problematical character of being itself – when this radical 
pondering is not assumed by affirmative ethics – adopts the historical form of a 
struggle against the forces of Nothing, of Death, against disaggregate, destructive, 
“negative forces”, forces “that oppose to life”, etc, without ever visualizing the 
possible structural character of the anomalies attempted, in this way, to be intra-
worldly redistributed, in a kind of kermesse of imputations, accusations and 
punishments. This is the only relation affirmative thinking accepts to establish in 
relation to nothingness, in its regular interpretation in terms of destructive and 
adventitious “nihilism”. 
 
However, as we have seen, since affirmative thinking is not radical and 
ignores the fundamental ethical questioning connected to the basic transgression 
of FEA, it connects to the almost unrestricted exercise of concealing hypocrisy, 
violent pride and expansive hetero-aggressiveness typical of affirmative 
organization of life; this makes us think the critique against “nihilism” is basically 
dictated by a bad conscience about the unresolved relations of affirmative thinking 
with the issue of nothingness, whose nature is known only through the information 
provided by routine and non-critical condemnations of “nihilism”. In this sense, I 
have dared to talk, sometimes, about an “affirmative nihilism”, which is a 
paradoxical expression indicating the path opened by affirmative thinking towards 
the faults above mentioned, in behalf of a “struggle against nothingness”; 
affirmative nihilism grounded on the basic breaking of the principle of inviolability of 
the other‟s life, as explained before. 
 
 
9. Due to the ethical difficulties of the affirmative, it is legitimate to suspect 
that maybe a kind of moral theory that accepts to make a radical pondering about 
the fundamental ethical transgression, connected to the basic issues of human 
condition, may be capable of recovering the moral motives connected to a first 
degree morality, without manipulation policies and with full responsibility in the 
level of being itself, beyond intra-worldly justifications. This new kind of morality, in 
strict contraposition to prevailing affirmative moral, may be called, in the first 
approach, “negative ethics”. It is to say: if affirmative ethics is captured and 
analyzed as secondary ethics, concealment, hypocrisy, pride, systematic hetero-
aggressiveness, administrated violence and non-authenticity, a “negative ethics”, 
stigmatized by the affirmative as being “nihilist”, might be able to maintain the 
moral reserves that were forgotten in affirmativeness.  
That is the first intuition about the internal bonds between morality and 
negativism. However it would be desirable that this kind of new ethics had a 
denomination not merely relative to the current affirmative; it could be, for example, 
called hyper-critical ethics, first degree ethics, ethics of what, ethics of being, or 
something similar. This would be an attempt of withdrawing the negative from the 
context of purely relative or “opposing” attitude to current affirmative approach, 
trying to formulate what would be a negative ethics in the sense of a radical ethics 
of what, which  would consider the questioning of being as such and not only of the 
strategies of how-to-be.  
 
All previous theses up to now have referred to the critical dimension of 
negative ethics. The next ones show the substantive thesis about the relation 
between morality and negativity. 
 
 
10. The fundamental pondering that “negative” ethics (in the strict sense of 
“non-affirmative”, and in the dual sense of affirming and firming or supporting) 
accepts to carry out, refers to the matter of whether it is possible a valuation of the 
world as such, which may relate to the being-in-the-world peculiar to human 
beings. This thesis means: there is no rational manner to do this valuation in a 
direct way under the form of a statement such as “The world is good”, “The world is 
bad”. Precisely, within the large scope of concealment, affirmative ethics commits 
itself – without justification – to a positive valuation of this kind. A “negative” ethics 
refuses to perform this same philosophical “excess”, declaring, for example, “the 
world is bad”. In this level of analysis, Wittgenstein‟s point of view in the Tractatus 
may be applied: all sentences have the same value, in the world everything is as it 
is, and everything happens as it happens; there is no value in it (See Tractatus, 
6.4, 6.41).  
 
Precisely, this kind of valuation is characteristic of the intra-world (as 
Wittgenstein himself sees the matter by underlining the words in it in his text). But a 
valuation of the world as such is possible in an indirect way, by doing a 
consideration through the question of pain. My tenth thesis states it is possible to 
prove – following Schopenhauer‟s footsteps – that pain does not belong to the 
intra-world but to the world itself; pain is structural in the sense of being connected 
to human condition in such way that pain may be rationally detected in the life of a 
human being before his or her effective existence in the world. This is the first step. 
The second is showing pain can morally disqualify, in the sense of FEA 
transgression. To the extent pain is presented as being structural, that is, as 
inextirpable component of any human life regardless its content, the possibility of 
moral disqualification will also be seen as regular and permanent, or structural. 
This is certainly a much weaker thesis than stating something like: “The world is 
bad”, but it is soundly based on rational arguments of the same type affirmative 
rationalism recommends making use of, when thinking philosophically. 
 
A naturalized ontology shows the being is connected, in its own instauration, 
to limitation, constraining, lack of space, inhibition of expansion: the step from non-
being to being is marked by those limitative and constrictive phenomena. In the 
case of the living being called man, this limitation is lived as pain, in a specially 
expressive sense, if compared to other forms of life that can also feel it, but without 
the specific human components of the experience (vivencia) of pain. It is crucial to 
understand that the emergence of being - and not something connected to the 
characteristics of this or that being - is systematically and regularly accompanied 
by the pain of limitation and lack of space. Thus, it is not legitimate to allege that, in 
the same way pain is structural, pleasure or happiness could be considered 
structural as well. Here we have a fundamental asymmetry.  
 
This distinction between pleasure and pain, and the sea-saw from one to 
another (as in the current sayings “there should be laughter after pain”, “tomorrow 
will be another day”, etc.) is completely intra-worldly and bonded to psychological 
experiences, but does not apply to the world as such. Certainly, in the 
psychological level, as seen on thesis 1, it is possible that someone lives the 
experience of “feeling happy simply by being”, regardless intra-worldly misfortunes 
and, symmetrically, it is possible that someone lives the experience of feeling 
unhappy simply by being, regardless intra-worldly happiness. However, this 
psychological symmetry is not sustained in the logical level, which is where I intend 
to formulate the thesis of structural pain and moral disqualification.  
 
Structural pain is not just a feeling, since it has objective proofs in its behalf 
based on the fragility of the body, disease and the inevitable conflict among natural 
beings (like humans). Since those are facts and not just feelings, the feeling of 
intense happiness by simply being is logically unsustainable, though it could have 
some psychological reality; by contrast, the recognition of the structural pain, 
independent of intra-worldly happiness, has empirical support and can be 
scientifically shown (through the information provided by Physics, Mathematics, 
Medicine, Sociology and many other sciences). There are no logical motives to feel 
happiness concerning the being itself, even when there are plenty to feel intra-
worldly happy; on the other hand, there are always motives to recognize the 
structural pain of being itself, even when such recognition is not accompanied by a 
psychological experience of pain. A “structural happiness” has no scientific support 
even when it could be felt by somebody, while structural pain has empirical support 
even though not psychologically lived in an experience. (This is a deep rupture of 
negative thought relative to Phenomenology and Philosophy of Existence).   
 
Pain is organized in degrees, from the mere logical recognition of it as 
structural pain to the extreme pole of lived pain which I have called one‟s own 
extreme physical pain. I mean “own” to the extent the pain must be my (in each 
case) pain, and not someone else‟s pain, however “close” the other person might 
be. I call it “physical” in order to differ from any kind of “moral pain” or “spiritual 
pain”, and the word “extreme” pretends to refer to a pain which, in the climax, is 
extremely unbearable to the one who suffers it (what is compatible with the 
objection that not everyone suffers pain in the same way, with the same resistance, 
etc. “Extreme” is a relative term which refers to the pain that is extreme-to-some-
person, and not to people in general). Each one of those degrees of pain 
corresponds to a degree of possible moral disqualifications until - in the extreme 
pole of pain - moral disqualification gets maximally and concretely effective. 
However, since birth, it is always present this possibility of moral disqualification, 
because pain is structural and therefore it does not appear during life, but together 
with it.  
 
If this is so, then even when the world cannot be proved to be “bad” in a direct 
way, it can be proved that: (a) the world itself is painful; and (b) pain morally 
disqualifies; therefore, the world itself morally disqualifies; being (to have emerged, 
to have been born) have placed me, since always, in the realm of permanent and 
inevitable possibility of moral disqualification, with all its consequences. (In this 
sense, we may question the mentioned aphorism of the Tractatus, so even when in 
the world all sentences have the same value, sentences about the world itself do 
not have all the same value: the simple statements about intra-worldly 
helplessness [such as poverty, lack of education, orphanage and so on] and 
statements – of another logical level – about structural helplessness [of all human 
beings as such, poor and rich, educated or ignorant, orphans or not] have not the 
same value. In the world, everything is as it is and all happens as it happens, but 




11. The axioms about fundamental pain of being are, in a way, trivial; they are 
very simple truths, accessible to anyone. Notwithstanding, they are not tautologies 
in the analytical sense, since they are synthetic truths that refer to the world, not 
empirically but structurally, or better said, not to the empirical intra-world but to the 
experience of world itself. Some (trivial) axioms about pain could be the following: 
 
D1) Human beings are born as sufferers, by being thrown from the mother‟s 
inward to the limitation of being in its instauration. 
D2) Human beings are regularly affected, already in mother‟s inward and 
during their whole existence, by the threat of countless diseases. Health condition 
can be seen as a highly unstable balance. 
D3) Human beings are affected, in general, by a fundamental fragility, which 
concerns the constitution of their organs, their brains, etc. 
D4) Human beings are affected, in general, by the conflict among natural 
beings, threatened by other natural beings and obliged to threat other natural 
beings (which constitutes a kind of anti-Spinozian geometrical ontology). 
 
All these statements and others that could be made are synthetic trivialities 
which do not help in anything to increase the “interest” for the world; they are just 
limited to announce basic truths about our condition, that have a wide influence on 
moral life. The synthetic triviality of these truths is regularly hidden through the 
concealment of the affirmative. Precisely, these axioms about pain of the very 
establishing of being are systematically concealed in order the affirmative intra-
worldly organization of life is possible, since there is no affirmative pondering about 
these items (and this is precisely, by contrast to monotonous negative thinking, 
what makes affirmative reflection so “interesting”). 
 
 
12. Finally, the previous ponderings on affirmative moral seem to have deep 
consequences of meta-philosophical character. The study of these basic ethical-
ontological issues seems to show that, in philosophy as usually conceived, its 
affirmative exercise is clearly and evidently beyond all doubts. As a matter of fact, 
philosophy seems to follow the same rhythms of life and of all things in the world, 
only in a higher level of sophistication and refinement. Philosophy, as well as life, 
seeks to give life interest, it seeks the interesting, the enriching and the complex, 
and not truth as it appears. Only apparently philosophical activity seeks to simplify 
or clarify issues. Actually, philosophy only wants to clarify issues in half, so they 
remain obscure in order philosophy can continue reflecting indefinitely or at least 
without ever visualizing some end. As well as life wants to keep living, philosophy 
fundamentally wants to keep thinking (and that‟s why radical thinking is so 
criticized – as the ones of Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, etc. – by what they have of “end 
of thinking”).  
 The flirting with truth is, that way, similar to the flirting with death; a maximum 
proximity without being grabbed, always leaving some remain that allow to keep 
fantasizing, complicating, getting lost, making it more complex, finding problems 
we did not have seen before. But human condition, as exposed in a series of 
fundamental axioms, is not complex at all, however complex might be the particular 
intra-worldly problems emerging at every moment. From philosophy – in particular 
the philosophy academically produced – it is demanded to be “interesting” in the 
sense of inter-esse, of introducing-it-in-the-being, and not in the sense of being 
true (or better said, truth matters to the strict extent it is interesting). Affirmative 
intellectual societies hate and fear thinkers who tend to finish reflection and 
reflective issues. On the other hand, these societies love and stimulate those 
capable of renewing issues incessantly.  
 
The possibility philosophical thinking could have another structure is not even 
considered, that philosophy may seek another thing that is not survival, 
continuation, incessant reproduction; it is never faced the possibility that truth, the 
search for truth, can be different, and maybe incompatible with the attempts to 
survive, to continue living. Maybe thinking leads to stopping, to refraining, to dying, 
to stop living, to getting quiet, to despair, to madness: why should thinking – 
assumed as a brave and really unconditioned searching for truth – be at service of 
the “interesting”, and not of the least interesting? Death can be seen as the 
uninteresting par excellence, so affirmative philosophy would be an attempt, 
through concepts, of taking distance from the uninteresting, from what introduced 
us in being (inter-esse), from what disconnects, unlinks, seeking, on the contrary, 
all that “re-connects”, the “re-ligious”, what is able to link. (The theologian Hans 
Küng has said God is not connected to deities or divine beings, but to a 
fundamental affirmation of reality. God is the absolute Yes, admissible in religion, 
problematic in philosophy. But truth, seen as pure accordance to facts, could be 
the unlinking par excellence, the unreligious). 
 
The Argentinean writer Eduardo Mallea has admirably expressed his fatigue 
before the endless process of self-renewal of philosophical reflection (and so did 
Emil Cioran, in another sense). “After having filled my head with the most different 
books, with the most audacious conceptions and with the most subtle theories, 
abstract and apparently harmonic, the process of philosophy theory seemed to me 
more and more the pure game of constant dialectic rectification… Hume‟s 
intelligence is as exact, precise and universal as Descartes‟ intelligence, and 
Descartes‟ intelligence is as exact, precise and universal as Kant‟s; 
notwithstanding, the three theories are opposed to each other. All this coming and 
going in the same fountain, so many improbable and rational dialectics, that 
cyclically have, throughout time, their defenders with the same passion and 
sincerity, seemed definitely candid to me in their eager to elevate man, this 
„thinking rush‟, to be arbiter of phenomena and essences when everything 
escapes, instant after instant, from his vulnerable reason (…) this deception 
brought me closer and closer to art, which, without ever contradicting itself, is 
never alike and is reborn in new forms that differ from each other without 
contradicting themselves by revealing the contradictions of men” (Mallea, Eduardo, 
Story of an Argentinean passion, chapter II, p. 59-60). 
 
Before the arguments of the radical and skeptical moralist on Part 1, his 
possible critics should not demonstrate his thoughts as “damaging”, “nihilistic”, 
“dangerous”, “neurotic”, “lunatic”, “decadent”, “inadvisable”, “anarchical”, 
“reactionary”, “anti-revolutionary”, “monstrous”, “conservative”, “fascist”, “relativist” 
or “solipsist”, but simply as false; and they must say why they are false.   Because 
they could be dangerous and true, lunatic and true, relativistic and true, inadvisable 
and true, pernicious and true, nihilistic and true, etc., but certainly not false and 
true. To the extent my adversary does not know how to demonstrate those 
thoughts as being false, I expect him or her to accept a redefinition of philosophical 
investigation (a meta-philosophy), in which substantial restrictions are made to the 
secular notion of philosophical activity as supposed “disinterested search for truth”.  
2 
Is non-affirmative morality even possible? (A short Survival 
Handbook) 
 
In the present section, I propose to return to the usual non-radical ethical 
issue of how we should live. However, only apparently the issue is now “the same”. 
Because, based on the previous analysis, we now know all the ethical-ontological 
problematic character of being; we are now fully conscious about the possibility to 
ethically justify formal self-suppression and abstention; it is the person who knows 
all that who puts the question of how-to-live. But this question can never be the 
same as the traditional one, which systematically ignores radical questioning. To 
highlight this difference in “asking the same question over again”, I herein use the 
expression survival, to indicate that, assuming negativity, it is no longer possible to 
choose simply living, in the sense of affirmatively experiencing the world (this is a 
definitively sealed attitude to whom has made the previous ethical reflection), but 
only surviving, or to sustain oneself assuming negativity in a form of life. We ask 
now to which extent and if it is possible to develop a form of life in those 
circumstances, if there is a possible form of life capable of incorporating the 
ethical-ontological questioning of the world in its own structure. This should prove 
negativity, as it is conceived here, not as finalization or interruption of morality, but 
as its consummation through other forms of life, hardly to be conceived from the 
affirmative viewpoint.  
 
Their internal connection to negativity does not mean they are “pessimistic” or 
“skeptical” forms of life, but ontologically minimal, radically responsible and 
therefore tragic lives, risky and fragile. Sobriety, responsibility and danger will so 
define these kinds of life. However, it is a sort of minimalism that does not 
“diminish” anything, does not “remove” anything, does not (“stoically”) “renounce” 
to anything; this living will be minimal just in relation to the maximal character of 
affirmative organization of life, in which humans give themselves unjustified ethical-
ontological “rights” concerning their lives. Negative minimalism simply puts us on 
the level of our constitution in the world, and that could only be interpreted as a 
“loss” from the perspective of usual affirmative “inflation” of human life. Our finitude 
does not “steal” anything from us; our condition does not let us “incomplete”. 
 
The “survivor” sees himself basically as someone who has systematically 
refused himself to non-being, from ever structurally viable. He is not simply 
someone who lives more or less “naturally”, but someone who has not taken risks 
and survives within this refusing, with all its logical and ethical significance. 
Therefore, his living is not like most lives, inert and automatic, but a continuing full 
of sense and questioning. His continuing is something explicit and self-defining, a 
refusing that fills and characterizes all his effective existence. The “memory”, so to 
speak, of his non self-suppression is a fundamental feature of the way he lives his 
temporality. It is something that was not accomplished, and constitutes as the 
permanent “memory” of this “not having done, being able to do it”. 
 
How can be the life of a person who stays in the world with the full 
conscience and the strong sensibility about the ethically problematical character of 
human life per se? How can be the life of a person who has already dismantled all 
concealing mechanisms of not-being, regularly employed by affirmative ethics? 
Somehow, those who die in battle, faint in asceticism, commit suicide escaping 
from moral disqualification of structural pain, the martyr, etc., take the not-being 
away with them, providing negativity with a concrete body, giving a face to the 
structure of the world. But while we are not martyrs, ascetics, heroes or suicides, 
our body is committed to the intra-world and to some sector of the affirmative: 
whoever stays in the world finds himself or herself compelled to design some sort 
of cohabitation with the negative under the impossibility (or the refusal) to be the 
negative, and this cohabitation will demand the omission or concealment of some 
of the basic and radical incoherencies and moral infractions that go together with 
every continuing to live. How can be the life of a person conscious about the 
ethical potentialities of not-being who refuses the most adequate fulfillment of 
these potentialities? How can the negative be lived? Is it possible to pose, in a non 
affirmative way, the question about how-to-live? Is it possible only to survive, or is 
survival, after all, just a way, among others, of living? What are the ethical costs of 
any project of survival? 
 
The global answer to those questions may be something as the following: a 
negative survival is characterized, in general, by an explicit assuming of the pure 
formality of human life, avoiding defining, characterizing or interpreting it only in 
reference to eventual contents. This recognition of the formality of life is a 
fundamental piece to operate a kind of access to other levels of vitality, in which 
the negotiations with being are carried out in ways profoundly different from the 
usual ones. Such recognition influences on the five following specific features of a 
negative survival: 1. Assuming the pure responsibility of being, recognizing that 
being provokes a basic moral transgression. 2. The systematic inclusion of the 
negative into a form of life, with special attention to the consideration of self-
suppression as a regulative idea. 3. The substantial modification of self-defense 
mechanisms, assuming life as a risk and not as some form of “care”. 4. The 
systematic refusal to put the other on the place of non-being. 5. The dramatization 
of illusion as “agonic repetition”. 
 
 
Indeed, whoever lives affirmatively, assumes, at most, the responsibility of 
being this or that, in the sense of what she is and does intra-worldly; however, 
because of the non-radical nature of her thinking, she has absolutely no 
conscience about the ethical-ontological disturbing caused by her pure being-in-
the-world as such. The affirmative human being inaugurates morality inside life, but 
never asks herself about the morality of life itself, of being, of living (any life). She 
constitutes her second degree morality as if it was completely natural and the only 
one possible, as if it was a primary and spontaneous morality. The survivor might 
certainly constitute for herself a moral of secondary kind as well, inevitable in every 
continuing to live, but this moral will be mediated by two important attenuations: 
first, the complete awareness that it is a secondary morality; and second, that it is 
secondary morality which can, at any moment, become primary, something totally 
excluded from the considerations of the affirmative approach.  
 
The negative survivor knows nothing she may do in the intra-world will relieve 
her of the responsibility of being, in the sense her secondary morality will only and 
forever be justified only within the world. Therein, she fully accepts the fact of being 
obliged to go against her within one fundamental and inevitable “going in favor of 
oneself”. The recognition of this tragic responsibility in the formal level of being 
exempts her from all kinds of excuses based on what may be done in the usual 
ethical intra-worldly games. 
 
The currently not assumed responsibility of simply being usually aggravates 
ordinary and concrete human relations. The negative survivor knows very well that, 
whatever is her relation with person X, and whoever X would be, it will be 
necessarily to assume a relation of aggressiveness and self-affirmation (in the 
sense of a positive assuring), and of “inter-specular” relation marked by radical 
non-communication (See Note 5). The ethical game may begin, from this 
awareness, to develop without recriminations or “pressures” (so oppressively 
present in interpersonal affirmative relations), as the tragically responsible relation 
between two people who know they attack each other and defend themselves for 
structural determinations which intrinsically have directly nothing to do with any of 
them. 
 
In the current affirmative organization of life, there is a maximal option for 
being, and a kind of “accumulation” of non-being, forever “dislocated”, until the 
empirical end of life, without realizing this structural end has always come, and is 
already available. In our societies, the relation with the negative is always external, 
without recognition of its constitutive character. However, in the short and long run, 
the dislocated and concealed non-being ends up – to use a metaphor of my Project 
of negative ethics – “revenging” for its regular postponement. Negative survival 
suggests new forms of relations with non-being, trying to define a eudemonia that 
contains non-being within itself, a kind of “negative eudemonia”. The sober 
distribution of the negative in every moment of life, even at those of most apparent 
affirmation, is completely contemporary to a minimalist option for being.  
 
Therein – to say it in the style of the Argentinean writer Macedonio Fernández 
– the negative survivor is an “almost-man” (el hombre del casi), always falling into 
the many “holes” of life, into silences, absences and missing, in what is not there, 
in pure possibility, in utopia, unfulfilled dreams, lacks, gaps, omission, abstention 
and distances. The one who lives according to a principle of priority of possible 
over real is able to enjoy all advantages of what is not, of what does not establish 
itself, of the richness of pure possible, the perfection of utopia, the truth of 
omission, the magic of distance, the feeling of absences, the interest of the never 
fulfilled, the love inspired by distance and the admiration caused by the never 
written works. 
 
This form of life questions the common belief that the best and most intense 
way of experiencing things is to be filled with them, following the usual maximal 
principle of “the more, the better”. The very presence of the survivor follows the 
regime of almost, of some almost-presence; his relations with people are also 
minimalist. The intensity of feeling is for him a clear sign the time to leave is come, 
and nothing scares him as much and promptly as an excessive cohabitation or 
neighborhood. He knows he will always get the best of others through cracks and 
crevices, always scarcely and as with the tail of the eye. He knows the other needs 
space to develop, so the survivor establishes a kind of “negative neighborhood” 
mediated by absence, lack and distance. Far from having something to do with 
“renounce”, such kind of attitude promotes a systematic use of negative to one‟s 
own benefit, to abandon for gaining, to abstain for obtaining, to leave for staying, to 
die for living.  He knows the worst that may happen to a dream is becoming true, 
because for something to have value it is necessary to maintain part of it in 
shadows, as a sort of “value by contrast”.  
 
This “never being completely” makes the negative survivor extremely sober 
before the disappearance and emergence of human beings in the world, because 
he knows death steals nothing that birth seemed to have promised. Actually, he 
knows that a being whose formal structure consists of ending has never been 
completely present. In a certain sense, he has never been totally “alive”, which 
suggests, on the contrary of what has been speculated at the beginning of this 
reflection, that all living is maybe, in its essence, a survival; the fully affirmative 
does not let itself be lived. Therefore, in the Project of negative ethics, its author 
has offered maybe the best images of a negative survivor, the Kafka‟s traveler, or 
the Antonioni‟s passenger. As Kafka‟s traveler, the negative survivor does not care 
about where he goes; he only wants to “get out of here” (wherever “here” may be). 
Abandoning, vacating, leaving empty, this is precisely his destiny, as well as the 
protagonist of Antonioni‟s movie, David Locke, who is only interested in getting out, 
stopping being himself, traveling, leaving. 
 
Death is certainly the inoccupation par excellence, the consummated 
vacancy, the masterpiece of leaving. That is the reason why the negative survivor 
acquires, by the way he lives, the tremendous force of death. Far from renouncing 
to anything, he actually puts himself on the very direction of nature and contributes 
so nature fulfills its “purposes”. The always possible – structural – self-suppression 
is herein a kind of extreme regulative pole. Even when the very act of suppression 
is not performed – and even though the survivor is defined as the one who has not 
done it -, he operates absolutely no concealment of this always present possibility, 
as one of the empty spaces into which falls his everlasting and insecure 
wandering. The pure idea that it is possible to do so at any moment, to turn 
radically proper what we only partially appropriate while we survive, is one of the 
fundamental components of a negative form of life, and one of its conditions of 
possibility.  
 
It is a kind of ideal that provides a conducting wire regulative of human life, an 
idea to which life is always approaching without maybe ever performing it. So there 
is no incoherence from the part of the negative human being between having 
defined himself as not suicide and maintaining, at the same time, self-suppression 
as a kind of regulative idea. This particular situation of suicide within a negative 
existence is the extreme case – the possibility of turning your own life into 
something that is always missing – of including the negative in a way of life where 
everything lacks except us. In a negative survival, there is undoubtedly no 
compromise with what is usually called “a long life”, neither there could be a 
compromise with the effective suicidal act, but only with its regulative idea that can, 
in any moment, be performed. Living-with-the-negative indicates the coexistence 
with this formal element. 
 
To be alive inevitably consists of “defending” oneself. Notwithstanding, within 
a negative survival, the self-defensive mechanisms may change in such way that 
they keep a connection to a kind of risk or danger. Indeed, the negative survival 
does not accept defending himself indefinitely and unconditionally, since he is 
permanently and always disposed to die under the very intensity of his actions and 
ideas, disposed to fall in every ambush they conduce them to, to enter into all 
dead-ends following ethical plenitude.  
 
In current affirmative ethics, life and death are disconnected, where death is 
regularly seen as “interruption” and “defeat”, where death have no content; as 
Wittgenstein said, “one cannot live death”; when the deaths of Martin Luther King, 
Gandhi, Giordano Bruno or Christ are “mourned”, their consummative character is 
misunderstood, and people persist on setting them in a dimension of “fracture”, as 
if those people could, with a little more care, “have lived longer”. They cannot 
visualize these ethical deaths as accomplishments and instaurations of values in 
the sense of first grade morality, giving the own life in exchange.  
 
Far from manifesting a morbid “self-destructiveness” - as an ordinary 
affirmative interpretation regularly consider - all these people made efforts to set 
their lives in consonance to the world structure. Strictly speaking, the hero and the 
martyr do not seek their own deaths, but they end up naturally finding it during the 
process of their negative lives, careless and risky. When disconnecting the habitual 
self-defense mechanisms, they get radically “exposed” and unsafe. 
 
To interpret negative survival as “desperate” or “nihilistic” is just an effect of 
the affirmative distortion of the world. Within a life program consisting of phobic 
repelling of not-being as “bad” each appearing of the negative must necessarily 
“depress”. Living-with-the-negative is not incompatible with joy, euphoria and 
dance, elements that have always regularly accompanied the life of any hero. On 
the contrary, in a deeper sense, perhaps human beings can only find their own joy, 
the joy of a finite being (and not the immaculate jubilance of angels), if they are 
able to include the negative into a human form of life. Before that, we have just the 
frightened and fragile “joy” of concealment, which seems more guided by a 
desperate “desire for joy” (as in parties and commemorations) than by genuine 
satisfaction. The negative must, therefore, be disconnected from suffering, anguish 
and desperation, the figures of negativity when seen from affirmative viewpoint. 
The living-with-the-negative is certainly incompatible to any kind of abstract joy 
based on anxious discarding the constitutive not-being. 
 
In affirmative ethics, for having repelled negative as “alienation” and 
“strangeness”, when this negative inevitably reappears it is common to blame the 
others, other people, of having brought the negative into the world. In its 
adventitious alienation, ignoring its internal and constitutive source, negative is 
systematically visualized as “evil” and the other as “guilty” for it. To adjudicate “guilt 
of the negative” – interpreted as evil – to the other who confronts us, is the core of 
the affirmative procedure for constitution of what I call “affirmative neighborhood”. It 
is the idea that, without some people (those who challenge and threaten us, those 
who appear to us as obstacles, the “enemies”), or together with others (our sons, 
our friends, our beloved ones), the being will finally be reached and something will 
at last be affirmatively lived.  
 
Because of structural pain, elucidated in naturalized ontology, this bet is 
certainly lost beforehand. All being and all pleasure may only be lived in opposition 
and the others cannot remediate this neither with their presence nor with their 
absence. By posing (and disposing of) others, we just redistribute not-being, but 
we neither increase nor decrease the ontology of the world (That is why Sartre‟s 
thesis is problematic or at least ambiguous, according to which human being brings 
nothingness into the world and the others reify me, that is, finally give me a nature. 
If the other must necessarily give me a nature, ultimately he is not really the one 
who gives this nature to me. The other would give me a nature if he or she could 
choose to do it or not, being able not to do it. Actually, if simply in order to be the 
other already reifies me, it means it is not really him or her who reifies me). 
 
Being aware of that, of the formality of this ontological irrelevance of the 
other, raises other aspects of a negative morality. The usual affirmative mechanism 
consists of blaming the other for the fact of the being cannot be lived affirmatively, 
without visualizing the formal character of this “fault” and the radical innocence of 
the other. In attempting to recover a being they never had and on which they never 
obtained any right, human beings kill each other and compulsively give birth to 
other humans within an expansive policy characterized by aggressiveness and 
occupation. An ethical outcome of the recognition of the formal character of the 
other‟s fault and innocence will be the systematical refusal to put the other in the 
place of not-being, consolidating him as a “negative neighbor”, as a partner in 
absence, as an over-imposed colleague of lacking and missing. 
 
It is an interesting magical mechanism that humans put in work when they 
connect the total disposing of the other‟s life (the newborn baby or the prisoner of 
war) to the attempt of establishing something affirmative in the world, as if the 
other‟s own body, in his defenselessness, was a kind of guarantee, a sort of 
“hostage” or “sponsor”. When somebody have another person as a prisoner of 
whom he may dispose of his feeding, sleeping, sexuality, etc, he creates a strong 
feeling of domain over being; as if by total disposal of the other his own being was 
achievable at last, as though the other‟s body was a kind of bridge to something he 
could never reach by himself. The connection is certainly magical: one could take 
thousands of prisoners or kill millions of people or get plenty of children and 
descendents without one single trace of being having appeared on the face of the 
Earth, in order to be affirmatively lived. We must realize that the other is not the 
place of not-being (although all circumstances incriminate him), but just his 
accidental and passing face. 
 
The elimination of “enemies” is one of the most typical forms affirmative 
societies use to deal with this ignored and displaced negativity. Through a 
conflictive commerce with my enemies, I can always postpone the structural 
negative for the time after their death. In this sense, there is no better 
“entertainment” than the game of war, a deviation affirmative society has used and 
abused throughout its whole bloody history. The empirical “enemies” forged in the 
intra-world make us forget about the Great Enemy, which is certainly not nature, 
but its visualization as strange and evil. The construction of the enemy is an 
important part of that transformation of negativity into evil. Therefore, in the Project 
of negative ethics it was said that humans, under the impossibility of constructing a 
paradise, decided to construct a manageable hell. The manipulation of the others 
is a strange way of dealing with the negative, since the others are at the same 
impossible situation we are, and they are certainly not guilty of being my 
compulsive neighbors of not-being. The “creation” of the enemy is, thus, the 
apotheosis of concealment. 
 
As we have seen before, procreating is also to dispose of the other in his own 
person and to operate the magical mechanism of a pretense instauration of being, 
now through the presence of the son. In a minimalist ethics such as negative 
survival, procreation must certainly appear as an ontologically and morally 
problematic luxury. The living-with-the-negative seems to make clear sense as 
normative option for an already existing being; but it seems unjustifiable to give 
birth to anyone in order to live-with-the-negative. On the other hand, it is impossible 
to educate people negatively. Education is a fatally affirmative enterprise, although 
this conceived as “critical”. It seems inevitable education should be based on the 
construction of the world, on the presentation of being as if it existed; this is 
certainly what the sons demand and what they need for living; and it is also what 
we ethically owe them to the strict extent we were not able to refrain ourselves 
from procreating.  
 
Since they are already here, we owe our sons the world. In this sense, an 
education cannot be “critical” until the last consequences because if it were, it 
would inevitably end up in the de-construction of the world, or in reducing the world 
to its minimal layout, something the sons are certainly not prepared to face. Once 
the sons are there, looking at us, we are forced to drastically decrease the critical 
levels of analysis about the world, since, if we intended to be really critical, we 
better should not have given them birth. Therefore, the presence of a son inevitably 
implies the unquestioning of some sector of the world; we “clean up” some spaces 
of intra-world in order to put there, momentarily “safe”, our unprotected offspring. 
 
In a certain way, the fatally affirmative character of any education process is a 
kind of “moral expense” for having given birth to the son. (Therefore, a philosopher, 
to the strict extent he understands himself as radically critical, should never take 
over the task of educating a son without risking, ipso facto, to deny himself as a 
philosopher; that gives an argumentative content to what is commonly seen as a 
frivolous joke about the incompatibility between philosophy and fatherhood). 
Paradoxically, the endless asking of children about matters of life is usually of a 
radical, philosophical kind. However, in the questioning of children, we find, at the 
same time, the greatest radical character in the questioning and the most intense 
demand for affirmativeness. Each one of us has been born with the absolute and 
inalienable right of having a world. Therefore, the usual intra-worldly discourse 
pretending to transmit a kind of “ethics of minimal procreating” (birth-rate control) is 
superficial, as if having “only” two kids or rather fourteen had any relevant ethical-
ontological difference. Between one and a thousand, there are only intra-worldly 
differences. From the ethical-radical point of view, the only possible “birth-rate 
control” is total abstention. 
 
Faced the allegation that, if this was universalized mankind would be 
extinguished, we shall answer that what we are trying to elucidate here is the 
ultimate ground of an ethical responsible life, not the conditions of indefinite 
keeping alive, not even in terms of the species as a whole. So perhaps survival at 
any cost may be incompatible – why not? – to the exercising of morality. Thus, we 
should understand the difference between humanity and humankind. Perhaps 
moral could demand humankind to be extinguished in order to morally safe 
humanity. If we are not disposed to take it to the end, then we should accept our 
ethics of second degree, in which case it has to be formally transformed into a kind 
of administration of human life, not free from all dangers of cynicism in its political 
appraisal about continuing or not, according to powerful institutions. Of course, the 
extinction of humankind is not, by force, part of a program of negative survival; but 
certainly, survival at any cost could never be either. 
 
Could abstention – as self-suppression – remain as a mere “regulative idea”, 
expressed as the initial purpose of not procreating but in such way that procreation 
can eventually occur? It would be wrong to suppose that the attitude of different 
social classes about negativity is the same. A negative ethics will undoubtedly 
appreciate the fact of restituting to human beings all brightness, variety and 
fascination of an intense life defined by risk. But on the other hand, it would be 
desirable that this vital intensity, with its constant putting its own value to test, was 
not dangerous to anyone else except their users, producing no disturbances in the 
ontology in any sense. The explosions of uncontrolled vitality should be 
dimensioned again within a reflective appropriation of life exuberance. By 
maintaining the merely regulative character of the idea of my self-suppression, I do 
not disturb the other in the way I would have if I kept abstention also as a mere 
regulative idea. Therefore, it seems that, in a negative survival, abstention must be 
demanded in a rigorously literal sense, as in the case of not killing. My own life 
should be subjected to the comings and goings that might demand sacrifice, but 
not the life of the others: in a first degree morality, the life of the others is absolutely 
inviolable. Therefore, not taking life and not giving life cannot be merely regulative 
ideas. Negative survival is ruled by a rigorous principle of ontological parsimony. 
 
The structural “declining”, the vacating, the decaying, may also be expressed 
in terms of agony. In strictly ethical reflection, it is hard to conceive a human being 
who has become aware of illusion and keeps living after that; but in esthetics, this 
is not difficult to frame. A comedian is at the same time inside and outside her 
comedy. This domain in which comedy is known as comedy and, notwithstanding, 
suffered and endured, is the level where the negative survivor tries to live ethically, 
and not only in the sense of an “acting out”. The very agony in which we have 
always lived (if we do not let ourselves be disturbed by the current ontologization of 
“time elapsing”) is deeply transformed through action; and it is not gratuitous, 
therefore, that we call “agonists” the actors – protagonists, deuteron-agonists – in 
the sense of being sufferers, patients, beings who support themselves on illusion 
and maintain the illusion in their own agonic bodies. 
 
Agonism supposes repetition. The basic idea is that nothing can be lived for 
the first time, but only, at least, for the second. The negative survivor, as an ethical 
agonist, has to come for the first time to things through repetition, even when the 
same gestures and figures are reproduced. It is as if repetition exorcizes things 
from their impossibility, re-posing them. Thus, reposition reposes the illusion now 
unmasked and, in its own reposition, makes it at last livable in a negative life. 
However, the comedian always keeps one foot on the negative that compelled her 
to re-present what could not be presented, that was somehow “not presentable”. 
The validity of the presented or reposed is so strong that even the greatest of the 
ethical skeptics can understand (and be lively touched by) an esthetic work which 
presents exactly “the same” that produced his skepticism. On the stage we may, at 
last, take advantage of a powerful control of the situation which we would never 
have if we tried to live the world in its mere position, as affirmative ethics tries in 
vain. The comedian appropriates the world through the extraordinary power of 
form. 
 
Perhaps this “esthetic” model is one of the most valuable indications about 
what would a negative survival be like, and helps also see how the other four 
features could be fulfilled. Maybe the ethical values can never be satisfied in the 
world, but only repeated and “agonized”. The repetition of aggressiveness – which 
is inevitable in the instauration of being – is already a way to posses it. Perhaps 
what ethics needs the most is not a militant or a fanatic, but an agonist, in the 
sense of a moral actor. Repetition is clearly not moving to a world where being is 
finally possible, but reposition, in the only existing world, of the inexorable 
impossibility of being. Dramatization absolutely does not get out from the trails of 
the not presentable. On the contrary, through the monotonous repetition of 
representations, negative human beings put their bodies without concealments into 
the very core of impossibility. If something has been “gained”, it was certainly not 
something new, but only the possibility of presenting what has always been lost.  
 
In the Spanish preface to this book, Fernando Savater considers "ethics" as 
“…some sort of symbolic articulation of human self-affirmation (…) it is in itself nothing but a vital 
manifestation: ethics, well understood, is a philosophical consequence of self-preservation instinct. 
That‟s why I cannot ask whether it is „better‟ to be alive or not: the word „better‟ has no meaning 
except from life and to celebrate what is convenient to it in one way or another. (…) The principal 
merit of this book of Julio Cabrera is to reveal and to prove that, a contrario, there can be no ethics 
but the affirmative”. The previous reflections could serve as a minute answer to 
Savater‟s statements; they may be true only on secondary ethics, about an already 
politicized ethics. The primary ethics may be incompatible to the interests of life, so 
it is not necessarily “a symbolic articulation of human self-affirmation”. The 
acceptance of “life”, on the contrary, is also the acceptance of aggressiveness, 
unconditional self-defense and transgression of FEA. Unless the notions of “life”, 
self-affirmation” and “self-preservation” are enlarged in an unusual manner, they 
cannot be regularly compatible to morality. If Savater includes abstaining, dying, 
self-suppression as a regulative idea, minimalism, exposing to danger, etc., into 
“self-affirmation”, then there are surely not non-affirmative ethics. However, in this 
case, the notion of “life” (and of “affirmative”) gets empty, and we cannot capture 
important differences among forms of life.  
 
This is so, of course, in case we want to maintain the reflection in the 
argumentative level. Another thing is the acceptance of life in a Nietzschenian 
sense, clearly not argumentative (see Epilogue II). On this case, it is not that ethics 
is “at the service of life”, but that life – in its irresponsible exuberance – eliminates 
each and every moral attempt, affirmative or negative. This kind of move is worth-
respecting. But we should also remember that, because we are dying creatures 
since we are born, an absolute notion of “life” is not philosophically conceivable. 
This was the meaning of saying that, essentially, every living is a survival; every 
living is a not total dying. This way, we can start thinking that, on the contrary of 
what Savater said, maybe there cannot be any other ethics than the negative, 
because extreme affirmativeness leaves to the Nieztschean position, which 




Note 8. On the impossible conciliation between ethics and politics, based on 
an analysis of their relations with death 
 
In virtue of the basic ethical articulation of “going against the own interests”, it 
seems absolutely typical of morality, radically thought, that, in case of serious 
conflict, morality can lead us to death. Death seems to be the maximum of the 
“going against the own interests” in the sense of the fundamental ethical 
articulation. Therein, ethics neither preserves me nor takes care of me, but on the 
contrary, it exposes me, puts me at risk. 
 
On the other hand, politics is a domain of human rationality much more 
flexible, which allows me, in case of frontal conflict with the other, the use of 
indefinite negotiation (in diplomacy) and, if necessary, of violence (in war). Politics, 
therefore, does not expose me, but on the contrary, it protects me the most, gives 
me the right to defend myself indefinitely. On this regard, ethics and politics seem 
reconcilable only in the non-radical level, that is, while it does not come to the 
extreme conflict: coming to that point, it seems impossible to be ethical and political 
at one time, because it is impossible to act towards indefinite self-defense and, at 
the same time, acting towards self-exposing. The ethical values are not negotiable 
and politics is the scope of endless negotiation. This is the starting point. However, 
although it is clear that politically maintaining life may lead us to kill (and, therein, 
getting us out of morality in the radical sense), it is not so clear that ethically 
accepting the disposal of my life does not equally leads us to the same point.  Let 
us think in parts. 
 
It is useful here, and perhaps indispensable, to remember again the 
distinction between first degree and second degree morality. I have called first 
degree morality the domain of actions in which the life of the other is absolutely 
preserved as inviolable, without any consideration about the person beyond the 
pure and simple fact of being a human. Any morality that presents exceptions to 
this principle of absolute inviolability, that is, which accepts that sometimes it is 
morally acceptable to kill human beings X – where X is some kind of qualification – 
is already a second degree morality which requires, to be constituted and 
sustained, the transgression of the first degree morality. In affirmative philosophical 
societies people like saying the great “moral progress” from ancient to modern 
times has been the demand for universality, that is, the idea humans have some 
rights (among which the most important is the “right to life”) not for being Athenian, 
or free citizens or kings or workers, but, purely and simply for being humans. 
However this progress sounds fictitious if we see that, for example, in “fair wars” as 
much as in capital punishment, the affirmative well-thinkers consider as morally 
right to kill certain human beings for having some qualification, for example, for 
“having undertaken expansion wars”, or “threatening the harmony among nations”, 
or “constituting themselves in dangers for the pillars of society”, and so on. The 
inviolability “of human life” is understood, in those affirmative contexts, as 
inviolability of the lives of the own allies, of the protectors of democracy, of the 
progressive forces of society, of those who do not want to see their homeland 
humiliated, and so on.  
 
From the disregard of human life for not being Athenian to the disregard of 
human life for not being pro-democracy, there are certainly differences, however 
not in the radical level of respect for human life simply for being human: from this 
point of view, Greeks, as much as Moderns, got out of the scope of a first degree 
morality; because, in spite of expressive changes from ancient to modern ethics, 
the affirmative characteristic of these theories has always been maintained. The 
justification of “self-defense” is fragile in the radical level: the “barbarians” 
threatened the Athenians as the Muslims threaten Western world nowadays. In 
both cases, we grant the right of killing “those who threaten us” (free citizens or 
occidentals). Modern affirmative societies, that allege to have overcome the partial 
(not universal) morality of the Greeks, are the same that totally agree with bombing 
the military bases of Sadam Hussein where many people die. There may be, I do 
not deny it, rational arguments to make important differences between ancient and 
modern ethics in this problematic context, but one cannot say we have overcome 
the Greeks by introducing the requirement of universality regarding the issue of 
respect for human life simply for being human. This is basically impossible for an 
affirmative ethics. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment whether there may or not be a moral 
justification to kill human beings with some characteristic X, some attempts of 
rational justification of those actions clearly appear. A partial disconnection 
between morality and rationality seems plausible: though every moral action is 
rational, maybe the opposite does not occur in the sense morality does not have 
the monopole of rationality. For example, the two following arguments may be 
presented, and they usually are, to kill other people: 1. We could kill human beings 
who, through their action and behavior, have already got out of morality and, in a 
certain sense, have denied themselves as human beings. Hitler, by programming 
the Final Solution, has got out of the scope of humanity and, consequently, it would 
be rational to kill him. 2. As a consequence of the previous argument, we would kill 
not only to punish or in virtue of a rigid moral decision, but because the human 
beings of this kind threaten, with their actions, the rest of human beings, so killing 
them is a matter of self-defense. These reasons lead to distinguish between 
expansion or invasion wars and wars for reestablishing order, and these last ones 
are considered “fair wars”, at least in the sense of being rational. The progress 
from the Greeks to Modernity would then consist of, while the characteristic X of 
those “killable humans” was a requirement of birth and blood lineage, the 
characteristic X, which is nowadays considered as legitimating of killing, is 
produced by human beings themselves, who can become X through their actions 
and put their lives and the lives of others at risk. 
 
The problem, when getting out of the calm and simplicity of first degree 
morality, is that, suddenly, humans are in the possession of mortal weapons of 
difficult handling: the possibility of determining certain humans have stopped being 
humans and are, therefore, eliminable, and also the always open possibility of 
killing in “legitimate self-defense”. Both things are diffuse, even though Hitler and 
other treacherous homicides are easy and rhetorical examples always at hand. 
The majority of cases, the common aggressions of everyday life, are not as easy to 
decide as the so-called “great crimes of humanity”. What should we do in order “to 
stop being human” and become, therefore, “eliminable”? Kill? Which way? How 
many? How often? Which attitude? And, on the other hand, what does “self-
defense” really mean? What are the limits between self-defense and aggression 
(and, therefore, between “expansive wars” and “merely defensive wars”)? When 
they are asked about, all nations at war declare they are only “defending 
themselves” (not too different from the men involved in a bar quarrel). Is there not 
the saying, in war and in joke, “the best defense is attack”? Offensive and 
defensive actions are intermixed in an inseparable way. In referring to “being 
Athenian”, there is indeed a rational difference in favor of “being for the democratic 
forces”, but the qualification of some human beings as “enemies” and, therefore, 
eliminable, is identical in the Peloponnesian war and in the Golf War. Affirmative 
societies, in a clear way, rationally justify the qualification of certain humans as 
being “eliminable”, and this should be fully assumed. Human life as such is not 
inviolable in affirmative societies and this must be systematically remembered in 
the context of moral condemnations of suicide and other human attitudes, as one 
of the greatest evaluative inconsistencies of affirmativeness. 
 
By assuming its fatally secondary moral character, affirmative societies 
accept having to bear some curious paradoxes, as “wars for peace”, or “performing 
violence in order to end violence”, or “killing murderers for having killed”, and so 
on. Affirmative modernity sometimes criticizes the frankly morbid taste of “post-
moderns” for paradoxes, without realizing its own consideration of “inviolability of 
human life” fatally results in one of the worst paradoxes of all times: killing in 
defense of life.  
 
Negative ethics wanted to drastically avoid moving into the domain of these 
disturbing paradoxes, assuming an initial compromise with first degree morality to 
its last consequences. Thus, in a negative context of thinking: (a) there is 
absolutely nothing a human can do to become “eliminable” based on ethical 
reasons; (b) there is no ethical obligation of unconditionally and indefinitely 
defending or preserving oneself. So, in a negative ethics, my own life is always at 
disposal and can be given in exchange for the life of the other. An easy objection is 
saying the affirmative is also disposed to die, for example, in going into a “fair war” 
and falling dead; but affirmative humans die fighting, that is, killing and failing, the 
only way an affirmative accepts to die. In affirmative societies, certain values are 
fostered since childhood, as “courage”, “bravery”, “not letting yourself be scared”, 
“confronting others”, “to die fighting” and so on; others, on the contrary, are 
denigrated, as the “cowardice” of giving up, of vacating, of abstaining, stimulating 
bellicose values.  
 
Negative ethics does not talk of the “inviolability of human life” including 
indiscriminately the life of others and the own life. The articulation I/others is 
fundamental in negative ethics because it is the life of the other what is, for me, (in 
each case) inviolable. Nothing the others can do will steal from them their 
inviolability, since this, in a first degree ethics, refers to their being itself, and not to 
the things they do or may do within the intra-world. On the other hand, I do not 
accept, as a negative moral agent, to confront somebody else in an attitude of 
systematic and unconditional self-defense, even if their attitude is offensive. My 
own life is certainly also inviolable, but not for me, but for the other. Ethically, I am 
bound to give my life away if necessary and not to maintain it indefinitely, because 
the one who must care about the inviolability of my person is not me, but the other. 
If the other does not take care of me, there is nothing I can do from the ethical 
point of view, and this is the dramatic connection ethics maintains to death, 
precisely the connection politics suspends in its own instauration, as we will see 
now. 
 
The reasons of “self-defense” and of “non-humanity of the other” are not 
accepted in negative ethics as ethical reasons to eliminate people, even when we 
may accept them as rational or afective motives of another kind, political or 
strategic, rational domains which are, among others, characterized by the fatally 
secondary nature of their morality. This implies negative ethics accepts there may 
be rational or affective motives to get out of the scope of morality (for example, 
killing other people), but certainly  there are not ethical motives to do so. It is 
philosophically convenient to clearly delimitate the scope of morality, in order to 
know when we are inside it and when we are not; on the contrary, we take the risk 
– so well seen by Kantian ethics – humans considers “moral” everything they 
effectively get to do, following a principle of inexhaustible “self-benevolence”. 
Accepting there are sometimes rational motives for not being moral is a tragic 
element completely characteristic of a negative ethics. 
 
It seems evident the life of the other is not respected in the case of hetero-
elimination, unless we argue, in a political-strategic level, the elimination of some 
people is convenient for the life of most part of mankind. With that, it is perfectly 
accepted we have slipped out of primary morality. However, what is most important 
to ask, within a negative ethics, is whether the life of the other is really respected in 
self-elimination. Because someone could allege, in the same previous line, that if I 
do not kill Hitler, if I let myself be killed by him, I leave him an open gate (or at least 
I do not contribute in anything to shut it) so he can kill other people and offending 
morality in the primary sense, something that seems to be a negative ethics‟ 
concern. Therefore, there are motives to kill as well as not to kill, but morality does 
not seem to be present in any of the two sides. This situation seems one hundred 
percent tragic: whether I kill the other and get out of first degree morality or else I 
let myself be killed by the other, remaining in the first degree morality, but leaving 
an open door for the other to freely offend first degree morality at will. It seems I 
must transgress primary ethics if I kill as much as if I let myself be killed (and here 
we meet some of the ethical-ontological intuitions of Lévinas). Sometimes, an 
ethics is criticized for being “impracticable”; however, in a practical context, and 
understanding morality as of first degree, an ethics has the obligation of being 
“impracticable”, indicating this way the very impossibility of being ethically. 
 
The matter seems to be put about the others when present and when not 
present. In case of conflict, I confront someone concrete. The questioning 
presented above means: sometimes, killing someone who is present means 
helping others who are not present, and letting you be killed by anyone who is 
present may represent harming others who are not present. The negative 
approach shall introduce a complication here, through some additional principle of 
the following kind: the primacy of the responsibility towards the present other over 
the responsibility for the not present one. Indeed, by killing the present other I 
necessarily violate first degree morality in the literal sense and without 
euphemisms, concerning this person who falls dead to my feet, before my eyes. 
Negative ethics does not allow killing people speculating about the possible 
advantages of that elimination to other people who are not there. It may be, I insist, 
rational to kill him, based on those possible advantages, but certainly it is not 
ethical in the primary sense. By letting myself be killed, I may harm others who are 
not present, but this is a mere possibility before the total and imposing factuality of 
my killing this present person in order to avoid other not present killings. So, there 
should be a principle establishing that, in case of extreme and inevitable conflict, 
moral obligations are primarily obligations about present people. 
 
Politics is the rational level in which morality has been assumed, since 
always, as secondary. Politics is able not to develop an ethics but just a kind of 
legal organization morally justified in the secondary level, which seeks essentially 
the survival of mankind (even to the cost of humanity), survival only reachable 
through the justified elimination of some humans with some characteristics, and 
accepting all the morality compatible with this project for survival. Politics strongly 
believes a first degree morality is a morality for angels (and so, not strictly a 
morality), and pragmatically starts from the principle we are not angels and, 
consequently, the most we can achieve in the world is an external harmonization of 
interests, but not disinterest. Thus, a supposed “moralization of politics” ends up 
inevitably in a politicizing of moral, in which the inviolability of human being is 
considered as a principle impossible to be obeyed, and where we can only 
elaborate a hierarchical list of humans who are “eliminable”, guided by careful 
second degree moral criteria.  
 
This is serious if we think abominable forms of life, such as gangsters and 
delinquency in general, also have solid “moral principles” and codes of honor, 
within the fundamental rupture of primary morality. Definitely, it is very easy to have 
a second degree morality. The prison guard may be very kind or even friendly to 
his prisoner, as the Nazi soldiers were extremely kind, sometimes, to the ancient 
ladies who got out of the crowded trains in concentration camps, and as exploiting 
bosses may allow his underpaid employees to drink coffee twice a day instead of 
only once. However, if the secondary moral level remains so generously open, the 
danger consists of giving complements to Sadam Hussein for having rigorously 
respected the truces and for never having bombed civil populations but “only” 
military targets, or to praise the Nazis for having killed many of their victims in a 
fast way without provoking suffering. If staying in morality is difficult and something 
only angels could do, it is excessively easy for demons to stay in politicized ethics, 
whatever they may do. It seems intuitively more adequate trying to make, ab initio, 
an ethics for angels than one for demons. I insist: that ethics is “impracticable” 
should not be an objection but, in some sense, a sign we are going on the right 
way. 
 
However, the negative survivor, by choosing to keep living, has also 
accepted, since always, to live in the domain of politics, of indefinite negotiation 
and violence. We cannot keep living without doing politics but, in case of extreme 
and inevitable conflict, we cannot even die without doing it (in the sense, seen 
before, of letting ourselves be killed by a moral transgressor like Hitler). The 
“ethical victory” of the dead, described on the previous pages on the analysis on 
Hegel, is an inner victory, but it can open the doors to immorality in the primary 
sense. Anyway, the only way a negative life can be political without stop being 
ethical in the primary sense is the questioning of the given through the force of the 
own absence, in the sense of the victory of the dead over his killer through the 
unbearable aggression of self-destruction. The “negative militancy” consists not of 
having a utopia but of transforming oneself in utopia, of being the emptiness of 
must be, the very normative gap. Through his attitude, the negative human 
enriches the content of his death so, in the moment of dying, this content bursts 
and commoves the established. 
 
To think on the origin, returning to it once and again (birth is, in the present 
work, the privileged locus of moral reflection), may be, in the perspective of the 
politics of being, “reactionary”, “archaizing”, and “conservative”. Whoever gets 
stuck in the Former - perplexed by something primitively unacceptable – will never 
be forgiven. He is demanded to go on, to continue, to be always able to follow “the 
great changes”, never to return to what has already been thought. To be in the 
movement of “progress” is to submerge into hetero-aggressive illusions and into a 
convinced and arduous struggle against the others, in the dispute for the domain of 
some sectors of the intra-world. This enraptures, gains adepts and proselytes, 
makes forget the grounding impotencies, the non negotiable. It gives the 
impression we are “doing something”, instead of remaining with “arms crossed”, 
uncommitted and irresponsible. However, in a negative vein, dying may be 
revolutionary. Those who are able to see the ontological-structural dimension of life 
will realize that abstaining, in the broad sense, may still be the least of evils, the 





Note 9. A logical-ethical paradox 
  There are two things frequently required at the same time from an ethical 
theory: 1. to be universally valid, and 2. that its author is coherent with its 
demands, in the sense of having “moral authority” to formulate her theory. But 
these two requirements could be impossible to satisfy at the same time. 
 
Let us examine the following example: if I say “All philosophy teachers are 
dishonest” (a sentence Wittgenstein frequently tells to his friend Norman Malcolm) 
and since I am myself (Wittgenstein, in the example) a philosophy teacher, we 
have the subsequent situation: (a) if I say that sentence and sustain its universal 
truth, this should affect everyone and, therefore, myself as well: consequently, I am 
also dishonest. But, in this case, I have no “moral authority” to say this about 
philosophy teachers in general, since I am, myself, what I intend to criticize. This is 
how our evaluation mechanisms usually work: in order to accuse others, I am 
expected to be “clean”, a wicked man cannot accuse other wicked men, etc. (b) 
But, on the other hand, if I say that sentence, but I, being a philosophy teacher, am 
not dishonest, then my sentence is not universally true, because I am, myself, the 
exception.  
 
The logical requirement is that I must state only universal truths, and the 
ethical requirement is that I must state only sentences I have moral authority to 
state. However, when I state sentences as the above mentioned, I cannot satisfy 
both things at the same time: if I attend the ethical condition, I do not satisfy the 
logical one and vice-versa. If my own moral criticism affects me, then I have no 
moral authority to advance it, but if it does not affect me, my sentence fails logically 
because it does not apply universally. It seems that, in the impossibility to sustain 
both things, one of them should be chosen and the other one, discarded. 
 
The negative human being makes a clear option in favor of the logical 
requirement, dramatically accepting that, by staying alive (and perhaps also by 
dying), it is not possible to have “moral authority” to say all she would ethically 
whish to say, or to denounce all she would ethically whish to denounce; because, 
for the very fact of being, she knows she has already inevitably lost her “moral 
authority” about a great amount of issues. The negative human has nothing to 
allege against a moral denounce which would also involve her own person: when 
she says “Everyone”, she means literally “Everyone, including myself”, because 
she understands self-inclusion as a kind of “logic self-suppression”, inevitable in 
every responsible survival. The ethical requirement of “having moral authority to 
say it” is an attempt – of affirmative character – to “leave me ethically safe” from 
the critical virulence of my own moral statement. However, accepting self-
application, by preserving universality even though it affects me, I recover the 
ethical requirement in another deeper level, being rigorously faithful to the objective 
content of my own statement, even when harming myself under the form of taking 
from me the “moral authority” to advance the statement. 
 
In a certain sense, the full assumption of lack of moral authority is a way of 
assuming the fundamental incoherence of being. Part of the everyday death lived 
by the negative human consists precisely in formulating theses whose critical 
content affects herself, as if staying alive at the logic‟s cost produced a kind of 
everyday “ethical suicide”, consisting of being obliged to keep making moral 
appreciations without having the radical right to pronounce them. If we are 
authentically moral, we cannot destroy the universality of our own statements only 
to protect our person, or to obtain “the respect of the others”, so they can see how I 
am “coherent to my principles”. My “moral authority” is simply part of my fragile 
survival: someone has to believe or not in what I say, analyzing its theoretical-
objective content, and not asking whether I have or not moral authority to state it. I 
certainly do not have it, in the radical level, though I can always constitute, in the 
intra-world, one or many justifications of secondary morality within the immorality; 






Negative ethics and some contemporary ethical theories on the 
issue of moral responsibility concerning possible children: 
discourse ethics (Habermas), moral of seriousness (Tugendhat),  
critical utilitarianism (Hare), Empirical pessimism (Benatar) 
          
    
  
1 
Habermas and the irrecoverable asymmetry of birth 
 
 
(a) On two types of Skepticism 
 
In his text, “Diskursethik-Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm”, included 
in the book Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, of 1983, Habermas 
tries to dialogue with what he calls “the skeptic” (der Skeptiker), delineating an 
imaginary discussion in seven rounds (Habermas, “Ethics of Discours, page 86 of 
the Spanish edition). A fundamental moment of that imaginary dialogue is the one 
where Habermas uses, against the “skeptic”, a resource which Apel turned 
popular: “…the moral theorist (der Moraltheoretiker) can make the skeptic see that, 
when he starts a concrete argumentation aiming to refute ethical cognitivism, he 
has to inevitably make argumentative presuppositions whose propositional content 
contradicts his objection” (page 92. The translation is mine). Explicitly quoting Apel: 
“Anything I cannot deny without incurring in an evident self-contradiction and, at 
the same time, neither can I deductively ground without a logic-formal petitio 
principii, belongs to those pragmatic-transcendental presuppositions of 
argumentation which will be always necessary to recognize if though the language 
game of argumentation may maintain its sense” (Idem).  
 
In the last rounds of the dialogue, Habermas describes the skeptic as 
someone who refuses argumentation: “A skeptic who predicts he will be surprised 
by performative contradictions will avoid, from the beginning, the game of mistake 
and will deny all argumentation” (page 109). “Notwithstanding, with the denial of 
argumentation, the skeptic cannot, for example, deny, not even indirectly, he 
shares a certain form of socio-cultural life… in one word, he may deny morality, but 
not the ethicity of the vital relations in which he, so to speak, participates everyday; 
otherwise he would have to seek refuge in suicide or in a serious mental disease” 
(page 110). And else: “There is no option to remain absent from the action contexts 
oriented to understanding for long periods. This would suppose the retreat to 
monastic isolation of strategic action or to schizophrenia and suicide. In the long 
run, such thing is self-destructive”. (page 112). Through the imaginary dialogue 
with the skeptic, Habermas tries to make the postulate of necessarily discursive 
ethics to be accepted; the strength of the argument is pragmatic because, with 
relative independence from the semantic content of the skeptic‟s counter-claim, he 
shows that, in order to be transmitted – with all its negativity force – it is necessary 
to move already within a discursive community; so his own argumentation is a self-
refutation of his posture. 
 
I believe skepticism is a critical attitude of great use and productivity in 
philosophy and Habermas himself develops the steps of his theory in a very fruitful 
confrontation with the skeptic‟s questioning, in such way that – even if skeptic is 
finally “refuted” – we should thank his presence and his irritating and stimulating 
challenges. However, I believe we should show Habermas he has a very partial 
notion of the “skeptic”, by considering him only as someone who “refuses to 
argue”. Without the clear pejorative sense the very term “skeptic” has for him, we 
can think of other type of “skepticism” which is precisely in the antipodes of the one 
considered by him; it is the “skepticism” of a person who, far from refusing 
argumentation, accepts to argue infinitely until the end, radically, achieving results 
and outcomes that might shock the sensibility of the “ethical cognitivist” in the 
Habermas style.  
 
Since the beginning of this book, I have taken an attitude of that kind (which, 
in my view, is not “skeptical” in any pejorative sense, nor “nihilistic”), presenting the 
argumentations on the first chapters as of “a radical and anti-skeptical moralist” 
(using there Habermas‟ conception of skepticism), but disposed to argue until the 
end, employing the same conceptual tools supplied by the moral cognitivist. I will 
call “empty skeptic” the skeptic who refuses to argue, and “plenary skeptic” this 
who accepts to argue infinitely and radically. Perhaps the “skepticism” is 
maintained in the negative conviction of the plenary skeptic that it is not necessary, 
in argumentation, to destroy concepts and theories, but only put them in 
movement, let them live. From a negative point of view, the most appropriate way 
of denying a concept is not killing it, but – on the contrary – letting it die naturally. 
 
Habermas seems much more unarmed before this kind of “skeptic”, who, 
“instead of retreating from argumentation”, invites to an argumentation of all, 
including of the very basis of moral legitimacy of human life. This kind of “skeptic” 
certainly does not fall under the usual accusations of “pragmatic self-contradiction” 
because he accepts, completely and from the beginning, his belonging to a 
community which argues and presents justifications, and he manifests therein, a 
kind of ultra-illustrated and ultra-modern intelligence, with no “postmodern” mistrust 
or suspicion destructive of rationality, but, on the contrary, committed to its more 
coherent and regular exercise. The empty skeptic, on the other hand, is still an 
affirmative philosopher and therefore he is systematically defeated by the 
“dogmatic” (if we can call like this, according to Kant‟s vocabulary, the skeptic‟s 
adversary), who simply threatens him - as we saw – with mental disease and 
suicide.  
 
The plenary skeptic, in retaliation, will argumentatively show the dogmatic he 
should accept, for example, a possible morality of suicide, using his own categories 
(for example, on the lines developed on Part II of this book, or on others, or those 
in Ancient philosophy or on the texts of Hume, Kamlah, etc). This way, even when 
the dogmatic will have managed to lead the empty skeptic to suicide, the plenary 
skeptic will have managed to lead the dogmatic to having to accept a possible 
morality of that act. Though the argumentative principles allow condemning the 
empty skeptic‟s undeveloped self-destruction (in the level of what can be 
considered a “not formal suicide”), those same principles can allow ethically-
rationally justifying the “developed” self-destruction presented by some radically 
reflective philosophy, dogmatic or plenary skeptic. 
 
 
(b)  Habermas playing with children 
  
Thus, the plenary skeptic is disposed to accept the grounds of Habermas‟ 
“communicative ethics” without any problem. Let us briefly remember them, 
through the same text already mentioned: 
 
“The attempt of grounding ethics in the form of a logic of moral argumentation 
only has a perspective of success when we can identify, in the level where moral 
dilemmas arise, a pretension of special validity bounded to commands and 
norms…” (Ethics of discourse, pages 67-68). Habermas distinguishes here, as it is 
well known, between “strategic” interactions and “communicative” ones. I quote at 
length: “I call communicative the interactions in which the participants coordinate in 
common agreement their action plans; the agreement obtained in each case is 
measured by the inter-subjective acknowledgment of the pretensions of validity. In 
the case of processes of linguistically explicit understanding, the agents pose 
pretensions of validity with their speech acts, to the extent they are reciprocally in 
accordance about some issues and they also pose pretensions of truth, of 
righteousness, of veracity… while, in strategic action, an agent empirically 
influences the other through the threat of sanctions or the promise of 
gratifications… in communicative action, each agent appears rationally motivated 
towards an integrated action, and so by the strength of the illocutionary binding 
effect of an speech act offer” (page 68). 
 
The Habermasian conception of universality should be understood within this 
framework: “The moral principle is conceived in such way it excludes as invalid 
those norms that do not get the qualified approval from all the possible addressees 
(aller möglicherweise Betroffenen)… the institution expressed in the idea of 
capability of universalization of maxims means…: the valid norms shall gain the 
recognition of all affected ones” (page 73). “Only through the grounding of this 
bridge principle we can advance towards discursive ethics.” (Page 76). Habermas 
emphasizes that, in moral argumentations, there is a cooperative effort from which 
a general will shall arise (pages 77 and 78). “Of course, only a real participation of 
each affected can avoid the misinterpretation of one‟s own interests by the 
others… on the other hand, the description each one presents about their interests 
has also to remain always open to the others‟ criticism “. (page 78) 
 
The plenary skeptical could put in question universality in the field of moral 
reflection, or rather the specific interpretation Habermas offers about it within 
communicative theory. However, his “skeptic” strategy will be of other kind: it will 
consist of accepting the theory – with its universalization principle and everything – 
and take it to ultimate applications in order to verify its mode of functioning. 
Universality, in theories as Habermas‟, is strongly connected, as we have seen, to 
the notion of “consideration of all the affected”, evidently trying to prevent the 
manipulation of the others through decisions that affect them but in which they are 
not allowed to participate because of having some permanent or transitory feature. 
The “affected” who seem, ab initio, more helpless before the always open 
possibility of manipulation, are the ones who can generically be called “absent 
people”. “Present people” can, in general, try al least to claim their rights to 
participation in decisions affecting them. But how can be taken into consideration 
the absent people‟s interests?   
 
 About “absent people”, it seems possible to identify three fundamental 
types: 1. Living people who are not present at the moment of decision making; 2. 
People yet unborn; 3. People already dead. The plenary skeptic totally agrees with 
many authors (Hans Jones, Wilhelm Kamlah, R. M. Hare, among others) who have 
considered the necessity of defining moral responsibilities before “absent people” 
precisely because they are infinitely subjected to manipulation. Notwithstanding, 
and following the argumentative lines developed on this book, the type 2 of absent 
people seem to be the most unprotected from this danger and consequently the 
ones who would demand, in certain way, a greater moral responsibility; because 
the living absent can always be called or convoked to claim their rights, and the 
dead may have had the opportunity to do so, or have said or written something so 
their rights would be respected. But the yet unborn are abysmally more helpless 
than the other types of “absent people”, because, as we have seen before, it is 
their own being that is decided without them and not any intra-worldly aspect of this 
being. Of an absent living human being we could say: “We could not find him”, “We 
forgot to convoke him”, etc. And of a dead one, we could say: “He would certainly 
have agreed”, “By taking this decision, we continue his work”, etc. But in the case 
of a yet unborn one, we get silent; we have no justifications based on his being 
because it is precisely his being we are disposed to constitute.   
 
On the issue of birth, a range of norms are taken into account, of which the 
basic one is, as we saw in a previous text, the same one God had to assume – 
alone and asymmetrically – at the moment of creating, in general, a world: that “to 
be bad is better than being nothing”, something we could consider as an affirmative 
meta-norm. Based on that, the plenary skeptic could say to the Habermasian 
dogmatic: “When you talk about „recognition of all the affected ones‟, you are 
thinking not radically, but only of intra-worldly situations and interactions among 
already living people, without thinking of absolute absent ones”. The super-norm 
which decides a birth (to be bad is better than being nothing) and all the sub-norms 
subjected to it cannot obtain a moral justification inside Haberma‟s communicative 
ethics, since the decision in which such norms are applied is taken, for obvious 
reasons, without counting on the participation of the main “affected” one, because 
it is evident that our own birth is of our interest, and we are affected by it.  
 
Thus, the ones who decide the birth of a person are obliged to act 
strategically and manipulatively, so, according to the principles of communicative 
ethics, any way to “general will” concerning this act is obstructed. Consequently, 
giving birth to someone is based on ethical-communicatively invalid norms. So 
Habermas‟ proof serves only to verify the validity of intra-worldly actions, but it may 
take as invalid some fundamental actions connected to the very being of the world 
and of human beings. This way, it would only be a proof able to ponder second 
degree morality, that is, a morality that must suppose the transgression of more 
basic moral principles. 
 
There are at least two less known replies of the dogmatic which would 
interest me to examine here: in the first one, it is alleged that, despite everything, 
the one who is going to be born is present in the decision of his birth through a 
certain “representative”. In the second line, it is accepted there is no possible 
representation, however it is alleged this is the only case it occurs,  because it 
simply cannot be prevented; the proof only refers, as it is obvious, to people who 
are in condition of taking decisions. 
 
Indeed, the “unborn” could be considered as being “present” in the decision of 
her birth, based on previsions about human nature or about the usual mechanisms 
of decision making, or as grounded on the belonging of every human being (even 
the unborn) to certain stables structures (for example, to a certain community 
whatsoever), all of them relevant previsions for taking the decision on birth. 
Therefore, Habermas and Apel use to frequently speak of “potential participants” 
on the dialogue, which indicates “the recognition of all affected ones” does not 
necessarily imply the physical presence of them. In the case of Kantian philosophy, 
since humans are “two-world citizens” – of the phenomenic and the noumenic 
world – their merely sensible birth matters little from the ethical-rational point of 
view. Getting in the perspective of the intelligible, the one who will be born has 
already been born for all the effects of the transcendental decision about her life, 
because, as a “noumenic being”, we already know all we need to know about her. 
The a priori baby will be absent only of his “merely sensible” birth and, therefore, of 
the empirical decision about her birth, but certainly not absent of the 
transcendental decision about it. However, this kind of answer obviously works with 
the metaphysical-transcendental basis supposed by Kant, but in declaredly “post-
metaphysical” thinking, as of Apel‟s and Habermas‟, we cannot count, in the 
contexts of a discourse ethics, on this kind of expedient. 
 
However, saying birth already belongs to the unlimited communication 
community, or to an ideal situation of speech, or to a community that has already 
accepted, since always, certain principles of argumentation, though they are all 
undoubtedly “post-metaphysical” statements, faces ethical dangers similar to those 
faced by the Kantian “metaphysical-transcendental prevision”, in the following 
problematic direction: if we are going to say the one who is being born is 
“represented”, in spite of not being physically present, to which measure is it 
morally permissible to extend this “habilitation” to legitimately “represent” the 
absent? The criterion was clear when we thought “the recognition of all the 
affected” was literal. The dogmatic may allege that, even in the case of living 
people who are already born, it is obvious there should be “representatives” of 
some kind in the multiple decisions taken about those people, being impossible to 
assemble them all in a room, allowing them to participate literally. The only 
aggravating, regarding the yet unborn, is that, in this case, we are radically unable 
to make any prevision of their will, managing intra-worldly information (as we can 
decide for the absent dentists, or for the absent Jewish, or for the absent 
underage, or for the absent boy scouts). In that case, every prevision shall be 
worldly.  
 
But if so, any worldly-structural prevision we may do in occasion of the 
emergence of a person in the world should also include “negative” considerations. 
Within that prevision, neither a presumed “will to be born” nor the opposite could be 
universalized. (After all, many of the people we gave birth committed suicide, or got 
mad, or manifested they did not want to live, or wished they were never born). 
Therefore, by giving birth to someone, we are acting unilaterally and strategically, 
and manipulating the one who is being born, to the extent our decision, though 
following a rationally grounded “prevision”, contains a decision element which this 
“representation” does not resolve. 
 
 Let us suppose the dogmatic discards this line of thought and accepts birth 
is effectively coercive and asymmetric. This will not mean to him that giving birth to 
someone is immoral but, so to speak, pre-moral, in the sense the proof is thought 
only to concern adult people who are already born and endowed with capability of 
decision. Therefore, not only the relations with the ones who are being born would 
be pre-moral, but also the relations we have with already born small children. 
Indeed, it can be logically deduced there cannot be ethical relationships with yet 
unborn from the fact – admitted by Habermas when he comments, in his text, 
Kohlberg‟s theory of moral stages – there cannot be ethical relationships with small 
children, in the sense that, in relation to them, only authority prevails, as fear, 
punishment and coercion, a stage which should be considered a “moral stage” only 
in a rather generic sense. If there are no moral relationships, in a strong sense, 
with small children – let us say, children under five years old – through a perfect 
legitimate logic path, we could consider an unborn as a child of zero years old or 
less, being affected by the lack of moral relationships with children under five. 
Therefore, regarding a yet unborn, only authority and coercion prevail. So, on this 
line, the dogmatic admits this is the way it is and it cannot be changed, but he 
wants to keep the idea this is the unique case it occurs and the ethical-discursive 
proof, from birth onwards, at least from a certain point, can be applied without 
problems. 
 
But the question the plenary skeptic makes here is the following: if the very 
being of the person is decided peremptorily, coercively and asymmetrically, 
strategically and manipulatively, how would humans be able to “cut”, in a given 
moment, the fundamental bond that links them to coercive and not 
communicatively decided asymmetry which affects them in their own beings? What 
intra-worldly eventuality could be able to contribute to cut this structural bond? How 
could humans demand, from a given moment, the strict satisfaction of the 
communicative conditions that define morality, if they are themselves originated 
from a rigorous dissatisfaction of such conditions? How could a being that is 
infinitely dependent in her very being demand autonomy “afterwards”? After what? 
Can, the “education” of the small child stop being, in this vein, the ineluctable 
continuation of basic authoritarian coercion which originated the child‟s own being? 
It would seem as if all that could be done afterwards is only to construct autonomy 
inside a fundamental heteronomy. All questions can be answered to the child (and 
the child, as the philosopher, is an inexorable question-making machine) to the 
extent those questions are intra-worldly, but the question on her own being cannot 
be answered, because it does not seem to be recoverable by ethics. Certainly, we 
love children, but, as we have seen, that is something with no special connection to 
morality, the only thing considered here. (Habermas is interested on edifying a 
theory of moral rationality, not a theory of love). 
 
Thus, it does not seem so simple and non-problematic to sustain something 
that does not work on procreation and on childhood “works afterwards” in the adult 
stage. Autonomy cannot be a creatio ex nihilo. Human condition is not something 
one goes assembling with links. Childhood and the adult stage are not separable 
arbitrarily. Whatever our attitude is before Freud‟s theories, the hypothesis the 
totality of life of a human being as internally referred to its first stages should be 
considered as a relevant and worth-considering questioning, at least in a 
speculation field as ethics, and even when a scientific status is denied to 
Psychoanalysis – as it is in my case. Anyway, in order to better understand this 
supposed step from a primordial situation of constitutive asymmetry to an alleged 
situation free from coercions, we need a psychological theory with that kind of 
questioning. The suspicious is that our adult “autonomy” can be operating only in a 
very superficial level, and our ethical personality gets infinitely connected to the 
coercive asymmetry from which it emerged.  
 
Kohlberg‟s theory, in addition to its relative conceptual poorness and linearity, 
is still the “mise en science” of a certain tendency of thinking (for not saying of 
“ideology”). That tendency includes the belief in a “universalistic” principle, so the 
theory of “moral development” determines moral development consists of 
progressively abandoning “relativism” and “achieving universality”. “Skepticism” is 
explained as a “necessarily surmountable” stage of the process. Thus, to become 
a moral person is like transforming in a good Kantian. This suggests there may be 
as many “scientific” theories of “moral development” as existing moral philosophical 
theories. What would avoid Nietzschenians from having their own, where the most 
advanced stages of the process were those in which the moral agents could get 
their actions to be unrepeatable, and completely conscious of their grounds on will 
to power? Or Spinozians to have theirs, where the most advanced stages of “moral 
development” is shown to the agents assuming the absolute necessity for their 
allegedly “free” actions, and so on? 
 
Habermas‟ proof cannot be radically applied because, in that case, it would 
ethically put in question the very being of humans and the very dynamics of life, in 
which coercive procreating is crucial. Given Habermas‟ ardent anti-
Nietzschenianism, it is ironic that this outcome could be seen, without much effort, 
as an “ethical-communicative” version of Nietzsche‟s intuition of “the essential 
immorality of life”.  
  
    
  
2 
Tugendhat and the seriousness of negative 
 
 
(a) The importance of being “ernsthaftig” 
 
Also Ernst Tugendhat has recognized the problematic relation of ethics with 
children and other helpless beings: “These (fetus, small children, animals) are not 
persons, they do not belong to moral community, if this is constituted by mutual 
recognition… the miscarriage of modern moral philosophy is shown here in its 
most drastic form. The responsibility concerning children seems the most intuitively 
simple case of a moral obligation and, notwithstanding, we do not have any moral 
theory that can explain it” (Tugendhat, E., “The helplessness of philosophers 
before the moral challenge of our time”, page 117; my translation from Spanish). 
 
In the “Three lessons on problems of ethics” (included in Probleme der Ethik), 
Tugendhat has posed something crucial: “Why do we think the involved people 
have to decide the norms under which they will have to live?” (Problems of Ethics, 
page 212. Translation from Spanish is mine). The question follows an example 
where a mother, after listening to her children, takes a decision for them. And 
Tugendhat comments: “The decision which she came to would probably be better 
grounded, in what concerns its contents, than if the children themselves had come 
to an agreement. And nevertheless we all think – I suppose – the children should 
have decided for themselves. Why? Evidently, on the basis of a normal moral that 
prohibits moral disqualification” (idem). “I suppose, therefore, we all want to be… 
autonomous, to personally decide for ourselves”, because “… it is morally wrong 
that a person or a group appeal to their own superior moral wisdom to decide 
which juridical norms should prevail, without interrogating the other persons 
involved. That seems to be the reason why moral problems (…) must be 
necessarily grounded on the discourse of all the involved” (page 123).  
 
But additionally he states: “Contrarily to Habermas‟ opinion, the reason is not 
the communicative nature of the process of moral grounding… the irreducibly 
communicative aspect is not cognitive, but volitional… the problem considered 
here is not a problem of grounding, but of participation on the power which decides 
what is legally permitted or not” (page 123). “… according to my thesis, the 
grounding of the very moral conception does not have already the sense of the 
grounding of a statement, but it is a grounding concerning the entrance into an 
inter-subjective praxis” (p. 125). 
 
In the first of the “Three Lessons…”, Tugendhat has admitted social norms 
need grounding, “because individuals are subjected to them once and for all 
through sanctions” (page 78). “So there are two possibilities: whether the individual 
feels this compulsion as mere compulsion or he conceives it as grounded and, to 
that extent, incorporates compulsion in the scope of his own freedom” (page 79). 
That is what he calls “willingness of submission””. “The grounding would have to 
consist, therefore, the individual was convinced that, if he had the possibility to 
decide… he would have chosen it with the same freedom with which he could 
chose, at any time, to get into a game” (Idem). However, in a post-metaphysical 
culture like ours, the matter resides – according to Tugendhat – that this “willing 
submission” to a normative system, admitting its sanctions, feeling guilty for not 
obeying it, feeling indignation for seeing others disobeying it, etc, does not come 
determined by a “superior truth” (theologian, metaphysical, like Aristotelian 
“essence” or “human nature”), but by “those aspects of self-conception of human 
being admitted by everyone” (pp. 129-130). 
 
Following Kantian footsteps, Tugendhat makes a difference between the 
consideration of someone as a person (in her own being) and the consideration 
regarding certain characteristics (being a good musician, a good teacher, etc.) 
(pages 136 and 147). This appreciation for the very person as such is connected to 
the Kantian issue of the “autonomous ends”. Nevertheless: “That my being and the 
others‟ being have an intrinsic value is an affirmation Kant can only conceive, of 
course, with the help of his strong (metaphysical) concept of reason. We cannot 
follow him so far with our weak means”. (page 161). Tugendhat tries to elucidate 
what would be a “person as such” using only these “weak means”. I quote at 
length: “Every moral conception that is expressed in each case with a determined 
grounding predicate seems founded in a conception of the essential characteristic 
of the identity of the person (But not vice-versa!). So does it mean we are obliged 
to go back to the old Aristotelian interpretation? My answer is no. The meaning we 
attribute here to the word “essential” does not derivate from a determined 
predicate; it is not, for example, the essence of the “human being” (or of the 
“person”) but it is the property that, in each case, “we” (the group with a determined 
moral conception) suppose to constitute, the decisive property of our being, of our 
conception about ourselves (for example, being sons of God, members of this 
people, etc.)” (page 50). The attribution of such essential property “seems to be, 
above all, about an empirical fact”. At this point, the rupture with Kant is produced 
when Tugendhat commits to a decided de-transcendentalization of rationality itself 
and, consequently, of all the grounding process. 
 
Hence, the question is to understand what the expression “considering the 
very person as such” means (or, in a Kantian line, the person as an “end in 
himself”) – what, according to Tugendhat, is not a mere moral principle among 
others but the very quintessence of moral behavior (page 135); but this inquiry 
must not appeal to any religious or metaphysical expedient (not even of 
metaphysical-transcendental kind) but only to empirical information about how the 
mechanisms of appraisal and self-appraisal of human are socially constituted in 
each case. However, in that context, the notion of “affirmation” is fundamental to 
Tugendhat:  “By self-affirmation, or affirmation of one‟s own being, I understand… 
the positive volitional relation to existence itself, and therefore the disposition to 
remain alive… we could say the same about love: loving a person means to 
voluntarily affirm his being and his well-(being) (and wanting to be with him)… so, 
the thesis is „we can only affirm our lives, in the sense of wanting to stay alive‟, if 
we understand life as worth-affirming, which means, worth-appraising…” (page 
138).   
 
And what happens with the small child? “…the small child only obtains a 
positive relationship with his being in the context of the experience of love received 
from his primary caretakers… obviously, the love towards the child is destitute of 
moral considerations (but naturally not of all other forms of consideration – for 
example, respect), because the child is not yet open to this valuing or moral 
dimension…” (pages 138 and 139).  
 
With these elements, we can now answer to the matter of the “willingness of 
submission”. The society humans live in, through its norms system, establishes, 
according to Tugendhat, internal sanctions connected to the mechanisms of self-
identity of the participants and to their necessity of self-affirmation. “To the question 
of why I must limit my freedom according to these precise norms, I answer this 
way: because these norms have the property of being good to everybody, and 
because you are one among others. The moral thus founded is the moral of 
reciprocal respect, which orders to mutually recognize (or to mutually consider) 
practically as “ends in themselves” (page 162). “…the initial premise is the interest 
in a feeling of one‟s own value inter-subjectively understood, the interest in being 
able to consider oneself worth- appraising” (page 163). Tugendhat connects this to 
a kind of broader morality which he calls, in passing, “moral of seriousness” 
(Ernshaftigkeit), because he puts this “considering one‟s own existence as an end 
in itself” together with the Heideggerian “authentic existence”, as the “responsible 
existing” (page 117). “We appraise people in their beings as people… only if we 
take existence seriously” (Idem). “Probably it is impossible to respect others…if 
one does not take oneself seriously.” (page 172). 
 
And what happens, at last, to those who are insensible to social sanctions 
and have no capacity of creating feelings of guilt of the required kind? That 
individual “…cannot understand this sense of „having to‟ (or observe the norm). To 
such individual, the word „moral‟ is an empty word”. (page 154). If the individual 
lacks “moral sense”, “…it is not possible to discuss with him… in my opinion, this 
case is pathological. This denomination, do not intend to be of disdain or contempt; 
on the contrary, it shows the fact every moral is supported on an empirical basis, 
on the empirical presupposition of a determined constitution or socio-psychological 
structure” (page 155). 
 
As I did in the case of Habermas, I am interested in connecting Tugendhat‟s 
considerations to the main interests of the present book. In this case, the strategy 
of the plenary skeptical will be trying to show how the moral of “reciprocal respect” 
and of “seriousness” is compatible with a negative ethics as the one here outlined, 
to the strict extent, however, one accepts the possibility the “empirical fact” 
searched for grounding includes “negative” elements, in the relative sense exposed 
on the preceding sections. But I see three factors – so closely tied, I can only 
distinguish them artificially – in Tugendhat‟s text, which contribute to ruin the 
desired symmetry between “affirmative” and “negative” elements: 1. the 
psychological superficiality of the analysis; 2. the non-acceptance of socially 
anomalous behaviors as being moral; 3. the connection – to me, dogmatic – 
between “self-affirmation” and the decision to “stay alive”. These three elements 
seem to constitute an attitude of non-recognition of the seriousness of negative (in 
Tugendhat‟s sense of “seriousness”). I will comment these three factors first and 
then, in a second moment, I will present the connections between the “fundamental 
empirical fact”, founding of morality, and negativity. 
 
Tugendhat himself is fully conscious of the extremely simple – and, therefore, 
provisory – character of his psychological analysis. After exposing his thesis of 
affirmation of one‟s own life as worth-appraising, he admits: “Naturally, this thesis 
is not analytic; it is only the result of an intuition and has to be understood as a 
psychological hypothesis that must be empirically contrasted… I admit the thesis 
has to be a little more precise” (pages 138 and 139). And in the next page: 
“Obviously, these analyses are exceedingly crude and can only show which 
direction to follow”. The psychological linearity has been almost a constant in 
affirmative moral reflection in general. Schemes of the kind “The more being the 
better; the less being the worse”, “Something imperfect cannot create something 
perfect”, “The more perfection the more happiness; the less perfection the less 
happiness”, “If X can do A and A is more difficult than B, X can do B” literally 
invades philosophical traditional literature. But all kind of (what we may call) “inter-
crossings” and “ruptures of linearity” are typical of the behavior of objects and 
human beings.  
 
In Tugendhat‟s case, the psychological linearity is patent, for example, in his 
analysis on the relations between morality and love, within the processes of 
socialization and education of children. Ursula Wolf has observed a fundamental 
ambiguity in Tugendhat‟s text between what he calls affective love and moral love. 
“Moral love” is something that receives its definition inside a certain moral theory. 
“Effective love” is, on the other hand, much less controllable, and it is possibly 
human intentionality what promotes more “inter-crossings” and linearity “ruptures”: 
to love affectively is not at all incompatible with the greatest disagreement, the 
greatest mutual destructibility or with the wish of separation and taking distance; 
we may want to destroy what we love the most and want to stay close to what we 
most hate. To live, we may need the ones we love as much as the ones we hate; 
we may feel strongly attracted for those we depreciate; because we love, we may 
feel strong wishes to abandon the beloved object; in self-contempt, we may find 
new possibilities of self-appraisal, and so on. (To Schopenhauer, we owe the most 
well-known “inter-crossing” of modern philosophy: to commit suicide manifests the 
highest level of willing to live). In previous chapters of the present book, inter-
crossings of this kind were also presented, for example, when talking about a 
negativity which is highly appraising human life and some kind of “keeping alive” 
based on the most pure contempt for life. 
 
This insensibly leads to my second critical line of Tugendhat‟s position. The 
institutions of the society we live in, which represent the norm system where we 
must take a position (together with the controlling mechanisms that guarantee its 
application), can determine, for example, that “loving what we depreciate” or 
“wanting to destroy what we love” or “wanting to become distant from what we 
appreciate” or “grounding self-appraisal on a form of contempt”, far from being 
“inter-crossings” that suggest the deepness and complexity of human beings, could 
be considered as purely and simply “pathological conducts” signed by abnormality 
and psychological derangement, carried out by individuals who, due to an 
inadequate socialization process, “lack moral sense”. Even when a member of that 
society considers the current norms as based on pitiful psychological 
superficialities, society might posses – and usually it does – the controlling 
mechanisms which give support to that kind of institutionalized psychological 
linearity: the Juridical-Sanitary Police that protects the standard assessment of the 
processes of self-identity and formation of personality, ultimately connected to the 
very formation of the so-called “moral sense”.  
 
 Tugendhat, as we have seen, accepts this as a fact (page 155). However, 
the problem consists here of the following: whether this is simply “descriptive 
Ethics”, of a more anthropological than strictly philosophical interest (and here are 
included the risks of “naturalism” in Tugendhat‟s theory, frequently stressed by his 
critics), or, if there is still a normative interest on it, this way of seeing things does 
not allow to define behaviors as defensible for being moral which could be, as a 
matter of fact, socially anomalous. We could think of behaviors whose moral value 
manifests in the fact the person precisely stops trusting in this “self respect” solidly 
based on the current system of norms, and torments himself with problems of self-
identity that maybe honor him from the moral point of view, even when they put his 
personality, socially constructed, under risk of collapse. Marx, as Freud and 
Nietzsche, would have much to say, no doubt, about the psychological social 
generation of “feelings of guilt”, which, in Tugendhat‟s explanation, are essential for 
the development of “moral sense”, without which the “moral of seriousness” is not 
even thinkable. 
 
If we enrich psychology, we will not necessarily see as “pathological” the non-
formation of feelings of guilt or shame, but maybe as a consequence of a certain 
hypercritic moral point of view which refuses to assume feelings whose social 
origin can be seen as ethically problematic. History is full of cases of human 
behaviors that, in general, are recognized as of high moral value and, 
notwithstanding, have drastically removed their agents from the mechanisms of 
self-identity imposed by current society, people who, no doubt, from the dominant 
point of view, “lacked moral sense‟”. In a similar way, we could also recognize 
noble suicides (as the ones of Petronius or Walter Benjamin), whose motives were, 
in part, originated from serious inconveniences of internalization of the self-
identification mechanisms proclaimed by Nero or by National-socialism. Within 
Tugendhat‟s theory, how could we call such behaviors moral in a normative and 
not merely descriptive sense? 
 
Finally, the other element which damages the proximity between Tugendhat‟s 
theory and negative ethics, like the one developed in the present book, is the 
connection – in the way I see, unjustifiable – between the self-affirmation of the 
person and what he calls “the positive volitional relation with our existence” and the 
“disposition to stay alive”. In fact, this is another case of the psychological linearity 
criticized before, but, because of its content, it is not an ordinary linearity, but one 
completely crucial to the main interests of the present book. What is not noticed 
here is that there may perfectly be “serious” mechanisms of self-affirmation that 
could be manifested by an intention of not staying alive, as we have argued on Part 
II. The “continuing to live” is a non-essential byproduct of any moral theory: 
whether from a moral theory that provides the idea life is “worth-appraising” or from 






(b) The negative character of the fundamental “empirical fact” 
 
None of those critical observations affects in anything the form of 
Tugendhat‟s project of grounding of ethics based on its de-transcendentalization 
and on the search for an “empirical fact” that makes it effective, and that does not 
need metaphysical or theological elements. “It is the specific challenge of the 
Illustration: that moral is no longer justified through religious tradition and beliefs 
and starts demanding some kind of natural grounding” (The helplessness of 
philosophers…, page 108). But Tugendhat uses the term “natural” not referring to 
nature, and his grounding is indeed much more psychological-social than strictly 
“natural”. I have tried to show, on the previous chapters, an empirical domain to be 
understood in two dimensions, one of intra-worldly events and the other structural-
worldly, within an interest on nature in the literal sense.  
 
Human condition, as presented in these texts, is certainly empirical and 
contingent (it could have been of another kind); however, at the same time, it is 
structurally given according to certain directions and not others, thus offering an 
ultimate and insuperable framework. This absolutely does not mean returning to 
traditional metaphysical thinking. The considerations regarding human condition, 
finitude, death, etc, cannot be put, as said on a previous chapter, in the same 
domain as of metaphysical or theological considerations. We can nowadays 
develop a practical philosophy without having to take position over the entelechies 
and the angels, but we cannot develop it without taking position before death and 
finitude, whatever this attitude may be. Of course the reference to “nature” has 
been many times unduly inflated – for example, in the context of the discussion on 
“natural rights”, in the sense of Jus-naturalism – but here it is about considering a 
minimalistic structural natural basis.  
 
When the metaphysical-religious reference points fall, it is hard to see what 
could “universal reciprocal respect” now be based on, since it seems difficult to 
keep postulating, in secularized basis, something like an “intrinsic value” of human 
person, as Kant used to do. Curiously, Tugendhat would repel a natural reference 
of the kind accepted in the present book, but he makes efforts to recover the 
Kantian idea of “an end in itself”, which is much closer to the metaphysical-
theological reference than the structural human condition studied here. In several 
points of his argumentation – similarly as occurred in Habermas‟ and Apel‟s – there 
is the strong impression the religious reference is much less feared than the 
natural one. What I intended to do here – I insist, without modifying the form of 
grounding intended by Tugendhat – is to indicate a way to determine an “empirical 
fact” that is natural in the literal sense and, at the same time, apt to ground 
morality.  
 
This attempt intends to maintain the “empirical” grounding in an ethical field, 
without falling into the religious one, but neither allowing to approach to a merely 
“juridical” grounding (as well observed by Ursula Wolf quoted by Tugendhat: 
“…with help of a similar contractual model… we generally do not reach moral, but 
a morally grounded juridical system” (Problems of Ethics, p. 134). The attempted 
“reconstruction” of the Kantian notion of “end in itself”, in psychological-social 
terms, destructs the very notion, because here appears the paradox of “an end in 
itself”, referring to the mark of normative decisions of a certain empirical society 
and, consequently, the possibility of a multiplicity of “ends in themselves”, 
something Kant would hardly accept as a plausible reconstruction of his concept. 
As presumably rational, that idea of a “value in itself” of the person seems 
incurably metaphysical-religious. The advisable in this point is simply accepting we 
should think “beyond Kant”, and not try to reconstruct at any cost his moral notions 
without his indispensable metaphysical-transcendental basis. 
 
Actually, we do not need the notion of an “end in itself” or an “intrinsic value” 
of the person in order to have moral notions which we are not disposed to 
renounce, as, for example, reciprocal respect and inviolability of the human person. 
But to accept an inviolability of human person, we do not need the idea that this 
person is “valuable” or “worthy” or that it is an “end in itself”. In order to reconstruct 
the notion of inviolability, we only need the idea of equality among all humans. 
However, we are not obliged to conceive that equality in affirmative terms; it can be 
a negative equality. A universe in which all humans are equal – and therefore 
inviolable to each other – is logically compatible to a universe where humans have 
absolutely no “value in itself” or “intrinsic value” at all. Inviolability would be based 
only on the fact there are not and there cannot be defensible rational arguments on 
which a person could legitimately find support to torture, chaise or kill another 
person who is basically like him. 
 
Remembering our analysis on structural human condition, on the first chapter 
of this book, we have strong reasons to think on our world exactly as a world with 
those characteristics, that is, one where all humans are inviolable in their persons 
for being naturally and negatively equal. Whatever are the mechanisms of 
“recognition” and “appraisal” and “self-appraisal” intra-worldly developed in a 
society, we can see our lives as being, since always, immersed in a kind of 
fundamental “indignity”. Of a being thrown up to the world, subjected to structural 
pain, to a process of inexorable physical and mental degradation, to other‟s 
aggressiveness and to the aggressiveness of his own project of self-instauration 
and with the permanent danger of moral disqualification, we can ask: where could 
he obtain a structural-worldly “dignity”, based on the mere fact of being a human? 
Any dignity that can be recognized by others can only come from intra-worldly 
agreements, through systems of norms that are socially established, as Tugendhat 
well explains. In the worldly-structural level, the idea of a fundamental “disvalue”, or 
of a worldly “indignity”, seems much more plausible and post-metaphysical than 
the one of a mysterious and little intelligible “intrinsic dignity” (if we have really 
become orphans of Father), though offensive this may seem to our pride and our 
narcissism. 
 
Notwithstanding, what is fundamental here is that this “natural and negative 
equality” can be source of morality – and, specifically, source of inviolability -, a 
morality not subjected to the normative comings and goings of the different 
empirical societies and, at the same time, free from metaphysical assumptions 
different from the minimal assumptions of naturalized ontology. The full conscience 
about the very lack of any structural value, beneath the intra-worldly prestige and 
merits humans pompously give to each other, can be a legitimate source of 
morality, as much or more than a presumed conscience about “our own value”, 
which in affirmative societies have been source of pride, aggressiveness and 
intolerance. Tugendhat said seriousness requires “taking oneself seriously”, but 
this cannot be absolute: the moral dangers of taking oneself excessively seriously 
should be evaluated. From the offense to our narcissism and pride could arise, on 
the other hand, a moral force that would perhaps not emerge from the regular 
stimulation of these affirmative attitudes. When a man allows himself to torture 
another, his action is ethically miserable not because his victim has a kind of 
“intrinsic value”, but because he, the executioner, could not present even one 
serious rational argument through which he could prove he has any superior 
“value” that gives him the “right” to do what he is doing.  
 
It is absurd and disproportionate that the torturer, equally affected by the 
fundamental indignity of his victim, has managed to accumulate on his hands – 
through intra-worldly manipulation of lies, compensations, pseudo-rights, false 
privileges, favorable circumstances and brute force – so much power to perform 
that unspeakable, indescribable suffering to his “fellow negative”. This gives us a 
factual-empirical support, directly connected to human condition, to condemn the 
act of the executioner as immoral. What makes human beings inviolable is 
paradoxically their structural disvalue. The idea is that an originally degrading 
empirical fact could provide a better “empirical fundament” to morality in a way an 
honorable empirical fact never could. The difficulty “post-metaphysical” 
philosophers have to recognize negative empirical facts of fundamental character 
(that writers like Orwell, Swift and Blake, among many others, show with such 
clarity) makes us think they still have not renounced entirely to be good sons of 
God; despite the proclaimed “program of secularization” of thinking started by 
Illustration, they still maintain their thoughts in the line of a world that cannot be 
structurally bad. 
 Now, I want to return to children, which is what really interests me here. The 
moral of seriousness, while it maintains its purely affirmative bases, will continue 
not giving a solution to the problem of a moral responsibility before children. When 
analyzing Habermas‟ theory, we saw it was inevitable to recognize the coercive 
and authoritarian nature of our relationship with small children (and, by extension, 
with the unborn). In Tugendhat‟s description, finally, the totality of human beings, 
the adults as much as the children, are described as coercively obliged (though 
coerciveness may be soften with the idea of “willingness of submission”) to 
construct their identities according to the social norms of the group which they 
have always belonged to, under penalty of being treated as sick or delinquents 
“lacking moral sense”. The important thing in this perspective is to give to children, 
very early, the elements so they could be proud of themselves and learn how to 
handle correctly the mechanisms of administration of the identification processes, 
accepted by the society in which they are born and where they will die.  
 
Obviously, by doing so, society has already coercively decided for the yet 
unborn, in the sense that (so they say) “if they had the opportunity to decide”, they 
would accept “to limit their freedom according to norms” in order to be “objects of 
affirmation on the part of the others,” to the extent such norms have the property to 
be “good for all”. Tugendhat does not present this as an ideal, but as a description 
(and so the dubiousness about the strictly ethical-normative character of his 
theory). According to such description, faced social norms, we are all in the same 
condition as the unborn. Certainly, on those bases, whether the problem of an 
ethics concerning children is diluted or it is transformed into an unreachable 
objective. 
 
In my negative perspective, Tugendhat‟s complaint on the lack of a moral 
before children is inextinguishable, since such morality cannot exist, and for 
structural reasons. Regarding the yet unborn, we have however the structural 
abstention, but on the small child we only dispose of a tragic and radical 
responsibility which, in no moment, will conceal the immorality in whose framework 
is reconstructed a second degree morality for children. The least we can do before 
the bittersweet and desolate glance of children is never dissimulate for them the 
terrible violence of their appearance in the world. 
  
3 
R. M. Hare and “possible people” 
 
(a)  On the fundamental ambiguity of the Utilitarian principle: the principle 
of “gratification” and the “anesthetic” principle 
 
As classically formulated by John Stuart Mill, the principle of utility reads: 
“…actions are fair to the extent they tend to promote happiness; and unfair while 
they tend to produce the opposite of happiness. Happiness is understood as 
pleasure and absence of pain; unhappiness as pain and absence of pleasure… 
pleasure and exemption of pain are the only things desirable as ends; and all 
desirable things… are so whether through the pleasure inherent to themselves or 
as means for promotion of pleasure and prevention from pain” (Mill, Utilitarianism, 
chapter II, p. 48 of Portuguese edition; my translation). Again, on chapter IV of this 
work, Mill puts the question: “…humanity does not desire anything except what 
constitutes pleasure or what consists absence of pain” (p. 76). Jeremy Bentham 
also refers to the principle in the same terms, understanding “utility” as the property 
under which the object tends to provide benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or 
happiness or to avoid the occurrence of harm, pain, evil or unhappiness.  
 
In this classical formulation of the Utilitarian principle, it seems to be present a 
crucial ambiguity. This consists of the following: Mill, like Bentham, considers the 
two expressions “looking for pleasure” and “avoiding pain” as mutually 
interchangeable, as if each one of them led directly, and with no hiatus, to the 
other. In principle, “looking for pleasure” and “avoiding pain” are two intentionalities 
that share one characteristic: their results cannot be granted. Looking for pleasure 
does not mean finding it, and trying to avoid pain does not mean one effectively 
manages to avoid it. But, on the other hand, whoever searches pleasure (maybe 
without finding it) is putting himself into the intentionality of avoiding pain, while 
(and here the symmetry seems to end) whoever tries to avoid pain (succeeding or 
not) does not necessarily puts himself into the intentionality of looking for pleasure. 
It seems avoiding pain is a “minimal” intentionality, whose exercise will not be 
enough to put whoever assumes it on the track of pleasure, a “maximal” 
intentionality.  
 
This can perhaps be seen in a clearer manner when the sought pleasure is 
obtained and when the avoided pain is, in fact, avoided. Indeed, if someone 
manages to feel pleasure, the more intense it is, he will certainly have, at the same 
time, stayed away from pain; he will have avoided it in the same act of 
achievement of pleasure. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the opposite also 
happens: whoever has managed to avoid pain will not necessarily experience 
pleasure in the same act of that avoidance. Perhaps, the only thing he will have 
obtained is “not suffering”, which is not equivalent to “feeling pleasure” or 
“enjoying”. It seems there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain, not 
considered by the classical Utilitarian principle (Note that the question is formal: 
what should be done for something to be present has no symmetry with what has 
to be done for something to remain absent. It is not about the relation 
pleasure/pain, but about the more general relation avoidance/searching. The same 
asymmetry would occur between the “avoidance of pleasure” and the “looking for 
pain” – as it could happen, for example, in the life of an ascetic -: avoiding pleasure 
does not automatically puts him on the track of pain. In general: only avoiding 
something does not put anyone on the track of searching the opposite. Avoidance 
is weaker than searching, so one cannot pass from the first to the second, 
whatever are the places of pleasure and pain within the relation 
avoidance/searching).                           
 
This makes us think the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain 
respond, actually, to two different principles and not to only one, two principles that 
are as “embedded” in the apparently unique Mill‟s principle of Utility, that I will call, 
respectively, “principle of gratification” (“All men look for pleasure”) and “anesthetic 
principle” (“All men seek to avoid pain”). If we accept this is so, two different types 
of Utilitarian theories should arise from that differentiation, a “Utilitarianism of 
gratification” and an “anesthetic Utilitarianism”. While the first one would be a 
“maximal” Utilitarianism, the last would be “minimal”, in the sense that, according to 
it, the most humans could try to obtain would be the avoidance of pain, without 
intending it as much as the achievement of pleasure (It would be a more austere 
and afflicted Utilitarianism than the Utilitarianism of gratification). 
 
There are at least two ways to prove those principles are different: (a) in the 
question of moral imputation; and (b) in the question of though it is possible 
another principle transcending them both. 
 
Indeed, we are able to justify a behavior C of a person A, from the moral point 
of view, when A did C in order to avoid an intense pain (for example, betraying 
under torture or offending someone in the moment of suffering the intense pains of 
a terminal disease), but we would not justify it if A had done C in order to obtain an 
intense pleasure. There are certain actions we justify on behalf of the anesthetic 
principle, but we are not disposed to justify on behalf of the gratifying principle. 
Pain (and especially extreme pain) has a characteristic pleasure does not (whether 
it is extreme pleasure or not): it is pressing, it corners, it blocks ways out, leaves no 
empty spaces, saturates all the space. Thus, we can criticize a hedonistic ethics for 
not leaving space, for example, to altruistic actions, while we cannot criticize an 
anesthetic ethics with the same arguments: in the case of extreme pain, it would be 
cruel to demand altruistic actions from the agent, but this would not be so in the 
case of extreme pleasure. This suggests they are two different principles and the 
usual Utilitarian principle is not simple, but composed and ambiguous. 
 
In the second place, from the works of Freud and Nietzsche, among others, 
the so called “principle of pleasure” was basically questioned, as it appears in the 
formulations of classic Utilitarianism among other theories. Especially the Freudian 
argument goes in the direction human being has, in the light of a “deep 
psychology”, complex connections with pain and death, in the sense of a living 
oriented to them according to a compulsive need to repeat pain despite the 
suffering. This would point out to a “beyond the principle of pleasure”, in the sense 
human beings would not be referred, strictly, to pleasure as a final end. But these 
formulations of a “beyond the principle of pleasure” can be understood as a beyond 
the gratifying component of the classical Utilitarian principle; it cannot be directly 
applied to its anesthetic component. So, though we may prove human beings, 
through the compulsion to repetition, do not search strictly pleasure, we cannot say 
they completely give up the domain of avoidance of pain.  
 
The compulsion for repetition does not search intense pain, even after 
abandoning the field of influence of the principle of pleasure in the gratifying sense. 
The compulsion for repetition could be interpreted as a kind of flirt with pain, as if it 
was about feeling pain just until a certain point, but without letting it come to 
extreme and unbearable intensities. Therefore, the compulsion for repetition could 
be interpreted as a sophisticated manner of avoiding pain, but in no way as a 
sophisticated manner of searching pleasure, since what is searched is the painful 
moment. The so called “death impulses” are certainly not desire for dying, but an 
exercise of symbolic control of death through a kind of indefinite approach to it, 
avoiding effective death as categorical and concluding fact. So, per se, and without 
addition of other elements, a “beyond the principle of pleasure” is not, ipso facto, a 
beyond the anesthetic principle of pain avoidance. 
 
In the following pages, I will try to show how this fundamental ambiguity of the 
Utilitarian principle has direct influence in Hare‟s argumentation on the moral 
obligations concerning possible people, although, as it is usually said – and Hare 
himself has said – the Utilitarianism he assumes is one of consideration of interests 
and preferences, more than one of the consideration of pleasures and pains. We 
will see that, in his inquiry, Hare incorporates elements of “gratification” that justify 
the kind of critical observations I intend to present here. 
 
 
(b)  Hare’s lack of radicality on the consideration about the nature of a 
worth-living life 
 
When considering the issue of our moral responsibilities before possible 
people (in his book Essays on Bioethics), the first question we should make, 
according to Hare, is if I, myself (in each case), would prefer being or coming into 
existence instead of not being or not existing. “(…) given the power to prescribe 
existence or non-existence, which do I prescribe?” (Hare, Essays on Bioethics. p. 
70). “Most of us are thankful for our existence; and what one can be thankful for 
must surely be something one prefers to its absence. I am not suggesting 
existence is in itself a benefit, but only that it is, for those who enjoy life, beneficial 
as a necessary condition of this” (p. 71). Here is formulated the “preferentialism” of 
Hare‟s Utilitarian theory: it is not said life is good in the sense of pleasure, but in 
the sense it would be preferred. 
 
From that point, Hare develops a hypothetical experiment according to which 
we are in a situation where we can communicate with our possible progenitors and 
ask them, if so we wish, that they bring us into existence. “My claim is that, if we 
have something more than zero happiness, if our lives are, at least, worth-living, 
we would all ask for that” (page 71). And more: “… in considering whether to bring 
a new person into existence, I have to look at the question as if I were going to be 
that person, or as if that person were going to be myself. So, it will be relevant 
what, for that person, it would be like to exist; and, of course, what, for him, it would 
be like not exist (…) if…his existence was moderately agreeable for him, then it 
seems to me that I am constrained by universalizability, to treat this fact as just as 
relevant to my moral thinking as a similar fact about my own actual existence; and 
we have seen that most of us have reason to be thankful for our own actual 
existence” (p. 73).  
 
Hare admits that “what makes our life worth-living is a very difficult thing to 
decide and something that every one has to decide for himself” (p. 75). And he 
gives some examples of his own experience: he did not consider not worth-living, 
the moments he spent as a prisoner during the war, but he considered not worth-
living the moments he suffered for the mistakes made by some of his sons: “At 
such times, I even got near wishing I did not exist” (Idem). In the case of war, he 
comments: “I think that, face with the prospect of such an existence prolonged 
throughout my life I would prefer not to exist. But it is hard to be sure” (Idem).  
 
On the chapter of the book dedicated to the moral issue of abortion, Hare 
asks what we can know about the fetus (a typical “possible person”) in order to 
ponder whether it is moral or not to avoid its development. “We know, for example, 
that it has the potentiality of becoming into a human adult – that is, if pregnancy 
comes to term, it will have turned into a baby, and if the baby survives, it will turn 
into an adult more or less like us” (page 168). Immediately, He asks the reader to 
suppose that, among the characteristics of the fetus – relevant to the consideration 
– the capability to suffer was not included. “…we can ignore this property if we 
confine… to cases where we can be sure it will not suffer” (page 171). Examining 
the case of the moral rights of the fetus, Hare reaffirms his previous ideas: if there 
would be a manner this fetus was me, and if I could communicate with my future 
mother, “I am sure I shall not say „Carry on, have the abortion; it‟s the same to me‟. 
Because my existence now is valuable to me, I shall not – other things being equal 
– (…) that she should have the abortion, thereby depriving me of the possibility of 
existence” (pp. 173).  
 
And his idea goes a way which particularly interests me: “I value my 
existence, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the good things that happen to 
me, which could not happen if I did not exist… that (…) does not show that mere 
existence is in itself a good, but it does show that it is a good at least as a means 
to other good things that those who exist can have. Therefore, faced with the 
possibility of existing now or not existing now, the normally happy person will tell 
his mother not to have the abortion” (pp. 173-174) We should note that, throughout 
his argumentation, Hare uses, within his “preferential” Utilitarian theory, elements 
of the “gratification” kind  (if not “hedonistic”), when talking, for example, about “the 
one who enjoys life”, “more than zero happiness”, “moderately pleasant existence”, 
“normally happy person”,  and so on. 
 
But what is crucial here is that, all over Hare‟s consideration about the moral 
rights before possible people and its consequences for practical problems as 
abortion, there is no use for the difference between what happens within the world 
and what we know about the world itself, in the usual lack of radical reflection. I 
want to say, ab initio, this distinction is not particularly “Heideggerian”, though the 
terminology (“worldly/intra-worldly”) is, but – as indicated before on the present 
work – those terms were used by philosophers who were completely out of 
Heidegger‟s scope of influence, like for example, Wittgenstein, a philosopher 
whose arguments Hare would certainly be much more disposed to listen to than 
Heidegger‟s (See Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.221, 6.42, 6.44). While in the 
Tractatus this difference is made summarily, in the Conference on ethics, of 1930 
(approximately), it is absolutely crucial. In this text, Wittgenstein refers to a kind of 
experience in which is manifested, according to him, the imperative and absolute 
character of moral requirements, as something that stays literally “out of the world” 
(since, in the world, “all sentences are worth the same”, without any kind of 
privilege). “I believe the best way to describe it is saying that, when I have it, I get 
amazed before the existence of the world. So I feel inclined to using sentences 
such as „How extraordinary that things exist, or „How extraordinary that the world 
exists‟” (Wittgenstein, Conference on ethics, pages 38-39 of the Spanish edition; 
my translation). 
 
Wittgenstein believes these expressions “have no sense” (according to 
semantic criteria), but this does not affect the fact he believes it is important to 
make that difference in order to trace the limits of ethics: “If I affirm: „I get amazed 
before the existence of the world‟, I am using the language wrongly. I will explain 
myself: it has perfect and clear sense saying I get amazed that something is as it 
is. We all understand what means saying I get amazed by the size of a dog bigger 
than anyone ever seen before… I get amazed by the size of this dog because I 
could conceive a dog of another size, that is, of normal size, by which I would not 
be amazed. Saying: „I get amazed that this or that thing is as it is‟ only makes 
sense if I can imagine it not being as it is… But it lacks any sense saying I get 
amazed by the existence of the world because I cannot represent it as not being” 
(page 39).  
 
To Wittgenstein, establishing this difference is not senseless at all, since, by 
doing so, we perceive the affirmations about the world itself fall out of the limits of 
language as regulated in the Tractatus, which can only capture the logic of 
affirmations made within the world. In order to deactivate the importance of the 
difference, Hare would have to prove it as non-sense within the context of his own 
ethical theory; but this is difficult because, according to Wittgenstein‟s semantics, 
the “lack of sense” of the difference is something much stronger, according to 
which also all the moral argumentations developed by Hare in his book (and in all 
his books) would certainly be equally considered by Wittgenstein as senseless.  
 
However, it is important to highlight that, in Hare‟s pondering, the difference is 
not omitted: it clearly appears, but it is not used in the core of the argumentation. 
Indeed, when he says he is not stating existence itself is good, but only that certain 
things within existence are good (or when he says it is not necessary to prove 
existence is good in itself, but only that existing should be preferred to not existing, 
since existing constitutes a condition for good things to happen within existing), he 
is recognizing, in some way, the pertinence of the distinction within his Utilitarian 
scope of thinking. The only relevant “goodness” for his consideration of the “worth-
living” character of existing will be the goodness of what happens in existence, and 
not any alleged goodness of existence itself as such, something Hare believes is 
not necessary to demonstrate (perhaps because it is not possible to demonstrate? 
For the clearly affirmative intentions of Hare‟s thinking, all makes us suspect that, if 
there were an available proof of the very goodness of the world, he would use it 
immediately!).  
 
So, if the difference between coming to existence and what happens within 
existing, or because of it (life as a condition for other things), is finally relevant, why 
not using it at the moment of the hypothetical experiment where each one of us 
would talk to our future mother, putting ourselves in the place of the possible 
person whose birth is being discussed? Why not consider, in this hypothetical 
experiment, the information, also available, about existing itself as such, and not 
only – as in the case of the argumentation presented by Hare – information on 
what people do with existence and in existence once they are born? 
 
What rational grounds has the “being thankful for our own existence” referred 
by Hare? On which fundaments can one say, in each case, “my existence is 
valuable to me now?” Hare affirms this feeling emerges when I manage to do, in 
existence, things that make my life reach a level that makes it “worth-living”. 
Nevertheless, by the examples he presents, it seems he does not differentiate 
between, as least, two things: (a) “worth-living” in the sense of something positively 
“good”; and (b) “worth-living” in the sense of something simply “endurable” (or 
“tolerable”). To live as a prisoner during a war is certainly not something “good”, 
but it is something that, according to Hare‟s own testimony, is, to a certain point, 
“endurable”. Shall we put the issue of the “worth-living” of existence only in the 
pure level of endurance? If what will be considered in the evaluation of existing is 
neither its “intrinsic value” (because that, according to Hare, cannot or “does not 
need” to be proved) nor even its intra-worldly positive value, but only its value of 
“being endured”, the evaluation does not seem to have too much force, nor is it 
very encouraging. It responds to a minimal Utilitarian criterion. After all, almost 
anything can be “endured” (think about what the prisoners of Auschwitz have 
managed to “endure”, according to what the survivals tell), but it seems irrational 
and anti-intuitive to say, therefore, this life is “worth living”. That something can be 
“endured” does not mean it is “worth-living”. In that, we can recognize intra-worldly 
events could reach such unpleasant levels that lead the supposed “worth-living” 
character of existence to the pure and simple “enduring” level. 
 
This is relevant in a moral consideration that has already renounced to 
demonstrating the “intrinsic value” of existing, but alleges, even though, life should 
be preferred in the hypothetical situation, because existing would provide 
conditions or “means” for good things to happen in the intra-worldly level. But if 
neither this can be said, the arguments in favor of a worth-existing life get 
drastically weaker than it appeared to be. What rational arguments, and not only 
punctual feelings, would present people having information about life, for example, 
the survivors of Auschwitz, in order to prefer existing in the hypothetic situation, 
since life, on one side, does not manifest any kind of “intrinsic value” and, on the 
other, we do not have rational guarantees of any kind life, intra-worldly, will include 
those gratifications Hare refers to, and that would motivate, in a crucial way, the 
affirmative decision in his hypothetical experiment? So, life does not seem to have 
value in itself, neither to give any guarantee it will be composed of gratifying, 
productive and personal achievements.    
 
So, introducing worldly considerations, those arguments simply loose almost 
all their force, if they ever had any. It is very curious – almost comically curious – to 
see how Hare, on the chapter about the issue of abortion, systematically lets aside 
each and every structural consideration on the value of life. When he refers to the 
characteristics of the fetus – the information we already have – he says, as we 
have seen, that among those characteristics there is that the fetus will be 
transformed, if pregnancy goes on normally, “into a baby, and if the baby survives, 
it will turn into an adult more or less like us”. But why stop there? This stopping is 
completely non-critical and typically affirmative. Actually, we have much more 
structural information about the fetus: we know it will turn into a baby, the baby into 
a young man, the young man into an adult – “more or less like us” -, but we also 
know the adult will turn into an old man, the old man into a decrepit, with dramatic 
mental and physical health problems, decadent and each time more dependent 
and fragile, and, at last, this decrepit will turn into a dying person (much possibly 
into a terminal patient) and finally into a dead!  
 
Why all this information is not considered relevant for the hypothetical 
experiment about the “preference for existing”? Is it only because it is unpleasant 
to think about it and easier to work exclusively with wishful thinking? Is not this 
structural information strictly pertinent to take a decision about the possible people 
in the hypothetical situation? Thinking of what waits for me in terms of decadence, 
decrepitude and fragility, could I not – put in the place of the fetus – doubt a lot 
about what I will say to my future mother – in the experiment proposed by Hare – 
regarding her possibility of making an abortion? I am not saying that now, in the 
light of this “complete” structural transformation (always so suspiciously 
“incomplete” in the usual affirmative lists), the fatal answer will be: “Please, have 
an abortion. I do not want to have to pass through all this”. No. I am saying the 
information is certainly relevant to take a decision, whatever it may be. The 
experiment leads to a choice, not to an obvious “preference for life”.  
 
In what rational sense should an old man be “grateful” for his decadence? In 
what sense should I be “grateful” for being worn out, swooning and finally dying? 
When we consider existence – already accepted (even by Hare) as not “valuable in 
itself” – is at least “valuable as a mean” to things we consider good, is it not 
relevant to consider that existence is a mean to terrible things, not eventual (as the 
concentration camps), but structural unpleasantness completely guaranteed by the 
very human condition (that is, decaying, swooning and dying)? Could that 
“thankfulness” be still something rational? Should this “thankfulness” not be, after 
all, something one feels “in spite of everything”, and not “because of” something? 
Is every “Yes to life” not of an emotional order? (I will suggest this on the Epilogue 
II). 
 
Early on his text, Hare tries to leave aside these “negative” elements of 
judgment in the moment he writes, immediately after considering the issue of 
decision on existing or not existing: “Here there is a danger to be avoided. We shall 
confuse the issue if we allow into it any thought of the „fear of death‟, which we all 
have. This fear is something which we have had built into us by evolution…All this, 
however, is irrelevant to our question, because the so-called „fear of death‟ is a fear 
of dying or, usually, of being killed. By contrast, what I am asking is, not whether I 
prefer remaining alive to dying or being killed, but whether I prefer existing now to 
never having existed. Since if I had never existed I could not die, the fear of death 
does not enter into the question, though it is extremely hard to prevent ourselves 
being irrelevantly influenced by it” (pages 70-1).  
 
This is extremely fallacious. Certainly, Hare is right in saying the issue is not 
rather I want “to stay alive or not”, but if, radically, “I want to be” in the sense of 
radically refusing “to never have existed”. This difference is genuine, but does not 
take the “fear of dying” out of the question. An argumentation line perfectly relevant 
to the issue would be, on the contrary, the following: “I prefer to have never been 
born – even accepting the not so remote possibility of intra-worldly gratifications – 
precisely for not being compelled to create the condition of having to die, to falter, 
to structurally suffer and disappear and, consequently, to have to live permanently 
with fear of all this”. 
 
Precisely, what Hare illegitimately does is to remove dying in its structural 
character from his consideration, this very dying that being born will bring inevitably 
together with it, and that does not configure any “mean” to achieve good things, 
but, on the contrary, the fundamental inhibition of all possibility. The fear of dying 
is, after all, the fear of being, the fear of having been born. It is perfectly legitimate 
to consider as relevant these elements of judgment in the moment of taking a 
rational decision about existing or not. Since coming into existence carries with it 
structural pain, fainting and death, I can legitimately want “to have never been 
born”, even admitting existing is, sometimes, a mean to obtain certain more or less 
enjoyable satisfactions, and my effective life may be reasonably full of such 
satisfactions. This does not remove rationality or points as “sick” or “disturbed” the 
posture which would say that, after all, to be born “is not worthy”.  
 
On the contrary, it certainly does not seem a much balanced rational decision 
choosing to exist only in function of some highly uncertain quantum of intra-worldly 
satisfactions, always confronted to the always open possibility of a quantum – that 
can be very high – of pain and intra-worldly displeasures and, moreover, having to 
count on wears and tears, diseases and physical and psychical failing, completely 
guaranteed by the very structure of human condition, ending up in total 
annihilation. Before this panorama, the option for life has to include some 
emotional elements to be sustained. Thus, it is extremely doubtful or simply a fake, 
to say “most of us have reasons to be thankful for our own actual existence”. Life 
seems more sustained by impulses than by reasons.  
 
Hare‟s Utilitarianism, in which he examined the issue of the value of life, is, I 
think, a minimal Utilitarianism, attending only to the “anesthetic” component of the 
Utilitarian principle, letting aside the “gratifying” component. The only proof he 
presented about affirmation of life or about preference for existing is exactly the 
following: “We wish to have been born not because existence is a good in  itself, 
but because it is a condition for enjoying some good while we were able to endure 
the rest.” To life is not given, then, a “value of gratification”, but only an “anesthetic 
value”, a “value of endurance”, because there is nothing in Hare‟s argumentation 
that discards the possibility of an intra-worldly life full of misfortunes (as of the 
prisoners of Auschwitz), a life that will still be, for him, “worth living” (that we only 
can rationally understand in the sense of “endurable”). But in this light, Hare‟s 
statements seem exaggerated and unjustifiable when he says “my existence is 
valuable to me now” or “we can be thankful for our existence”, since the only that 
can be offered to life, according to his theory, is an “anesthetic value”, a value of 
pure “enduring”.  
 
I believe Hare‟s vision is essentially correct (the world has no intrinsic value, 
and life can only be endured, in the light of the tenuous hope of some intra-worldly 
gratification without guarantees), but it does not seem right to present this as a 
reason to affirm existence in opposition to the other possibility. Adding the rational 
and structural-worldly elements of judgments, the balance clearly inclines to the 
other side, and the possibility (certainly not the necessity) of reasoning in the 
following alternative way also arises: “We do not wish to have been born because: 
1. in the first place, life has no intrinsic value (admitted by Hare); 2. Secondly: 
because existence is not a guaranteed condition of intra-worldly good. Nothing 
rational discards the possibility of an existence literally full of misfortunes; 3. Third: 
because existence is a guaranteed condition for structural pain, decadence and 
death, even when, in the best hypothesis, this existence can be full of intra-worldly 
good, 4. Forth, because it does not seem to have any rational sense giving 
existence to someone, since we cannot give them a positive „gratifying‟ value, but 
only an „anesthetic‟ value or a “value of endurance”: why giving birth to someone in 
order to anesthetize him, or to protect him or her from being? (why removing them 
from where, so to speak, they were in „total anesthesia‟?) It would have full sense 
to give birth to gratify newborns, but this is precisely what we cannot do under any 
guarantee of the intra-world, and what we can absolutely not do in virtue of severe 
guarantees of the world itself. 
 
 On item 3, I admitted a life can be – with much luck – full of 
accomplishments, joys, triumphs, etc, and, at the same time, subjected to 
structural tragedy, as inevitable. I have been told sometimes that the opposite is 
also a usual experience: feeling deeply happy for simply having been born, in spite 
of intra-worldly misfortunes. (Anna Frank‟s smiling face). I believe there is a 
profound and educating asymmetry between both experiences, if the intention is to 
present rational arguments and not only punctual feelings not rationally justifiable. 
There is no rational support to feel happy simply for being, since being is 
overburden by structural tragedy, wastage and death. If this experience exists, it is 
based on a feeling that does not count as an argument. By contrast, there is 
rational support – all that has been formulated on the present book – for the 
demonstration of structural pain and the consequent moral disqualification that 
supports a disvalue of simply being alive, even when such disvalue is not in most 
of moments directly lived, but constantly concealed by strong and not rationally 
guided mechanisms of survival.  
 
Ultimately, experiences are not my last point of reference; we experience all 
kind of unreliable things (and this is maybe my deepest rupture with 
Phenomenology and Existencialism). Here we have a logical proof. That being, 
itself, can be rationally disvalued through arguments in spite of intra-worldly 
gratifications, it has no parallel with the fact the being itself could be emotionally 
reinforced and valued though “experiences”, in spite of intra-worldly misfortunes. 
So there is here a logical asymmetry, even when there can evidently be 
experiences of both things. It is impossible to consider wastage, decadence, 
decrepitude, fading and death as “gratifying”, as positive values, even though we 
can, to a certain point, “endure” them. Each and every gratification is always intra-
worldly. From the ethical-rational point of view, there would only have sense in 
coming into existence if there was in it a worldly-structural gratification that could 
be logically demonstrated, and not only lived through arduous mechanisms of 
concealment under the form of supporting feelings and experiences.  
 
(In the previous argumentation, I was not interested on discussing with Hare 
in the level of the concrete “bioethical” issues he considers, for example, abortion, 
but about issues of fundamental character. I mean that what was here argued goes 
on the direction of a minimalist ethics of abstention. An argumentative line that 
defends abstention does not necessarily also save abortion. In general, an ethics 
of abstention does not justify, of course, crime. Abstaining does not have the same 
logical structure as making-not-be. It is then possible that a negative ethics is anti-











 In his book Better never to have been (Oxford, 2006), David Benatar claims 
that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that procreation is 
ethically problematic, that‟s to say, the two theses sustained in the present book, 
published in Spanish in 1996. Benatar is not therefore an affirmative thinker, but I 
pretend to show that his purely empirical method is not sufficient to support a 
sound pessimistic position in regard to a negative ethics.  
 
  He presents his basic arguments on Chapters 2 and 3 of his book. The line of 
argument of Chapter 2 can be considered as formal, while that of Chapter 3 
develops a material-type line. In this work, I present logical and methodological 
objections for both lines of argument. Furthermore, I discuss Benatar‟s assumption 




(a) Two notions of “possible being”. 
   
In his introduction, Benatar formulates an asymmetry which he considers to 
be crucial to the formal argumentation; the asymmetry goes this way:  
 
 "Both good and bad things happen to those who exist. However, there is a 
crucial asymmetry between the good and the bad things. The absence of bad 
things, such as pain, is good even if there is nobody to enjoy that good, whereas 
the absence of good things, such as pleasure, is bad only if there is somebody who 
is deprived of these good things. The implication of this is that the avoidance of the 
bad by never existing is a real advantage over existence, whereas the loss of 
certain goods by not existing is not a real disadvantage over never existing". 
(Better never to have been, p. 14).  
 
He starts his argumentation from two axioms: “(1) The presence of pain is 
bad” and: (2) “The presence of pleasure is good” (p. 30), two statements 
apparently well-established. At the level of presence of these things, there seems 
to be total draw. The differences appear in the level of absences. The relevant 
assertions are the following: “(3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is 
not enjoyed by anyone” and: “(4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is 
somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation” (p. 30) 
 
 According to the author, to understand this asymmetry between 
absences one should adopt the perspective of potential interests of a "possible 
being" within a counterfactual account. Given the crucial importance of this text for 
my purposes, I quote it in full:  
 
 "... (3) can say something about the counterfactual case in which a person 
who does actually exist never did exist. Of the pain of an existing person, (3) says 
that the absence of this pain would have been good even if this could be achieved 




"Claim (3) says that this absence is good when judged in terms of the 
interests of the person who would otherwise have existed. We may not know who 
that person would have been, but we can still say that whoever that person would 
have been, the avoidance of his or her pain is good when judged in terms of his or 
her potential interests. (...) Clearly (3) does not entail the absurd literal claim that 
there is some actual person for whom the absent pain is good ". (p. 31).  
 
To show that (3) is not an "incoherent" statement, Benatar shows it as a 
statement "with reference to the (potential) interests of a person who either does or 
does not exist" (p. 30). As he concedes, one could make a consideration of (4) 
essentially identical to that made in (3):  
 
"One could (logically) make symmetrical claims about the absence of 
pleasure – that, when judged in terms of the (potential) interests of a person who 
does or does not exist, the absence of pleasure is bad”. (p. 31, note 23) 
 
All this line of thought is viable if we keep the same concept of "possible 
being" as counterfactually represented. So, we could paraphrase, for example, the 
statement at the beginning of page 31 in the following way: "Of the pleasure of an 
existing person, (4) says that the absence of this pleasure would have been bad 
even if this could only have been achieved by the absence of the person who now 
enjoys it”. And the paraphrase may continue this way: “Claim (4) says that this 
absence is bad when judged in terms of the interests of the person who would 
otherwise have existed. We may not know who that person would have been, but 
we can still say that whoever that person would have been, the avoidance of his or 
her pleasures is bad when judged in terms of his or her potential interests". Just as 
in the case of the absence of pain, this does not imply the absurdity of saying that 
there is really a person to whom the absence of pleasure is bad. That is, if we use 
the same notion of "possible being" (the counterfactual notion) in the two cases 
(absence of pain, absence of pleasure), there is no asymmetry at all.  
 
But immediately in the same footnote (p. 31) Benatar adds: “However, (4) 
suggests that this symmetrical claim, although logically possible, is actually false". 
This suggests that the asymmetry cannot be obtained only by means of the formal 
argumentation, but it rather needs the material elements from the other line of 
argument, even though Benatar explicitly defends the independence between the 
two lines (for example, in pp. 14 and 93/4. See last section of the present text). But 
from the strict formal point of view, everything seems to "draw". On that footnote, 
Benatar concedes that the only thing his consideration showed so far is that (3) "is 
not incoherent". But neither it is “incoherent", from a strictly logical point of view, to 
say that the absence of pleasure is bad even when this damage is not suffered by 
anyone. This may be challenged by false or inadequate, but not by “incoherent”; 
so, the not incoherence is not a decisive argument in favor of (3).  
 
 If the counterfactual conception of a "possible being" is used in the same 
way when assessing the absence of pleasure and the absence of pain, the alleged 
asymmetry would not follow. What is happening here is that in certain moments of 
his argumentation, Benatar uses a different notion of "possible being", a concept 
that could be called "empty", according to which a "possible being" would be the 
one that simply is not present in the world and neither is counterfactually 
represented. Clearly, these two concepts are incompatible: when using the 
counterfactual conception, it is irrelevant that the being is not present in the world, 
since he/she is counterfactually represented; and when using the empty 
conception, it is irrelevant making considerations of any kind about the possible 
being because, in this conception, there is no such a being at all. Benatar allows 
the “counterfactual conception” of a possible being when dealing with the absence 
of pain, but he imposes the “empty conception” when dealing with the absence of 
pleasure.  
 
 Ideally, someone could say (using the empty conception) that for the 
absence of pain to be good, there has to be someone for whom this absence is 
enjoyable, and (using the counterfactual notion) that the absence of pleasure is 
bad even when there is nobody to suffer from it. If the "possible being" is conceived 
in (3) in the empty conception, the absence of pain would not be good (or bad), 
and if the "possible being" is conceived in (4) in the counterfactual conception, the 
absence of pleasure would not be not bad, but bad. This would be establishing the 
asymmetry of the way around of Benatar, and with the same drawbacks. In fact, to 
stay within the logical requirements, it would be right using both for the absence of 
pleasure and the absence of pain, the same conception of "possible being" 
whatever it is (counterfactual or empty). What is illegitimate is to mix them within 
the same line of reasoning.  
 
 Therefore, the argumentation in favor of asymmetry is imperfect because it 
applies unilaterally a procedure that is based on a fallacy of equivocation in the 
meaning of the term "possible being". The equivocation is best viewed if we put the 
words "for a possible person" after "the absence of pain is good" in (3) and after 
"the absence of pleasure is not bad" in (4) (p. 30). I maintain that the expression 




(b) Weakness of the “support asymmetries” 
   
 To strengthen his position, Benatar tries to provide indirect evidence or 
"supports" in favor of the alleged asymmetry between (3) and (4): for example, that 
it has significant "explanatory power" in the explanation of other asymmetries 
usually endorsed, such as that there is a duty to avoid bringing into existence 
people who suffer, but there is no duty to bring into existence people who enjoy (p. 
32-33), that procreating is not a moral duty (people without children are not 
considered immoral); that while it is strange to declare that giving rise to someone 
to benefit him/her, it is not strange to declare that one does not give rise to 
someone to free him/her from suffering (34); that by adopting the point of view of 
the possible being, we can only regret for having brought somebody into existence 
and not for not bringing him/her (34-35) and, finally, that on uninhabited land, we 
do not regret that no one lives happily on them, while we regret of land inhabited by 
unhappy people (p. 35).  
 
 Regarding the first support asymmetry, one can argue, first, that the 
symmetry in this case can be restored just by the same procedure applied in the 
first case. One can paraphrase, for example, the statement on the beginning of 
page. 32 by saying, “...the reason why we think that there is a duty to bring happy 
people into existence is that the presence of this pleasure would be good (for the 
enjoyers) and the absence of pleasure is bad (even though there is nobody to 
suffer the absence of pleasure)”.  Here, we simply allow that the absence of 
pleasure is assessed according to the potential concerns of the person (using the 
“counterfactual conception” of possible person): if counterfactually represented, 
there is someone who is harmed by the absence of pleasure.  On the other hand, 
we could say in strict symmetry: “In contrast to this, we think that there is not a duty 
not to bring suffering people into existence because while their pain would be bad 
for them, its absence would not be good for them (given that there would be 
nobody who would be benefited from it)”. Here, we allow that the absence of pain 
is assessed according to a non-represented being (the “empty conception”):  if 
there is no real being, no one can be "benefited".   
 
Secondly, it seems wrong to claim that there is not, in our societies, a duty 
to procreate, if understood as a moral duty. Indeed, the moral character of an 
obligation is seen in the actual attitudes and behaviors of a group, rather than in 
effective punishment mechanisms (with which the obligation would cease to be 
moral to become legal). In the case of procreation, the moral character of its 
obligation is clearly seen in the following evidence: (1) There is social pressure for 
people to have children, pressure that can become intense, embarrassing and 
even threatening (e.g., generating suspicion of homosexuality, perversion, bad 
character, etc. on those who do not procreate), (2) There are incentives and social 
benefits for those with children, which shows that, in the impossibility of having a 
law enforcing reproduction, mechanisms are established for non reproductive 
people not to enjoy these benefits, (3) Within the prevailing view, life is regarded as 
something very valuable, and therefore, it is ethically correct to have children, and 
the contrary position is considered "selfish", especially if the person enjoys “a good 
quality of life”. This leads to the idea that there is a moral obligation to procreate, 
and if a certain tolerance exists this is something typical of a requirement of moral 
type, since there are no effective constraints to force people to reproduce.  
   For all this, it does not seem that this new "asymmetry" is in good condition 
to provide plausible "support" for the first one. And the others are even weaker: the 
notion of "stranger" is dubious, subjective and socially relative, but even 
considering the term as it usually works, it is false that it is "strange" that people 
justify having children in terms of the benefits they cause them, and many people 
even accept that this should lead to try to have as many children as possible. Only 
when we refer to children who will be born very sick, it is not "strange" to say that 
we avoid having them for their own sake. On the contrary, it would sound very 
"strange" in our society to say that we will not have children to avoid them from the 
hardships of life, when there is not a specific disease or impairment.  
 
 Following with the other "support asymmetries" considered plausible, of 
course one can regret for the children‟s sake the fact that they were not born, 
under the very common argument that if they could give their opinion, the children 
that will be born healthy would like to live and wish that their mothers would not 
abort them (the common sense argument reproduced by Hare). In the current 
situation, the parents think they are benefiting their children by having them, and 
later the vast majority of children think that they were actually benefited. Finally, it 
is perfectly plausible that someone knows an uninhabited island and think of how 
much pleasurable this place would be if it had, for example, an amusement park; 
there is nothing "strange" in the fact that someone with this project in mind who 
could not achieve it for some reason, feels sorry for the many people who could 
enjoy it and will be without this pleasure.  
 
  I think, then, that none of these other presumed asymmetries, even though 
they may be widely endorsed by the multitude (p. 36), is stronger than the initial 
one, so that they cannot work as its "support". Nevertheless, Benatar attempts to 
extract the result that coming into existence is always a serious harm from this 
supposed asymmetry, which appears to him to be well established. To do this, he 
analyzes "scenarios" in several figures. In figure 2.1 (p. 38), there is a scenario A, 
where X already exists, and a scenario B, where X never existed. In scenario A, 
there is pleasure and pain and in scenario B, there is lack of both things. The point 
is that, according to Benatar, in scenario A, the presence of pain is bad (assertion 
1) and the presence of pleasure is good (assertion 2) for the existing being, but in 
scenario B, while the absence of pain is good (assertion 3), the absence of 
pleasure is neither good nor bad (assertion 4) for the possible being, and, in 
particular, it is not bad.  
 
The obvious reply would be saying that, symmetrically, in scenario B, since 
X does not exist, the absence of pain is good and the absence of pleasure is bad, 
but this is precisely what Benatar rejects. Because, according to him, when 
someone does not exist, the fact of not having pleasure is not bad, but we can say 
that it is good for this possible being not to suffer from pain (p. 38). When 
considering the attempts to restore symmetry, Benatar says that the one who held 
that the absence of pleasure of the possible being in scenario B is bad (as 
reflected in the figure 2.2, p. 39), would be supporting a "too strong" thesis (p. 38), 
while he considers "too weak" (p. 39) to attempt to restore symmetry saying that, in 
scenario B of the non-existent being, neither the absence of pain nor the presence 
of pleasure would be good or bad (as reflected in the figure 2.3. , p. 40).  
 
  According to my previous argumentation, I believe that both alternatives are 
perfectly correct: in figure 2.2, in both cases the possible being is considered in the 
counterfactual conception; and in figure 2.3., in both cases the possible being is 
considered in the empty conception. These two possibilities do not make the mix of 
"possible being" conceptions, and that is why the symmetry is properly preserved 
in these figures. In 2.2, the absence of pain is good and the absence of pleasure is 
bad, for a possible being that if he could choose, he would choose this way (i.e., for 
a possible being counterfactually conceived); in 2.3, both the absence of pain and 
absence of pleasure is neither good nor bad, since, in the empty conception, there 
is simply no one who suffer or enjoy, and there is no representation of their 
preferences. There is total draw.  
   Benatar coherently believes that 2.2. is "too strong" because if the absence 
of pleasure is considered bad "... we should have to regret, for X's sake, that X did 
not come into existence. But it is not regrettable "(38-39). But I have already shown 
that it may well be regretted, which shows that 2.2. is not "too strong" at all. 
Examining the other case, Benatar correctly says that in 2.3., "not bad" means "not 
bad, but not good either." "Interpreted in this way, however, it is too weak. Avoiding 
the pains of existence is more than merely „not bad‟. It is good” (p. 39). But this 
may be the case for existing people; for non-existing ones, saying that neither the 
absence of pain or pleasure are neither good nor bad is perfectly appropriate, and 




(c)  Crossing argumentation between absence/presence and existing/not-
existing dualisms. 
 
  If symmetry can always be restored in the indicated way, the pessimistic 
results of Benatar about that not existing is always preferable to existing (even in a 
life with pleasures) do not follow. He states (p. 41) that it is clear that the absence 
of pain in scenario B (where X never existed) is better than the presence of pain in 
scenario A (where X exists). But this, if I am right, has not been proven. If it is 
allowed to the possible being simply not being anything (without counterfactual 
representation), it makes no sense to say that the absence of pain in scenario B is 
better than the presence of pain in scenario A, because one possible being in this 
empty sense cannot be "benefited" from the absence of pain. On the other hand, 
Benatar argues that the absence of pleasure in scenario B is better than the 
presence of pleasure in scenario A, because nobody is deprived of anything in B. 
But I have already shown that restoring symmetry, i.e., allowing the possible being 
to be counterfactually represented, makes perfect sense to say that the absence of 
pleasure in scenario B is worse than the presence of pleasure in scenario A,  
because a possible being in this sense may be harmed by the absence of 
pleasure, in a counterfactual consideration.   
 
  All these problems arise in the application of the terms "absence of pain" 
and "absence of pleasure" to existing and to non-existing beings. It seems not 
impartial to put the comparison between scenarios A and B only en terms of a 
confrontation between presences on one side and absences on another, since 
scenario A also shows absences; scenario A is in fact a combination of presences 
and absences (both of pain and pleasure), while in scenario B, obviously, we have 
only absences. Benatar admits that these possibilities are not reflected in his 
matrix (p. 41), although they are implicit. But this point is too important as to keep it 
in the background, because it will have decisive influence at the time of the 
comparisons between scenarios A and B.  
 
When comparing the presence of pain in existing people and the absence of 
pain in non-existing people, Benatar says: "In the first comparison we see that non-
existence is preferable to existence. Non-existence has an advantage over 
existence "(pp. 40/41). But this is much less uncontroversial than it seems to be if 
we look at the difference between "absence of pain or pleasure existing" and 
"absence of pain or pleasure by not existing." Benatar attempts to support his 
assertion on the apparently indisputable fact that the absence of pain is better than 
the presence of pain, but it is not clear that the absence of pain by not existing is 
better than the presence of pain existing, due to the high price we should pay for 
not existing. If Benatar argues that it is not a high price because existing is always 
a serious harm, it is precisely this point that the asymmetry would have to 
demonstrate, and not to presume. It seems that we must already have the 
(material) proof that non-existing is better than existing to accept the absence of 
pain by not existing is always better than the presence of pain existing. Here, we 
move in a circle.  
   
In the case of absence of pleasure, Benatar states:  
 "In the second comparison...the pleasures of the existent, although good, 
are not an advantage over non-existence, because the absence of pleasures is not 
bad. For the good to be an advantage over non-existence, it would have to have 
been the case that its absence was bad". (p. 41).  
 
I have already shown to be perfectly plausible to accept this as being 
precisely the case, if we use "possible person" in the counterfactual way. Benatar‟s 
statement intends to rely on the apparently undisputed fact that the absence of not 
depriving pleasure is better than the absence of depriving pleasure, but it is not so 
obvious that the absence of not depriving pleasure due to the fact that the person 
does not exist is better than the absence of depriving pleasure when the person 
exists, and as before, he presupposes that it had already been shown that non-
existence is always better than existence, which is precisely what is in question. 
 
  Benatar makes here a mistake that he complains against the hypothetical 
opponents who object that "good" should be an advantage over "not bad" because 
the feeling of pleasure is better than a neutral state (p. 41). He complains that this 
is treating "absence of pleasure" in scenario B (of never existing people) as if it 
were similar to the "absence of pleasure" in scenario A (of existing people); but he 
does exactly the same in the case of the "absence of pain": he makes no 
difference between feeling pain existing (scenario A) and not feeling pain by not 
existing (scenario B). The presence of pain in A is worse than the absence of pain 
in A, but not necessarily worse than the absence of pain in B obtained at the price 
of not existing. In any case, it seems illegitimate and partial to compare absences 
(of anything) in absolute terms, instead of comparing absences within existence 
and absences paying the price of not existing. 
 
  To give more strength to his asymmetry, Benatar presents (p. 42) an 
analogy: we have two persons, S and H, S has a tendency to fall ill, but with ability 
to recover quickly; H does not have this ability, but this person never gets sick. 
Thus, it is bad for S to get sick and good for S to recover quickly, but while it is 
good for H never being sick, not having quick recovery is neither good nor bad for 
him. From this, it follows that the state of S is not better than the state of H, since a 
world where I can get sick and recover quickly is not better than a world where I 
never get sick. The analogy with birth seems clear. But yet in this analogy, the 
same problem identified above is present, because one can argue that H is not 
better than S, because although it is better, in scenario A, not getting sick than 
getting sick, this may not be the case if never getting sick is paid with the price of 
not existing. There is one important difference between never getting sick for not 
being born and never getting sick because I was born and have a very good 
health. This suggests that it could be better to get sick existing than never getting 
sick by simply not existing. It appears again that the asymmetry already needs the 
material thesis that not existing is better than existing, which is precisely what was 
intended to be proven by the asymmetry. 
 
  In the last chapter of his book, Benatar states that there are many problems 
for those who reject the asymmetry. One of them would be to accept that we have 
a moral reason, and perhaps a duty, to create people for them not to be deprived 
of the pleasure, or that we should regret that we do not bring people to the world or 
the fact that they do not live in a pleasant place, etc. But, as was shown, there is 
nothing wrong in these consequences from the strictly formal point of view; on the 
contrary, they seem formally compelling. On the other hand, Benatar says that 
rejecting the asymmetry would lead us to accept that we do not have good moral 
reasons, based on the interests of a possible suffering person, to prevent his or her 
birth, nor could we regret having brought him or her to existence based on these 
sufferings, nor we should want people who suffer miserably in some part of the 
world to never being born. But again, none of these consequences is wrong from 
the strict formal point of view; they just do not fit in Benatar's convictions about life. 
Benatar is convinced that this is a life of suffering and that people should not be 
born and I absolutely agree with him; but only the alleged asymmetry between 
absence of pleasure and absence of pain cannot establish these points; in fact, it 
has to presuppose them; this undermines the thesis of the independence between 
the two lines of argument. 
 
 
(d)  Benatar's material argumentation: limits of the empiricist approach 
      
  The formal argumentation tried to show that not being born does not harm 
(on the contrary, it benefits); the material argumentation will be devoted to showing 
how being born harms a lot. Within an empiricist and Utilitarian stance of the 
calculation of losses and benefits, Benatar said it would be a mistake to evaluate 
the quality of human life by a simple absolute summation: one evil for one good. 
We must understand how these goods and evils are "distributed" in existence (p. 
62), the intensity of pain and pleasure, life extension, and the fact of having lived 
experiences so bad (such as to lose body parts) that no good can compensate. It is 
a fact that all people permanently suffer from fatigue, hunger, thirst, intestinal 
malaise, thermal differences, pain, lethargy, frustration with disabilities, headaches, 
allergies, chills, stomach aches, heat flows, nausea, hyperglycemia, guilt, shame, 
boredom, sadness, depression, loneliness, dissatisfaction with their bodies and 
suffering for more serious illnesses of those we love or of ourselves (p. 71). Human 
desires are compelling and disturbing (p. 75) and human life, in a cosmic point of 
view, seems to lack any sense. Chapter 3 ends in apocalypse, talking about 
natural disasters, hunger (89), devastating diseases (90) and violence (91). The 
presence of "well-known features of human psychology" may explain the positive 
opinion that people have, in general, of their own lives: the tendency to optimism, 
the incredible ability to adapt to new circumstances, however painful, and the 
tendency to compare our lives with other‟s and coming out winning in comparison 
(p. 64 - 69).   
 
In this methodology, the poor quality of life is shown through an empirical 
assessment of evils and benefits, where these are considered as objects 
susceptible of manipulation and measurement. But experience is always open to 
new information and pondering. Benatar's pessimism is based on the world as it 
currently is, but in some moments he refers to how the world could be different. On 
page 79, he imagines a world where, in the dynamics of desires, the period 
between deprivation and fulfillment is unnecessary, so that pleasure was 
immediately obtained; and on page 84, he imagines a world in which human life 
was much longer, devoid of pain and frustration and with much greater capacity to 
acquire understanding. Benatar accuses people for not having sufficient 
imagination to conceive these worlds better than ours, but one could think that the 
opposite is happening at present: the scientific and technological imagination just 
escaped from all limits.  
 
Nowadays, it is thought, for example, in a world where medicine could, in 
the not so distant future, discover the secrecy of aging and make people simply no 
longer die from aging and start to live indefinitely, or a world where the 
replacement of deficient organs by new ones would be very simple, or where 
serious illnesses were things of the past. They talk about a genetic program of 
well-being, change of the eco-system and re-writing of the genome, seeking for a 
world full of unprecedented benefits, which would greatly compensate the still 
remaining damages. In this view, Homo Sapiens would be the only species able to 
free the world from suffering, so that it is vital that humans can survive on earth. 
Benatar could accuse the authors of these ideas of anything but of "lack of 
imagination." According to them, it would be rational and ethical continuing to 
generate people in a world still bad, but with good perspectives for improvement 
even if it is the result of a mammoth task that still takes many generations. I do not 
see how merely empiricist and Utilitarian methodologies can deal successfully with 
this type of objection.  
 
 In the context of Benatar‟s material argumentation, we find some mixture of 
these Utilitarian strategies and quotes from Schopenhauer that is supposed to 
"illustrate" them. But this is curious because the Schopenhauer‟s method of inquiry 
has nothing to do with the Utilitarian method.  Schopenhauer attempts to show the 
poor quality of life through a consideration of a structural nature: humans are 
endowed of mortality since their birth, of a tremendous anxiety of affirmation in life, 
and of a brain big enough to clearly see their tragedy. Their suffering is therefore 
unavoidable, and not due to mere empirical reasons. (Schopenhauer (2005), Part 
IV, sections 56 to 59). Suffering, for Schopenhauer, in the form of pain, boredom, 
and moral failure, is not a mere empirical fact, but a necessary feature of 
existence. (Even attenuating his own pessimism, Schopenhauer states that, 
precisely, this inevitable and necessary feature of suffering should give relief to 
humans because their condition would be even worse if the pain was something 
contingent that could somehow have been avoided.  See Schopenhauer (2005), 
Book IV, section 57, p. 411). Benatar employs Utilitarian calculus to get his results, 
based on the mere predominance of evils on goods, but on the other, he 
celebrates Schopenhauer, whose pessimism is based on the problematic character 
of the structural origins of life, and not on the mere empirical calculation of “gains 
and losses”.  
 
The odd thing is that the structural elements are not absent in the book of 
Benatar, but mixed with the Utilitarian resources. For example, every time he 
alludes to death and disease, or to the insatiable desiring mechanisms (p. 74), he 
is actually pointing to structural elements of life that should not be put to the same 
level as allergies, headaches or injustice; there may be lives without them, but they 
are all decaying and terminal. But the moment where Benatar best visualizes the 
structure of human life is the last chapter, when trying to resolve the apparent 
paradox that, being birth bad, death must also be considered bad. For the 
philosophical common sense argues as follows: since being born was bad, to die 
must be good. Benatar answers to this question in an appropriate way, but in doing 
so, he clearly shows the mix of empirical and structural methodologies that I am 
trying to put in evidence:  
 
  “...it is because we (usually) have an interest in continuing to exist that 
death may be thought of as a harm, even though coming into existence is also a 
harm. Indeed, the harm of death may partially explain why coming into existence is 
a harm. Coming into existence is bad in part because it invariably leads to the 
harm of ceasing to exist” (p. 213).  
 
Here, Benatar finds out that being born mortally and dying punctually (some 
day) are just aspects of one and the same process: being born mortal is already 
starting to die, and that is why both issues are bad, because they are intrinsically 
connected. The use of structural elements by Benatar is quite curious, because, on 
the one hand, he openly acknowledges the "unavoidable" and "endemic" character 
of pain in Schopenhauer‟s philosophy of life (pp. 76-77), without seeing that this 
contradicts the idea that there is nothing "necessary" in the harm of coming into 
existence (p. 29).  
 
 The structural point of view of Schopenhauer, I think (which I adopted in the 
present book myself), is better equipped to meet the objections of meliorists such 
as Doyal, who believes in the "brave new world": the crucial problem would not be 
in changing worlds, but purely and simply in becoming one world (any world); the 
mortality of emergence of a world will continue to exist in this world without disease 
or aging, for when the technical procedures to obtain these benefits were available 
they will block the birth of new generations, not mentioning the many social, 
political and economic conflicts that these scientific advantages will bring. 
Therefore, if the material argumentation is convincing, it will be for the structural 




(e) On the alleged independence between formal and material 
argumentation.  
 
 At various moments in his book, Benatar states that the two lines of 
argument, formal and material, are independent:  
  “The arguments in the third chapter thus provide independent grounds even 
for those who are not persuaded by the arguments in the second chapter to accept 




“There is more than one way to reach this conclusion. Those who reject the 
arguments in Chapter 2 that coming into existence is always a harm may 
nonetheless be persuaded by the arguments in Chapter 3 that our lives are 
actually very bad” (p. 93 / 4).  
 
At the beginning of Chapter 3, the author insists that evidence independent 
from asymmetry will be provided (p. 61), as a "continuation" of the arguments of 
Chapter 2, where nothing was said about the magnitude of the harm imposed to 
those who are born. With this, it is assumed that the issue has already been well 
established, and in Chapter 3 we will see only how serious the situation really is. 
This suggests that what is really important has already been shown by the formal 
demonstration, and that arguments of  Chapter 3 could, ultimately, be exempted 
(having been proven that life is bad, maybe it is just emphatic showing that it is 
very bad).  
 
I hold the exact opposite is the case: while I agree with Benatar that the 
material arguments do not need the formal ones (based on the supposed 
asymmetry), the inverse situation seems not to be the case: the formal arguments 
need the material arguments. This dependence appears for the first time when, just 
before asymmetry is presented, Benatar uses several lines (from page 32) on 
issues of material type ("As a matter of fact, bad things happen to all of us", "No life 
is without hardship”, etc.), and to face the well-known optimistic objection that "also 
good things happen to those who exist," he presents the asymmetry. But my 
previous arguments, if correct, show that the formal line is not able to show alone 
that failing to procreate does not harm (and that, to the contrary, it benefits), or that 
not existing is always better than existing. Precisely, because in the purely formal 
level, symmetries are restored, the material elements are required to decide the 
issue in favor of the pessimistic view.  
 
Indeed, after knowing the material evidence that human life is very bad 
because we are constantly disturbed by unpleasantness, devoured by insatiable 
desires and shaken by the meaninglessness of life, we can accept that not feeling 
pain by not existing is better than feeling pain existing, because we now know that 
existing is very bad: if not to feel pain we have to pay the price of not existing, we 
know now that this price is not too high. On the other hand, we can also accept that 
not depriving pleasure by not existing is better than depriving pleasure existing, for 
now we know that existing is very bad: if to feel pleasure, we have to pay the price 
of existing, now we know this price is too high. But this makes the material 
evidence much more important than it was, and especially than Benatar himself 
thought it was, no longer considering it as mere "continuation” or supplement of 
something that would have been proven before.  
 
  I think this evidence of the dependence of formal arguments over the 
material ones suggests that perhaps it would have been better for Benatar‟s 
argumentative procedure, to reverse the order of the chapters, i.e., to quickly 
dispose of material evidence about the poor quality of human life to go better 
equipped to the formal line. However, given this situation, one could maintain 
something much stronger: not that the order of the chapters should be reversed, 
but that all the formal argumentation could be dispensed with. Given the 
dependence of formal argumentation over the material one, the many problems of 
formal argumentation and the great power of the material line (especially if 
improved with a clear explanation of the structural elements), one could simply 
dismiss the arguments of Chapter 2 and support the demonstration of the main 
theses of the book (that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that 
procreation is ethically problematic) only on the material arguments, without having 

























SUMMARY OF THE ETHICAL QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE APPROACH 
 
 
Steps towards Negative Ethics 
 
1. Throughout the history (of philosophy and of humankind) an intrinsic positive 
value has been given to human life. Because human life has this intrinsic 
positive value, procreating is good (or more: it is the most sacred and 
sublime moral value) and committing suicide is bad (or more: it is the worst, 
the greatest moral sin). 
 
2. With intrinsic value I mean: whether life has a metaphysical value (as in 
Christianity) or it has a practical value (as in Kant‟s ethics); in any case, 
there is a basic value, which makes human life inviolable. Ethics, in this 
tradition, is understood as an activity aiming to determine how-to-live a life 
ultimately guided by that supreme, basic value, intrinsic to human life. 
 
3. Negative ethics starts with a negative ontology that presents life as having 
an intrinsic value, but negative. Therefore, it primarily denies Agnosticism, 
the idea that in life there is good and bad things, and that neither a positive 
nor a negative value can be derived. Nevertheless, it is the very being of life 
that is bad, not in the sense of a metaphysical evil, but in the sense of a 
sensitive and moral uneasiness.   
 
4. The very being of human life is a terminal structure that starts to end from 
the beginning, and that causes uneasiness in the sensitive level, through the 
phenomena of pain and boredom, and in the moral level, through the 
phenomena of moral disqualification. We are thrown into a body always 
subjected to disease, in fast process of aging, decline and final 
decomposition, in obligatory neighborhood with others in the same situation, 
what leaves little space for mutual moral consideration.  
 
5. Positive values do exist, but they are all of the order of beings (and not of 
the order of Being) and they are all of a vindictive character, or reactive to 
the structural uneasiness of Being; moreover, they pay high ontological 
prices (when a value is created, new disvalues are also, new conditions for 
non-consideration to other people). Positive values are thus, inevitably intra-
worldly, reactive and onerous.  
 
6. Ethical theories have regularly supposed that it is possible to live an ethical 
life. Negative ethics states that an ethical life is possible only in the level of 
intra-worldly ethical values, reactive and onerous, within the structural 
uneasiness. Negative ontology (which is a naturalized ontology, to the 
extent that the characteristics of being are basically those of nature) 
replaces, therefore, the rationalist affirmative ontology of tradition, in the 
light of which all European ethical theories we know were built.  
 
7. Specifically, attending particular ethical theories, humans are unable of 
being virtuous (Aristotle), or of observing the categorical imperative (Kant) or 
of fighting for the happiness of the majority (Mill); when we face the whole 
context, we are aware of not being ethical in the terms of any of those 
theories. To avoid having to go into the nuances of each ethical theory, we 
can understand that all of them demand, at least, the consideration of other 
people‟s interests, the non-manipulation and the non-damage (we call this 
FEA, fundamental ethical articulation). Negative ethics shows that people 
regularly violate FEA, what is called moral disqualification.  
 
8. In this level, negative ethics simply shows that, when the usual and current 
affirmative categories are seriously taken into consideration, the result is 
that all human actions are morally disqualified at some point, in some 
respect, at some moment or situation of its performance or compliance. This 
is important because it is not the case that “negative” categories lead to 
these results, but affirmative ones, when radicalized, do the job. This 
suggests that all European ethical theories we know perform an internal 
differentiation within general moral disqualification, declaring to be “moral” 
some disqualified actions, and disqualifying others in a sort of second order 
disqualification. 
 
9. But why do we have the strong impression that ethics exists and that we can 
be moral agents? When ethics talk about happiness, virtue or duty, when 
they accept the difference between good and bad people, they are 
concealing the structural disvalue of the being of human life as such, 
forgetting the intra-wordly, reactive and onerous character of positive 
values. Actually, we are all morally disqualified; disrespectful people do not 
constitute a small group of exceptions. All ethical theories that we know are 
“second degree ethics”, concealing, through all sort of mechanisms, the 
structural disvalue of human life, the moral disqualification and the situated 
and partial character of all positive value. (The usual ethics are built within 
the framework of a radical ethical impossibility).  
 
10. The fundamental deforming factor in ethics is the persistent belief that life is 
something good, that some people are good because they follow the norm 
of life, and other (few, exceptional) are bad for transgressing it; without 
seeing that goodness is built inside a fundamental evil, in a concealing and 
never gratuitous way (paying prices). The impossibility of ethics is hidden in 
everyday life, and also in the prevailing affirmative philosophical thinking, 
guided by the ideas of the positive value of life and of the exceptional nature 
of “evil”.  
 
11. As a corollary of this new view of things, procreation can be seen as an act 
morally problematic and, in many cases, simply irresponsible, since it 
consists in putting a being into existence knowing he or she will be placed in 
a terminal situation (in a terminal body), in constant friction and corruptible 
(sensitively and morally) structure, where the positive values will always be 
reactive and will pay high ethical and sensitive prices. Even the ontically 
responsible procreations are morally problematic, because the most one 
can offer to children is the capability of defending themselves against the 
terminal structure of being, in a scope of necessary disrespect of others in 
some degree. Besides giving them a structural disvalue, this is done in self 
benefit and in a clear exercise of manipulation of the other, using him or her 
as a means. 
 
12. Another important corollary is that suicide, far from being, in this 
perspective, the more horrible moral sin, it turns into an act that has better 
chances of being moral than many others, to the extent it empties the 
spaces of struggle against other people. Even though it may also damages, 
it does so not differently than the rest of human acts; the suicidal act is as 
reactive and onerous as the other acts, and maybe less (since it is about a 
sort of self-sacrifice, of stopping to defend oneself with no restrictions); and 
it is, certainly, the last disrespectful act. After all, we can cause more 
damage staying than we do leaving. (In any case from the sole disvalue of 
being of human life does not emerge suicide as a necessity, but merely as a 
possibility: each one of us will have to decide whether to continue or not 
struggling against the disvalue of being until our final defeat) 
 
13. Pain, boredom and moral disqualification are permanent and structural 
motives for abstaining of procreating and for suicide, independent from 
specific motivations.  
 
14. The disvalue of the very being of human life is what cannot be accepted or 
assumed; something that will be currently concealed until the end, because 
the basic value of human life is seen as what sustains all the rest. Life 
continues due to a powerful vital impulse, immoral and irrational. The 
arguments do not affect this value; it overruns all arguments, even the better 
ones. Humans stay alive and procreating not because life is intrinsically 
valuable, but because they are compelled to live even in the worst 
conditions. It is a mere “value of adhesion” (with something as a “value of 
resistance”, of competitive nature). Etwas Animalisches.  
 
15. Philosophers and people in general should understand that what they call 
“value of human life” is not value of human life in its being, but they are 
pointing to the values which humans are compelled to create precisely 
because life, in its being, is not good. (We do not need to give value to 
something already valuable). Our defensive and vindicatory actions try to 
make life something good (or at least tolerable), and these actions are 
confused with the being of life itself. Human life is, in any case, a 
conjunction of structural disvalue and positive intra-worldly invented values. 
And the persistent tendency is to take the seconds as if they were 
refutations of the first. (I call this the “fallacy of the way back”). But the 
existence of positive values is not the refutation of the disvalue of the being 
of life, but, on the contrary, its powerful confirmation: the worse are the 
rigors of being the more intense and dazzling are valuing intra-worldly 
inventions.   
 
 
Recent ideas on suicide 
 
I heard once a mother saying: “I gave him life; if he does not like it, he can 
commit suicide”. But this is a morally dubious statement because abstention seems 
to be much easier than suicide. On the contrary of what many people think and 
say, committing suicide is, at present at least, a very difficult enterprise. 
Committing suicide faces several problems, technical, practical, juridical, etc. But 
mentioning just the moral difficulties, the first thing to say is that suicide will violate 
FEA, as any other human act. Therein, the most one can do in the track of a quest 
for the morality of suicide will be trying to describe some characteristics of the final 
act that do not make it more immoral than many other human acts, or that can 
make it more moral than other human acts. My specific points are as follows:  
 
(a) The thesis of moral disqualification condemns suicide not specifically as 
suicide, but as a human act whatever. Therefore, in negative ethics, there is not a 
specific moral condemnation of suicide; suicide is morally disqualified as any other 
human act, in the sense that no human act can be beneficial to all people at the 
same time; they cause damages to someone, regardless how well intentioned they 
may be. The immorality of suicide is stressed, in the affirmative contexts, because 
the radical fact of moral disqualification is not recognized (due mostly to the 
ignorance of the negative ontology, and because of the metaphysical conception 
on human being in vigor).  
 
(b) On the other hand, as it can be observed, the suicidal act does not damage in a 
peculiar way: through powerful psychological and biological mechanisms, people 
tend to accept and continue living after the death (suicidal or not) of their loved 
ones. It is true that there are people who never recover from the suicide of a loved 
one, but it is also true that there are people who never recover from the homicide 
of a loved one. There is nothing in suicide that makes it especially traumatizing to 
all humans. To the contrary, there are people who can feel relieved when they 
know that a loved one decided to die, instead of watching him slowly languishing in 
a “natural death”.  
 
(c) The thesis that suicide would be an act particularly immoral, the worst of all, is 
based on some metaphysical or religious thesis connected to points of reference 
nowadays in crisis or abandoned. If the negative ontology is accepted, there is a 
permanent structural motive to killing oneself (the negative structure of the being of 
life and the reactive character of positive values, finally defeated); and therefore it 
is absurd the question of psychologists and sociologists about the motives of the 
suicide, as well as the transformation of suicide into “enigma”; in the light of 
negative ontology, the true enigma is how human beings keep living after all. But 
we still have to find the moral motives to suicide, because killing us just to run 
away from the negative structure of being is not, per se, morally justified.  
 
(d) There is a first aspect of the suicidal act that seems to clearly put it in the 
direction of morality: the suicidal manages to challenge the natural (and social) 
powerful impulse of staying alive without conditions and in any circumstance; it 
seems that all morality has as necessary condition (although not sufficient!) the 
capability of overcoming this natural tendency. But of course one can have this 
capability without the suicide being moral: for it to be, the overcoming of the natural 
(and social) resistances of staying alive must have a moral motivation. However, 
the fact that suicide complies with this necessary condition seems to put it in 
advantage with regards to all those human actions of continuing to live at any cost 
and with no conditions.  
 
(e) My idea of formal suicide resides in that killing oneself is morally justified when 
the negative (terminal) structure of the being of life totally strangles, or is about to 
strangle, the possibilities of living a life of moral consideration to the others. If 
human life is, in its structure, the search for equilibrium – always unstable - 
between the terminal structure of being and the intra-worldly invention of values, it 
seems to be morally justified the suicide performed when the spaces of this 
invention were or are about to be totally closed. The general pattern of moral 
justification of suicide is as follows: “It is morally justified to stop living in all 
situations where the intra-worldly creation of values has literally (or predictably) 
been blocked by the advance of the terminality of the being of life in its natural and 
social deployments”. Of course this pattern does not order every person who is in 
this situation to commit suicide; it just says that those ones who do it does not 
commit an immoral act (besides the inevitable break of the FEA which affects 
every human act); those who do not do it, may have merit, but it cannot be 
ordered.  
 
 This pattern shall morally justify the suicides of Seneca and Walter 
Benjamin, committed for motives of social strangling of possibilities, and the ones 
of Arthur Koestler and Mário Monicelli, who killed themselves to run away from 
incurable illness. This pattern leaves aside, in principle, a huge amount of suicides 
without the support of moral justification (but there may be other kinds of 
justifications). For example: suicides that include homicides, aggressive suicides, 
revenge suicides, suicides for protest, performatic suicides, proud suicides, 
suicides for lack of success (or for excess of recognition!), suicides for love 
(Werther), suicides for competition (Russian roulette), and even the “altruistic 
suicides”. 
 
 This is what makes me reject every other kind of suicide as being moral, if 
they are committed in “wide spaces”, that is, without being cornered by the 
terminality of being, regardless how “altruistic” its motives may be. The only thing 
that can justify suicide is that it was committed in an extreme case, under risk of 
not having any ethical life left. This justification is out of reach for the “altruistic 
suicidal”, to the extent he or she has spaces (or “freedom”) to keep living morally, 
difficulties notwithstanding. One should evaluate the moral onus (the inevitable 
moral disqualifications) of continuing alive and those of killing oneself: the balance, 
in formal suicide, is clearly favorable to self-suppression (because there are no 
way out); in the case of the altruistic suicide, by contrast, it is not excluded the 
possibility that continuing to live is more moral – concerning the others - than the 
pretense “sacrifice” of the martyr (letting aside the many genealogical inconvenient 
of the altruistic acts already captured by Nietzsche).  
  
(h) The suicidal pattern could be broadened if two conditions are satisfied: (h.1) 
Understanding “or predictably” in the formulation of the matrix in a very wide way. 
That is: the strangling of possibilities may not be literal, but it can point to a 
situation leading inevitably to strangling. This is clear in the case of a person who 
has been diagnosed with a degenerative disease and who wants to die before its 
final consummation; however, a suicidal for political protest could claim that, in 
staying alive, sooner or later the strangling of possibilities would arrive (through 
ideological censure, political repression, police violation, etc). (h.2) Granting to 
people a high level of reliability to judge over the strangled character or not of their 
possibilities of moral life (recognizing to young Werther the right of saying: “Without 
my loved Carlota, I would not be able to live a moral life”). If h1 and h2 are 
complied, the pattern could justify many other suicides or all suicides perhaps. I, 
personally, do not find this line reasonable, for the same previous motive: when the 
strangling is not literal or almost literal, nothing prevents that continuing to live can 





ON THE UNLIMITED SAYING YES (FOR AND AGAINST NIETZSCHE) 
 
1. “At that time I understood my instinct wanted to do all the contrary of what 
had intended Schopenhauer‟s instinct: coming to a justification of life, even to what 
is most terrible, doubtful and deceptive in it…”(Will to power, aphorism 1005; my 
translation from Portuguese). 
 
When affirmative philosophers encounter “nihilism” – the rational and moral 
condemnation of life, the radical disvaluing of life – they usually consider that 
attitude as an error, as a mistake that should be cured by some kind of 
methodology, the transcendental analysis (Kant) or even the analysis of language 
(Wittgenstein). This way, life is never defended on behalf of its own “value”: in 
order to struggle against the radical questioning of life, the “nihilistic” enemy is tried 
to be situated in the place of non-truth and non-morality, in the place of the 
monstrous. Nietzsche‟s originality consisted in conceding to “nihilism” both truth 
and morality, and the great merit of Schopenhauer consisted of having taken the 
necessary conflict between life and truth to its extreme point, so the defense of life 
for its own merits can finally be assumed, something never dared before, not even 
by the great affirmative philosophers (even for them, life itself was indefensible).  
 
In this case, life does not send “emissaries” or “representatives” in the fight 
against “nihilism”, but life decides to personally act in its own defense, a defense of 
life itself and not of “the duty to preserve it” or the fictions that make it endurable. If 
philosophy must lead necessarily and unavoidably – according to the direction 
taken since Plato to Schopenhauer – to the radical disvaluing of life, the answer 
will not consist of showing philosophy is “mistaken”, but showing life can reply not 
less radically by disvaluing the philosophy that disvalues life. By being denied, life 
denies, but not in the sense of considering nihilistic philosophy false, but in the 
sense of showing that any denial of life obtains its own legitimacy – the vital force 
of the  denial – precisely from what it intends to deny, regardless the mere “truth” of 
its actual statements. 
 
The application of the usual set of philosophical categories – being, 
conscience, reality, unity, end, etc. – must inevitably produce, when applied to life, 
its radical disvaluing. “The fundamental error consists precisely that, instead of 
comprehending conscience as a tool and as a particularity of the totality of life, we 
put conscience as a criterion of life, as a supreme state of the value of life: this is 
the mistaken perspective of a parte ad totum…” (Will to power, aphorism 707). 
Many philosophers have sustained that what the “nihilistic” says against life “was 
not properly legitimated”; but when situating such lack of legitimacy in terms of 
“false” or “nonsense”, they will keep concealing the very nature of philosophy. 
Nietzsche tries to show the illegitimacy of the philosophical discourse about life is 
indicated precisely by the strict, rigorous and irrefutable truth of its nihilistic 
statements.  
 
Assuming this posture is fundamental in order to subject the philosophical 
discourse to a kind of test of legitimacy or illegitimacy as a language about life, 
because if “nihilism” is declared to be “false” or “nonsense”, philosophy, once 
more, runs away from a necessary confrontation with itself, beyond its automatic 
self-laudatory discourse as “disinterested search for truth”. The most interesting of 
this Nietzschean “terminal argument” – in contrast to the “existential” readings of 
this Nietzsche today unfortunately à la mode – is the fact it is much more a 
methodological-linguistic argument than an “existential” or “vital” one, in the sense 
of pointing the inadequacy of the traditional set of philosophical categories when 
someone intends to inadequately apply them out of their proper field of application. 
 
 
2. It is usually insisted a lot in the “fragmentary” character of Nietzsche‟s 
thinking, connecting it to the aphoristic form of exposition and his difficulties of 
systematization. However, not all that is written aphoristically is, per se, 
fragmentary reflection. Fragmentation of thinking is not only a question of style. 
There is, in Nietzsche‟s work, a non fragmentary thinking about the relations 
between life and truth, an issue with which he has been concerned since the early 
opuscule Truth and lie in extra-normal sense, to the last notes of Will to power, in a 
suggestively uniform sense and even when aphorism is not employed. The 
development of this issue can be studied, as it seems, in three fundamental 
stages: in the first one, Nietzsche denounces the confusion of truth with what helps 
living; in the second, he invites to see life as fundamentally fake; in the third he 
denounces the nihilism of truth. (These stages are not strictly historical, nor point to 
an effective sequence given in the peculiar narrative of Nietzsche‟s writings). 
 
First stage. In Human, all too human I, Nietzsche refers to “the bad habits of 
inferring” like: “An opinion provides happiness, so it is true; its effect is good, so the 
opinion itself is good and true…” (aphorism 30), which leads to the temptation of 
making the opposite inferences, equally mistaken: “… an opinion causes pity, 
uneasy, so it is true”. “The pleasant opinion is admitted as true: this is the proof of 
pleasure (or, as said the Church, the proof of force), which all religions are so 
proud of, when they should actually be ashamed.” (Idem, aphorism 120). “Nothing 
is proved against the truth of a plant when this plant is proved not to contribute in 
anything for the healing of sick people…Therefore science provides so little 
genuine happiness to whom recriminates science for its coldness, its dry character, 
its inhumanity…” (Aurora, aphorism 424) (See also The Gay Science, aphorisms 
121 and 347). 
 
The most “compact” text about this issue is undoubtedly the first section of 
Beyond good and evil, named “Prejudices of philosophers”. However, the most 
ironic denounce of the confusion between truth and what helps living is in another 
part of this same book, when Nietzsche refers to the philosophers of the future, 
and specifically to the ones of the 20th century! (Is it possible to imagine the 
enormous deception he would have when meeting Habermas and Hare?): “They 
will be stronger, rougher…than humanitarian people would like; they would not 
establish relations with „truth‟ because truth „pleases‟ or „elevates‟ or „excites‟ them; 
on the contrary, the belief that precisely truth could provide such pleasures to 
sentiment will be sober in them. Such rigorous spirits will smile when someone tells 
them: „this thought elevates me; how could it not be true?‟ Or: „This work delights 
me; how could it not be beautiful?‟” (Beyond good and evil, aphorism 210)  
 
This first stage denounces completely usual affirmative mechanisms of 
thought, as the persistent attempt to put truth beside life, as if the movement of life 
had to always follow what humans consider true and virtuous. But such 
coincidence could only be magical. Truth and virtue are criticized by Nietzsche as 
anthropomorphic categories. When life is not coercively obliged to be embedded 
into “truth”, the truths humans of science (psychologist, physiologist) discuss 
should be frightening and unbearable. But no one has ever seen a philosopher 
being annihilated by his own “truths”; on the contrary, it seems the “truths” he finds 
keep providing him a certain conceptual functionalized comfort. Science, in 
opposition, does not console. “Nor the gods of Greece knew how to console, and 
when Greek society got ill, those gods died”. (Aurora, aphorism 424)  
 
Second stage. But life, in its own expansive and indomitable movement, 
immediately protests because of its unbearable prison within the limits of mere 
truth, a “truth” that intends to measure life, and so life escapes from that truth 
towards what, in relation to truth, would be mistake, delusion and the immorality of 
life. This textual moment is worth-quoting at length: “During long ages, intelligence 
has generated nothing but mistakes. Some of them have resulted useful and 
preserved the species…Such mistaken articles of faith, always transmitted by 
heresy, finally came to build a basic heritage to human species… Much later, 
appeared those who denied and put at doubt similar propositions and, much too 
late, truth also emerged, the less effective form of knowledge. It seems we cannot 
live with it, because our organism is disposed to the opposite of truth; all its 
superior functions…work with those ancestrally incorporated fundamental 
mistakes…Therefore, the strength of knowledge does not reside in the grade of 
truth it has, but in its antiquity, in its grade of incorporation, in its character of vital 
condition” (The Gay Science, aphorism 110).  
 
And more: “To us, the falsity of a judgment is not an objection against it… and 
we are inclined, by principle, to affirm the fakest judgments of all… are the most 
indispensable for us… that renouncing fake judgments would be as renouncing 
life” (Beyond good and evil, aphorism 4). “How much truth can it bear, how much 
truth does a spirit long for…? This was for me the key-question in the consideration 
of values”. (Will to power, aphorism 1041). “… all life is based on appearances, art, 
deception, optics, in the need for perspectivism and the deceptive…before 
moral…life must lack meaning in a constant and inevitable way, since life is 
something essentially not moral; life, finally oppressed under the weight of 
contempt and eternal No, shall feel unworthy of being object of appetite, as the 
proper non-valuable in itself.” (The birth of tragedy, Attempt of Self Criticism). 
 
Thus, the second stage of the process is accomplished: after an attempt of 
identification of truth with life, life overcomes the limits pre-imposed by truth and, 
taking advantage of the force, fertility and beauty of mistake, illusion and 
immorality, it manages to run away from these limits. Therefore, it is supposed the 
revenge of truth (of philosophy, of moral) will not take long, and will be terrible. This 
leads us to the last stage. 
 
Third stage. Life has shown, in a rather disrespectful way, its preference for 
mistake and falsity. The second stage has questioned the presumed conciliation in 
whose light traditional philosophical discourse was formulated. If conciliation was 
not possible, what could be the option for the philosopher who sees himself as the 
“guardian of rationality”, as a defender of objectivity and virtue? The answer can 
only be: nihilism! That is, the radical denial of any moral and true value of life, the 
rejection of life for being fake and immoral. Moral conduct itself is defined as 
struggle against the natural, as an ought-to-be that never occurs in the world but to 
which humans must aim at with all their forces. The philosophical truth tried, in the 
first stage of the process, to come to a friendly agreement with life, but life – in the 
second stage – disrespectfully broke the limits of that agreement. Now, in terrible 
retaliation, the philosophical truth formally constitutes itself as radical denial and 
annihilation of the world.  
 
At this point, the thinker is compelled to become a doctor, a physiologist: 
similarly as Wittgenstein considers a waste of time trying to give a positive solution 
to metaphysical issues, being preferable to show they were only diseases of 
language, these same issues are considered by Nietzsche as symptoms. “The 
unconscious disguise of physiological necessities, under the mask of the objective, 
the ideal, the pure spiritual, go so far that it frightens, and more than once have I 
asked myself, in general terms, if philosophy has not been, up to now, just an 
interpretation of the body, and perhaps a mistake of the body… All those 
audacious extravagances of metaphysicians, specially their answers to the 
questions of the value of existence, can be seen as symptoms of determined types 
of bodies… of their plenitude, their power, their sovereignty in history and also their 
retards, their fatigues, their weakening, their premonition of the end and their will to 
deceasing” (The Gay Science, Foreword, 2). 
 
“We keep ourselves well from saying that (the world) has less value: 
nowadays we would consider ridiculous man had the pretension of finding values 
that exceeded the value of the effective world… This deviation had its most recent 
expression in modern pessimism and a more ancient and solid expression in the 
doctrine of Buda, and also in Christianity…” (The Gaya Science, aphorism 346). 
But the very nothing-of-the-world is also “wanted”, and with the same intensity and 
passion as any other “object”, because Will never can remain empty. Nothingness 
does not succeed in annihilating the Will, that manages to transform nothingness 
into a new and fascinating object of willing. The nihilistic finds in nothingness all he 
did not have found in the world: plenitude, stimulus to will and, inclusive, 
immortality. The affirmation of his knowledge supposes the annihilation of the 
world, with which he finally reconciles through a negative mediation. 
 
Actually, in this third stage, we watch a new attempt of recovering of life by 
the part of truth, but now in the level of a life “decreased” by nihilism: all that cannot 
be sustained for more time through a vigorous form of life is interpreted as fake 
and sin. The almost immediate effect of that is the escape of value out of the world, 
and life, at the same time, gets invaded by evil. This must be, no doubt, the great 
victory of morality: “The Christian, for example, who hates sin, calls everything a 
sin. Precisely for believing in an opposition between good and evil, for him the 
world gets invaded by hateful things that he must constantly struggle against. The 
“good man” sees himself as surrounded by evil, constantly pursued by evil; he 
sharpens his vision and ends up discovering signals of evil in everything he does. 
So he obviously considers nature as evil, man as corrupted, goodness as a grace 
and, consequently, as humanly impossible… Notwithstanding… one cannot refute 
a disease…” (Will to power, aphorism 351). 
 
The criticism against nihilism in the third stage is not against this or that 
moral, but against the moral point of view in general, since the fundamental ethical 
articulation is connected to the insuperable difference between to be and ought-to-
be, and to the possibility of “going against oneself”. Therefore, it is not the case of 
criticizing particular “nihilistic morals”, but showing that moral, as such, is viscerally 
nihilistic, to the extent the moral discourse cannot develop but through the 
depreciation of the world and through the creation of an Ultra-world, to the extent 
moral discourse cannot live without the depreciation of the world. 
 
 
3. Nietzsche is an affirmative philosopher, but not in the sense criticized by 
the present book; his affirmativeness is not argumentative and, precisely because 
of it, he is the only affirmative who could escape from the radical questionings 
presented here. Nietzsche accepts that, in the light of current philosophical 
categories, the expansion of vitality must necessarily fall under a strong moral 
questioning. But, on the other hand, the nihilistic thesis must be profoundly 
disturbed in the moment when, instead of trying to demonstrate its “falsity”, it is 
condemned to simply get filled with its own vitally decreased “truth”. Nietzsche 
shows, not argumentatively, the same I have meta-argumentatively tried to show 
here: there are no affirmative arguments “in favor of life”. Unless someone was 
able to consider “argumentative” texts like this: 
 
“Today I allow everyone to express their desire and their dearest thought and 
today I am going to say myself what I most long for, and this is the first thought that 
came to me this year, the thought which, from now on, will be for me the reason, 
the guarantee and the sweetness of life. I want to better learn everyday how to 
consider beauty what things have of necessary; thus, I will be one of those who 
make things more beautiful: Amor Fati, may that be, from now on, my love. I do not 
want to challenge what is ugly. I do not want to accuse, not even the accusers. Let 
my only denial be to look away. And above all, I do not want, under any 
circumstance, be anything other than someone who say yes”. (The Gaya Science, 
aphorism 276). 
 
Or maybe, can the following text be considered “argumentative? 
 
“I experience a melancholic pleasure in living in the middle of the confusion of 
these narrow streets, of necessities and voices. How much joy, how much 
impatience, how many wishes, how much desire to live and how much inebriation 
of life reach the light in each passing moment! And notwithstanding, these people, 
noisy, living and satisfied of living, will quickly fall into silence! Behind each one of 
them goes their shadow, their obscure fellow traveler…I note with joy that humans 
completely resist conceiving the idea of death and I would like to contribute to 
make one hundred times worthier being meditated the idea of life” (Idem, aphorism 
278). 
 
Nietzsche takes life to the field where it has no more defenses or 
justifications, no favorable sophisms, no coherence, absolutely nothing to its favor, 
so from the same core of this fragility – in which life was confined by truth – arises 
the most amazing attack against nihilism and against the rational forces against 
life, the merciless judgment against the judge himself. The time will come to reveal 
the high vital prices of truth and virtue. “The longing for truth could conceal the 
longing for death. So the question „What is science for?‟ is reduced to the moral 
issue of „What is moral for?‟, if life, nature and history are immoral?” (The Gay 
science, aphorism 344). 
 
The option for life is an option for pure joy, punctual and eternal in its 
punctuality, by the precise temporality of living. Thus, happiness remains 
definitively relegated, ready to be ardently rebuilt by moral theories (as Utilitarian 
“happiness of the greatest number” or Kantian “Selbstzufriedenheit”). It is joy and 
not happiness what matters, what puts-into-being (inter-esse). The intra-worldly joy 
that consumes itself is the appropriate attitude for a life that has said yes to the 
sense of Earth. However, we ought to say the Nietzschean enthusiasm before the 
exuberance of life - documented in the poetical texts above quoted – and the 
unlimited saying Yes which derives from it, do not form part of the (non-comforting) 
scientific description of human phenomena Nietzsche intends to offer. The denial 
of the world or the exultant dance of life are attitudes that are, each of them, 
connected to a vital cost we may or not be able to pay with the coin of our health 
and forces.  
 
Indeed, in Nietzsche‟s texts, it seems to live an unresolved tension between 
accepting “nihilism” as an exultant form of life and Will to Power and its accusation 
as decadent, dying, sick, dangerous, contagious, corruptive and weak. It seems, 
ab initio, defensible – in the same sense opened by Nietzsche – the exuberance of 
a negative life, the passion for a dangerous survival dominated by the interest for 
morality, the sublime exaltation of abstention and the nobility of a voluntary and 
consummating death. Nietzsche could not, in fact, oppose to it, I do not say with 
arguments, but not even with passions or enthusiasms, since enthusiasms do not 
oppose to each other as arguments do, they do not establish relations of 
“contradiction” among them: to some exalted enthusiasms in favor of life there can 
always be opposed not less exalted ones in favor of reason and morality. Once 
Nietzsche has shown us, following Schopenhauer‟s footprints, life and truth can 
mutually deny, his strictly scientific labor has come to an end: every “enthusiasm”, 
in any direction, is superfluous. What was expected from Nietzsche was his 
competent services as genealogic psychologist, as “symptomatologist”: preaching 
in favor or against life is religious, as any other preaching. It is neither scientific nor 
philosophical.                   
 
“I have learned the art of considering myself happy, objective, curious and, 
before anything, healthy and perverse, what seems to me the „good taste‟ of the 
sick man. (…) The man who suffers has no even right to pessimism! ...Optimism as 
a mean of cure, in order to have, afterwards, the right to become pessimist from 
time to time” (Human, all too human II, Forword). It is, therefore, perfectly 
understandable – to say it in a Nietzschean style – that we, negative philosophers, 
have earned precisely this right. The present book has been written in the full 
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